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In 1926, the United States' first Egyptologist James Henry Breasted and the
philanthropist John D. Rockefeller Jr., proposed to build a New Egyptian Museum and Research
Institute in Cairo. The Egyptian government ultimately rejected the proposal and the museum
was never built as suggested. The project's failure was attributed to "suspicious" or "irrational"
nationalism and "Egyptian vanity." The archives, however, demonstrate otherwise.
This thesis analyzes the Breasted-Rockefeller museum's conception, trajectory and
failure, using the team's lengthy correspondence. The archives show that the project was an early
example of U.S. cultural imperialism, disguised as a gift of "Science," from the "Great
Democracy of the West," to an Egypt desirous of independence from British and French empires.
Deploying the twin themes of post World War I "opportunity" (political) and "obligation"
(civilizational, scientific, philanthropic) to demonstrate the imperial possibilities of the particular
political and cultural moment in 1926, Breasted mobilized Rockefeller first and the U.S. State
Department later, to pry open the political field in Egypt for U.S. entry through archaeology and
appropriation of antiquity. The Breasted-Rockefeller team's strategy was to create an Anglo-
American alliance in the Near East, by beginning with the creation of a private-philanthropic
corporation for the New Egyptian Museum, controlled by Western archaeologists, with token
Egyptian representation. This ambitious and innovative approach to imperialism was spatially
and architecturally revealed in the proposed museum's design and in its location in Cairo.
That this project failed when it would succeed in later iterations elsewhere, is to be
ascribed both to the lack of U.S. power against competing British and French imperialisms at this
early stage, as well as to Egyptian nationalism, which identified the Breasted-Rockefeller
proposal for the imperial project that it was, and which had begun to recognize Egyptian
antiquity as a metaphor for nationalism.
Thesis Supervisor: Nasser Rabbat
Title: Aga Khan Professor of the History of Architecture
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INTRODUCTION
View of Suggested New Egyptian Museum Buildings Seen From Across The Nile.
Source: The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England: Oxford University
Press, 1925).
During the riots that preceded the 1952 Nasserist revolution in Egypt, the son of the
United States' Egyptologist James Henry Breasted wrote to the industrialist and philanthropist,
John D. Rockefeller Jr.:
When the holocaust befell Cairo recently, I resisted the impulse to write
you, to express my profound sense of gratitude that there was no
Rockefeller museum there to be pillaged and destroyed.1
Charles Breasted was referring to an unrealized proposal for the New Egyptian Museum
and Research Institute at Cairo. His father - James Breasted - masterminded the proposal and led
the project between 1924 and 1926, and Rockefeller agreed to fund its construction, future
upkeep, and endowment for the generous sum of $10 million. Rockefeller's personal architect,
William Welles Bosworth, proposed a museum complex with two grand and elegant neo-
classical / neo-Pharaonic buildings designed in the Beaux-Arts tradition. The project's design, its
terms and conditions, and introductory letters from Rockefeller and Breasted were compiled in a
proposal book, 2 which the Breasted-Rockefeller 3 team presented to the Egyptian government in
1926. The new museum would replace the existing Cairo Museum, which Breasted described as
Quoted in James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past : Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle
East, 1919-1941, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 116.
2 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England: Oxford University Press, 1925).
3 Jeffrey Abt uses the term "Breasted-Rockefeller" to refer to the Egyptologist and the patron, in his articles on the
museum. See, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt,
Palestine, and America," Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194. In my usage,
the term refers to the entire team, which is comprised of: John D. Rockefeller Jr., James Henry Breasted, Raymond
Fosdick, William Welles Bosworth, V. E. Macy, Martin Ryerson, Chauncey Belknap, Merzbach Bey (the team's
Egyptian lawyer), and Charles Breasted. The team's principal players, however, are Rockefeller, Breasted, and
Fosdick.
a generation behind in its architecture, arrangement, and scientific facilities.4 Key monuments
and items from this museum (primarily those belonging to the Pharaonic era) would be housed in
the new museum.
To the surprise of the team, the Egyptians subjected the proposal to a series of
negotiations, refusing to approve it without some fundamental changes to its terms and
conditions, which resulted in the team's withdrawal of the offer. When, months later, the
museum's soon-to-be defunct Board of Trustees mailed copies of the original proposal book to
"opinion leaders" 5 throughout the world, they included a card, which read:
The Trustees take pleasure ... in sending to you these suggestions of the
spirit in which this project was conceived and the purposes which it was
hoped would be carried out if the Egyptian Government had found it
possible to cooperate. 6
The card oversimplified the reality, and was emblematic of the general U.S. view that the
project's failure was due to Egyptian intransigence: the Egyptian government had rejected its
4 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo, 12.
5 Jeffrey Abt uses the term "opinion leaders" in his articles on the museum. See, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's
Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine, and America," Journal of the American
Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194. See also, Publisher to Raymond Fosdick (hereafter designated
Fosdick), December 2, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence, Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap, box
Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, Oriental Institute Archives at the University of
Chicago (hereafter designated OIA). Of the 5,000 opinion leaders, this particular letter features a dozen names,
including the following: Professor Henry F. Lutz (University of California, Berkeley, California), Mr. Arthur C.
Mace (Associate Curator, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City) and other museum directors and professors
within the U.S. In later correspondences, Breasted discussed mailing (or having mailed) the books to political
leaders in the Near East, and to museum directors and archaeologists in the West.
6 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England: Oxford University Press, 1925), folder
0258A, box 025, series E, Record Group 02, Rockefeller Family Archives, RAC. Emphasis in the quote is mine.
'own' terms and conditions 7 and, in the process, derailed a generous gift to 'science.' This
official (U.S.) version of the project's failure masked a complex, international network of
political maneuverings, Western imperial ambitions, Orientalist assumptions, cultural attitudes,
and emerging nationalism that sank the project.
My thesis aims to historically analyze the conception and failure of the New Egyptian
Museum and Research Institute at Cairo. The primary question - indeed the question - is of
course, "Why was the museum proposed in the first place?" Answering this question will
provide clues to the answer for the logical follow-up question, "Why did the project fail?" As
this work will show, the proposal and its failure were both lodged in the political and cultural
moment between the First and Second World Wars. By foregrounding this moment, it becomes
clear that although the museum's conception was ostensibly motivated by science and cultural
philanthropy, and although it was presented as a gift from "the Great Democracy of the West," 8
the project was fueled in part by the Breasted-Rockefeller team's desire to pry open the political
field in Egypt, which was dominated by the British and French empires and by Egyptian
nationalists, and to allow the United States to partake of it. The museum, with its stately and
majestic architecture, was to be the bait.
That the project is an example of U.S. imperialism is not a hypothesis on my part. It has
emerged as such from the Breasted-Rockefeller archives. However, the private funding of the
project complicates the claim, and I aim to understand the nature of U.S. imperialism in this
instance, and its spatial and architectural manifestation. Chapter 1 lays out the theories of
7 Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son
Charles Breasted (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2009), 396-97.
8 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo, 14.
imperialism, which I use to understand the conception and trajectory of the project. In addition to
providing a basic theoretical background for the thesis, Chapter 1 also provides a foundational
background for the Breasted-Rockefeller project as derived from the archives, a structure for the
rest of the thesis, and a status of the literature on the project.
My investigation of the project's conception, trajectory, and fate, primarily spans the
period between 1924 (when the project was conceived) and 1926 (when Breasted presented it to
the Egyptian King). I argue that the project was an early example of U.S. imperialism in the Near
East at a time of declining Old World Empires and rising nationalism. It is important to establish
the context of these different imperial and national interests; therefore, I begin by looking back
briefly at Napoleon's 1798 Egyptian Expedition, which marked the beginning of European
engagement with Egypt. I end my thesis by presenting three important post-failure projects that
shed light on the Breasted-Rockefeller project: the team's next collaboration in the Near East in
Jerusalem, the design for the mausoleum of Egypt's nationalist leader, and the fate of the original
desired site for the Breasted-Rockefeller project.

Chapter 1
FOUNDATIONS
Tympanum (designed by James Henry Breasted) above the entrance of the Oriental Institute
building on the University of Chicago campus. It shows an Egyptian scribe representing the East,
presenting a wall fragment from a temple to the personification of the West on the right. It
demonstrates the Eastern origins of Western writing, according to the Institute's website.
Source: The Oriental Institute website.
The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute's conception and failure is well
documented in the Oriental Institute Archives and the Rockefeller Archive Center. Using these
archives, I have singled out two decisive letters, both authored by James Breasted, which provide
a crucial framework for our understanding of the genesis and collapse of the project. The first
letter is dated 1919, and it successfully launched the Oriental Institute at the University of
Chicago (the first major Breasted-Rockefeller collaboration). The second letter dated 1924
launched the proposal for the museum. Together, these letters reveal Breasted's ambitions for the
Near East and for the museum. The 1919 letter introduces Breasted's notion of the United States'
political "opportunity"' and civilizational "obligation" with regards to the Near East. These
themes are picked up again in the 1924 letter, but of particular importance here is an
understanding of the museum's architecture and site as an embodiment of Breasted's vision and
as bait for the Egyptians. Both letters were addressed to prominent individuals within
Rockefeller's vast philanthropic network. Though the earlier (1919) letter pre-dates the proposal
for the museum, in many ways it is the foundational letter for it, and for all subsequent Breasted-
Rockefeller projects, and I will begin with it.
Launching the Institute: The 1919 Letter(s)
On January 13, 1919, a few weeks after the departure of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
for the Paris Peace Conference, which marked the end of World War I, Breasted wrote to Dr.
' Breasted's concept of "opportunity" and "obligation" is explained and cited later in this chapter.
Wallace Buttrick, President of the Rockefeller-endowed General Education Board (GEB), 2 of an
unparalleled turn of events in the Near East:
As I realize that in these last few weeks since we last met in New York, the
opportunity of the ages has come to us, - such an opportunity as no other
generation has ever had or ever will have, - it thrills me beyond all expression.
For the first time in history the birth-lands of religion and civilization lie open to
unrestricted research and discovery. Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Assyria, and
Babylonia have suddenly become ours. 3
The three-page letter was accompanied by a document titled, "Plan for the Organization of an
Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," in which Breasted wrote:
The study of these lands is the birthright and the sacred legacy of all
civilized peoples. Their delivery from the Turk brings to us an opportunity
such as the world has never seen before and will never see again. Our
Allies in Europe are financially too exhausted to take advantage of the
great opportunity. This makes both the opportunity and the obligation all
the greater for us in America. " [Emphasis mine]
Buttrick responded with interest in Breasted's vision, but he believed that the creation of
such an institution was not within the GEB's purview.5 Undeterred, the following month
2 The General Education Board was a philanthropic foundation created by Rockefeller Jr.'s father, John D.
Rockefeller, in 1902.
3 James Henry Breasted (hereafter designated Breasted) to Wallace Buttrick (hereafter designated Buttrick), January
13, 1919, folder 6851, box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, General Education Board Archives (hereafter designated
GEB), Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter designated RAC).
4 "Plan for the Organization of an Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," January 13, 1919, folder 6851,
box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC.
5 Buttrick to Breasted, January 28, 1919, folder 6851, box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC.
Buttrick suggested that the University of Chicago or some other university should directly undertake such a mission.
Breasted wrote directly to Rockefeller and included the "Plan" here as well.6 The letter to
Rockefeller was shorter, but contained similar themes. It was, however, tailored for its recipient,
whom Breasted suggested exhibited the same high moral and social values as were first found in
the ancient civilizations. Together, I will treat these three documents - the letter to Buttrick, the
letter to Rockefeller and the "Plan" - as the decisive 1919 letter(s) for the Oriental Institute.
Breasted's understanding of the nature of the United States' "opportunity" and
"obligation" with respect to the Near East, and his subsequent appeal for the creation of the
Oriental Institute is key to understanding the future museum project. He based his argument for
the New Egyptian Museum on these same grounds. (An Egyptologist, by definition, is a scholar
of ancient Egypt. Such a scholar's active participation in modem-day political developments in
Egypt may seem incongruent, unless we understand his goals).
Although the First World War was fought in modem times against modem rivals,
Breasted celebrated the "delivery" of ancient lands from the Ottomans. He used his scholarship
to demonstrate that these lands and their ancient civilizations were the origins of the 'American
civilization.' To make the claim, he denied this heritage to the lands' modem-day inhabitants,
whom he described as ignorant and uninterested. Breasted's dismissal of the modem-day
inhabitants of the Near East, through scholarly means, demonstrates a discernable Orientalism. 7
With combined Western victory over the "Turk", the lands were finally under control of the
civilized people of the West, who alone could protect and study their ancient civilizations. The
6 Breasted to John D. Rockefeller Jr. (hereafter designated Rockefeller), February 16, 1919, folder 812, box 112,
series G, Record Group 2, The Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller (hereafter designated OMR), RAC.
7 See, Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
financial incapacitation of the Europeans and the defeat of the Ottomans meant that the U.S.
must - and finally could - step into the field of Near Eastern studies and, presumably, the Near
East.
The 1919 letters were Breasted's second appeal to Rockefeller's philanthropic network
for the creation of the Oriental Institute. His failure to engage the GEB shows that the Board did
not share his originary view of the Near East, nor recognize the need for, or benefit of, U.S.
involvement in this field, and hints at the obstacles to Breasted's ambitions.
The obstacles, as Breasted perceived them, were many. Internationally, Breasted was
competing with established European, and rising native, Egyptologists. To contend with them,
Breasted required funding from U.S. patrons. On the home front, however, due to the field's
associations with purely philological pursuits and biblical archaeology, Near Eastern studies
were perceived as an "oddity at the county fair"8 on the outer fringes of science, at a time of
scientific enthusiasm in the United States. And within the humanities, Near Eastern studies were
pushed aside by a strong classical bias. From 1895 (the beginning of Breasted's career as an
Egyptologist) to 1914 (the beginning of the First World War) Breasted struggled to raise funds,
turning primarily to the Rockefeller network because of its reputation for supporting unexplored
areas of study,9 and its association with the University of Chicago,10 (where Breasted held a
8 Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son
Charles Breasted (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2009), 96.
9 For example, in 1903, Breasted wrote to Frederick T. Gates (Rockefeller Sr.'s advisor) to secure a grant on behalf
of the University of Chicago for archaeological field expeditions in the Near East. This grant - the Oriental
Exploration Fund - resulted in the 1906-1907 Nubian and Egyptian Expedition. In 1907, Breasted outlined a scheme
for more thorough documentation of ancient Egyptian monuments. He proposed a floating, archaeological research
laboratory on the Nile, but Gates rejected the proposal arguing that a project of this scope should be undertaken by
the Egyptian government itself, and not by an American enterprise. Egyptian archaeology was not yet considered an
established science, worthy of such private philanthropic funding. Furthermore, the U.S. public and philanthropists
professorship and where he was the Assistant Director of the Haskell Oriental Museum, which
was associated with the Department of Semitic Languages). He met with limited success.
Eventually, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 put an end to all further possibilities of field
work in Egypt.
He used his years of "exile"" from the Near East, to systematically attack the
unfavorable perception of Near Eastern studies through a succession of academic and popular
books on the field.'2 Breasted's books conveyed his scholarly view that the Near East -
particularly ancient Egypt - was the origins of Western civilization and modem religion,
preceding the Greco-Roman civilizations. He presented Near Eastern civilizations as the
"keystone of the arch, with prehistoric man on one side and civilized Europe on the other,"13 and
with Americans as the ultimate heirs of this civilization.' 4 As such, men like Rockefeller were
duty-bound to ensure the protection, documentation and study of the ancient Near East. The
books were hugely popular so that when the war ended, Breasted felt confident enough to turn
did not view the study of ancient Egyptian civilizations as fundamental or foundational to an understanding of
Western civilization. See also, , Pioneer to the Past; the Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist (New
York,: C. Scribner's Sons, 1943).
10 John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s father, Rockefeller Sr., founded the University of Chicago.
" Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait, [1st ed. (New York,: Harper, 1956), 359.
1 He wrote the following books (amongst others) during this time:
James Henry Breasted, Ancient Times, a History of the Early World (Boston, New York [etc.]: Ginn and company,
1916).
James Henry Breasted, Egypt through the Stereoscope: A Journey through the Land of the Pharaohs (New York,
London: Underwood & Underwood, 1900).
13 ___ , The Oriental Institute (Chicago, Ill.,: The University of Chicago Press, 1933), 11.
14 See, "Plan for the Organization of an Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," January 13, 1919, folder
6851, box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC, 2.
once again to the Rockefeller philanthropic network with his vision for U.S. involvement in the
Near East.
Breasted demonstrated the urgency of such an involvement. He wrote, "sources for the
recovery of the whole [human] story lie thousands of miles away, scattered through the Near
East and the museums of Europe."' 5 With the opening up of the modem Near East to
"enlightened exploitation"16 such as railroads, agriculture etc., the ancient cities faced
destruction. He compared U.S. scientific and scholarly work against what he termed "alleged
scientific excavators" 17 (referring to European archaeologists) and "illicit native diggings." 8 In
comparison to these native and European methods, U.S. methods would be precise, rational, and
scientific. In order to protect and document the ancient ruins, he wrote, U.S. archaeologists and
Orientalists needed time and funds. The imperially motivated British and French dominated the
field, presenting themselves as responsible custodians of the ancient ruins19 and modem heirs to
the ancient civilizations and, by extension, of the lands themselves. Just prior to the First World
War, the Germans commanded the field, particularly in Mesopotamia, in the Ottoman Empire.
15 Breasted to Buttrick, January 13, 1919, folder 6851, box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC.
16 "Plan for the Organization of an Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," January 13, 1919, folder 6851,
box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC.
17 Ibid. In this instance, Breasted is referring to Italian archaeologists and to items that mysteriously found their way
to the Museum in Turin. Usually though, he attributes unscientific methods to French Egyptologists, with whom he
had a combative relationship. (He had a higher opinion of German Egyptologists, as he himself had studied
Egyptology in Germany).
18 Ibid.
19 See, Donald M. Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon
to World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
2 Ann C. Gunter and Stefan R. Hauser, "Introduction," in Ernst Herzfeld and the Development of Near Eastern
Studies, 1900-1950, Eds., Ann C. Gunter and Stefan R. Hauser (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 7, 13.
By virtue of their ambitions, European archaeologists were very well funded.2 ' For the American
archaeologist, the problems of time, distance and money loomed large. National organizations or
government bodies that might fund this work did not exist. And as in Europe, there was no
unified organization or institution where these records could be filed, archived, and properly
studied.
Since Breasted knew that both the GEB and Rockefeller were interested in funding
research and education in medical and scientific fields, he asserted that archaeology was a
science, requiring scientific methods for the excavating, archiving, and studying of the remains
of ancient civilizations. Comparing archaeology to an established science such as astronomy,
Breasted wrote:
The astronomer is sometimes required to visit distant regions in order to
make his observations. This is constantly true of the Orientalist and
ancient historian. To secure his materials, he must be granted the time and
the funds to become a kind of permanent archaeological ambassador-at-
large to the Near Orient.2 2
To construct such an Orientalist, Breasted looked to the archaeologist, the Americanist,
and the astronomer. He imagined a free-lance historian not tethered by university protocol, a man
equipped with the tools of technology: the camera and the airplane. And a man assisted by a
21 "Plan for the Organization of an Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," January 13, 1919, folder 6851,
box 659, sub-series 4, series 1, GEB, RAC. Giving an example of official European support for Near Eastern
archaeology, Breasted wrote that the National Academy in France granted subventions to French savants to visit the
Orient. (However, the records produced by these men were not organized in a single location: they were dispersed
throughout France).
22 "Plan for the Organization of an Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago," January 13, 1919, Folder 6851,
Box 659, Series 1, GEB, RAC.
team of specialists, fully equipped and organized around a scientific laboratory and archive. The
Oriental Institute, in fact.
The argument worked in Breasted's direct appeal to Rockefeller.23 The latter funded the
creation of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago in 1919. Between the two World
Wars the Institute dominated archaeological work in the Near East, surpassing European
activities and other U.S. institutions such as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, the University of
Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Breasted organized the Institute as a research facility for Near Eastern studies, incorporating an
existing home-based philology department and a new archaeological field operations arm.2 4 The
Institute included the existing Haskell Oriental Museum, which housed a collection of Near
Eastern artifacts.25
Breasted's idea of "opportunity" was two-fold. On the one hand, he wrote to Buttrick that
it would be a great boost to the United States, if a U.S. institution could be the first to
methodically study and archive the ancient records. He seemed to suggest a boost for U.S.
archaeology. On the other hand, he presented a more political view of "opportunity," and
suggested that the creation of the Oriental Institute could politically benefit the United States.
The transformed political landscape at the end of the First World War crucially provided
the Institute and its expeditions with access to the Near East for fieldwork. Though the United
23 Prior to this, however, the GEB had rejected Breasted's request, resulting in the latter's direct appeal to
Rockefeller Jr.
24 See, James Henry Breasted, The Oriental Institute. The University of Chicago Survey (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1933).
25 Prior to the creation of the Oriental Institute, the Haskell Oriental Museum did not have enough funding for
excavation work in the Near East. Most items in its collection were acquired from British excavation teams.
States was never really isolationist, it took the Spanish-American war of 1898 for the U.S. to see
potential for imperial and political engagement with the larger world. Even so, until its
involvement in the First World War, the U.S. focused primarily on its interests in North
America, the Caribbean, and in the Pacific Ocean, and had little to no political involvement
26across the Atlantic in the Near East, Western Asia and Europe. But it was the United States'
participation in the First World War, and particularly Wilson's formulation of the Fourteen
Points,27 which signaled the United States' emergence from political periphery and its
engagement across the Atlantic, with Europe and the Near East.
The War resulted in the collapse and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (finalized in
1920 under the Treaty of Sevres), with large parts of it falling under British and French control.
The British and French struggled to hold onto these territories and to their empires in the wake of
Arab nationalism and their own financial troubles. The Paris Peace Conference briefly resulted in
German financial incapacitation. Meanwhile, the United States emerged as part of the "Big
Four," along with Great Britain, France and Italy. Although the U.S. remained wary of full
engagement with the Near East, it had - through support for self-determination in the former
Ottoman territories - built up a large reserve of goodwill with the Muslims, which its private
interest groups could use to their advantage. In the eyes of the Muslims, the United States
26 See, George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower : U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008). However, there were some private U.S. interest groups operating in the Near East at the
time, such as missionaries, early archaeological expeditions, small businesses, etc. See also, John A. DeNovo,
American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis,: University of Minnesota Press,
1963), 26.
27 The Fourteen Points was a speech delivered by Woodrow Wilson to Congress in January 1918. In this speech he
outlined his vision for post war peace in Europe and talked about the idea of other nationalities under Turkish rule
being granted "an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous
development." See, Stephen Lucas and Martin J. Medhurst, Words of a Century : The Top 100 American Speeches,
1900-1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 124-28.
emerged as a 'benevolent' power. In the good graces of all involved in Europe and the Near East,
it seemed to Breasted an opportune moment for U.S. archaeologists to intensify their activities in
the ancient lands that had opened up. Breasted and his Oriental Institute's dominance was
established through this political opportunity.
The process suggests a fascinating and paradoxical beginning for imperialism: U.S.
cultural imperialism (through archaeological dominance) would seem to be founded on goodwill
generated by U.S. support for self-determination and democratic ideals in the Near East, even
though this support was not offered with an imperial ambition in mind. This hints at a difference
in the aims of the individuals and institutions within the U.S., such as between private interest
groups and the government.
Breasted further strengthened the Oriental Institute's position and future funding, by
pointing out the side benefits of a research organization with a team on the ground. Such a team
could alert U.S. museums and buyers about new items on the market, or, provide valuable
information to the government and businesses about the state of affairs in the Near East. This,
then, was the political (and perhaps economic) opportunity.
As an extension of the Institute's operations, Breasted created satellite expedition houses
throughout the Near East in which scholars and scientists could study their materials. The New
Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo - had it succeeded - would have been the
largest, and certainly the grandest, example of such a cultural "outpost."28 The themes of
opportunity and obligation, which I have just unraveled from Breasted's 1919 letters, are also
28 Breasted to Abraham Flexner, June 2 5th, 1926, folder 6851, box 659, series 1, GEB, RAC: "... entire Luxor plant
[expedition house] is outpost of University of Chicago specifically designed to build up American science."
evident in the 1924 letter: cultural philanthropy, archaeology as a science, U.S. supremacy in
science, appropriation of origins, and the political opportunity of the moment. In addition to
these themes, the 1924 letter introduces architecture and site as a crucial component of U.S. entry
into Near Eastern archaeology and the Near East.
Launching the Museum: The 1924 Letter
On October 7 th, 1924, Breasted telegrammed the following message to Rockefeller's
trusted legal advisor, Raymond Fosdick:
Your letter fundamentally important. You have discerned unparalleled
opportunity. Am writing.29
Breasted followed this telegram with a lengthy, passionate response, in which he
addressed Fosdick's enquiry regarding the condition of the existing Cairo Museum in Egypt.30
George E. Vincent, the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, had visited Breasted earlier that
year in Cairo. Breasted showed Vincent around the Cairo Museum, pointing out its state of
disrepair.3 1 On his return from Cairo, Vincent briefed Fosdick, who then wrote to Breasted. The
latter was particularly encouraged that Fosdick - who said he was writing on behalf of "other
29 Breasted to Fosdick (Cablegram), October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis,
Fosdick and Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers (Proposed Gift of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 1925-
1926), Oriental Institute Archives at the University of Chicago (hereafter designated OIA).
30 Breasted to Fosdick (Letter), October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick
and Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers, OIA.
31 See, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt,
Palestine, and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194.
sources [of money],"32 and not the Rockefeller Foundation itself - had displayed "unprompted" 33
interest in this very pressing matter.
While this is seemingly true, we know from Breasted's archives that he was a convincing
and articulate champion on behalf of U.S. involvement in Near Eastern studies and archaeology.
Very likely, he convinced Vincent of the need for repairs to the Cairo Museum. In his letter to
Fosdick, he addressed the Cairo Museum's state of disrepair, and then - completely unprompted
himself - suggested that an altogether new museum should be built.
Breasted began his letter by establishing the Cairo Museum's significance as the greatest
Museum in the world. His declaration was based on more than just the sheer quantity of artifacts
in the museum's collection. It grew out of his scholarship and belief in ancient Egyptian
civilization as the origin of the religious and moral values that he believed the West had
inherited. Such a key civilization's material legacy faced imminent danger, because of "official
Egyptian indifference" to the collections. But it faced yet another danger. The Egyptian
Antiquities Service that ran the museum was headed by a French Director-General, Pierre Lacau,
with whom Breasted had a combative relationship. In his letter to Fosdick, Breasted lamented the
French museum administration's disinterest and financial inability to maintain and repair the
Museum, the poor construction of the French-built museum, and, most egregiously, the
32 Fosdick to Breasted, October 2, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers, OIA.
33 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers, OIA.
museum's lack of scientific facilities for the study of Egyptian antiquity.3 4 Summing up the
problem, Breasted wrote:
(1) The very survival of these collections themselves is in danger in such a
building.
(2) They are so badly housed, and lighting provisions for working
scientists are so totally lacking, that if the collections survive, it is
impossible for Science to utilize them.
In short, such a heritage from the past is sheltered by no other building in
the world, and at present it is neither safe nor accessible to scientists. 35
To remedy this situation, Breasted proposed that the United States provide "...a safe
building, affording adequate facilities for the scientists of the civilized world who gather there
every year."
But Breasted was concerned with more than just practical and technical requirements. He
was motivated by visions of U.S. domination in the field, and he presented the beginnings of an
architectural and urban vision for the new museum that could convey this message. Breasted's
choice of site is particularly important and symbolic, hinting at a double-displacement. He
proposed to locate the new museum close to the existing French-run Cairo Museum (which it
would administratively displace), on the site of the "hideous" Kasr al-Nil barracks where the
British military was then garrisoned. Of this land, Breasted believed the British did not have any
legal right, except that of "long occupancy."
34 He wrote that the collection faced physical danger from "tawdry" French construction, which had resulted in
falling ceilings, flooded basements etc. The building was too cramped for its vast collection and left no space for
such recent discoveries as the items from the tomb of Tutankhamun.
35 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers, OIA.
Using the idea of political "opportunity" from Breasted's earlier 1919 letter, it would
seem that the creation of the New Egyptian Museum and the subsequent 'double displacement'
suggested by Breasted's choice of site, hint at a purpose other than scientific care of Egyptian
antiquity. Simply put, it suggests U.S. entry into Egyptian politics. The museum would facilitate
this process.
Breasted had spent a considerable amount of time working and living in Egypt and had
plenty of opportunity to observe the political situation in the country. Despite this, he seems to
have perceived the physical displacement of a British Army garrison and the institutional
displacement of a French-run museum as easy tasks. Furthermore, in his letter he fails to mention
or account for any possible Egyptian resistance to the project. In 1926, Egypt was officially ruled
by a constitutional monarchy, but the Egyptians did not have full and absolute control over their
country. In fact, the British - who had invaded Egypt in 1882 - still held rights to four spheres of
influence, which included military defense of, and presence in, Egypt. To complicate matters, as
a result of the Anglo-French treaty in 1904, the French had been guaranteed control of the
Egyptian Antiquities Service - although this treaty's validity was now uncertain.36
The concepts of formal and informal empire, of cultural imperialism, of local
collaborators and of nationalism and Orientalism, are crucial to our understanding of both British
and French presence in Egypt, as well as the Breasted-Rockefeller team's proposal, its failure,
and the complicated imperial and nationalist maneuverings during the negotiations. The theories
are outlined here, and tested with respect to the Breasted-Rockefeller project throughout the
thesis.
36 Britain's declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Egypt threw the Anglo-French Treaty - and French control
of the EAS - into uncertainty. I discuss this further in the following chapters.
Theoretical Foundations
I begin with Orientalism, for which I use Edward Said's three-part definition.3 7 Said
describes Orientalism as "the Western approach to the Orient," "the discipline by which the
Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice,"
and "that collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to
talk about what lies east of the dividing line." Certainly, the Western approach to, and bias
towards, modern Egypt can be explained through all three definitions. However, a popular
criticism of Said has been the lack of agency that he allows the Orient. As we shall see in the
case of the Egyptian nation, they did have agency and were able to resist U.S. ambitions in this
instance.
This brings us to the concept of 'nation,' for which I use Benedict Anderson's definition.
Anderson describes the nation as an "imagined political community - and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign," 38 but he is careful to differentiate between imaginative
"invention" and outright "fabrication," favoring the former. This definition explains the
processes by which Egyptian nationalists defined an Egyptian nation; they united Coptic
Christians and Muslims under the rubric of a common ancestry - ancient Egypt - to achieve this.
But nations are also defined as reverse processes of imperialism, as I will show later in this
section.
37 Said, Orientalism, 73.
38 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1983), 5-6.
Empire and imperialism are much harder concepts to define. Here, I introduce some
theories that help shed light on the varieties of imperialisms and empires active in Egypt, in
1926.
In their seminal paper, "The Imperialism of Free Trade,"39 John Gallagher and Ronald
Robinson introduced the concept of formal and informal empire. They argued that the old
(classical) models of imperialism imagined physical occupation and annexation of territories by a
metropolitan center as the only proof of an empire, and of the metropolitan center's imperial
interest with respect to said country. But this model contradicted actual facts, leading Robinson
and Gallagher to conclude that, "Refusals to annex are no proof of reluctance to control."40
Elaborating on this, using the example of the British Empire in the Victorian period, they argue
that instead of sharp distinctions between imperialism and anti-imperialism, there was instead
continuity in imperial policy. This policy was to secure British economic interests. If indirect
means could secure Britain's interests in a country, then it would not physically annex that
country. But where free trade could not flourish without direct intervention, Britain would in fact
directly intervene. Robinson and Gallagher defined imperialism as "a sufficient political function
of this process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely
decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements
of expansion in any particular region and time."'1 Such an explanation allows us to see that
although Egypt was no longer officially a British colony and was ostensibly a constitutional
39
-John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History Review, New
Series, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953): 1-15.
40 Ibid., 3
41 Ibid., 5-6.
monarchy in 1926, it was in fact part of Britain's informal empire. The Breasted-Rockefeller
team was aware of this, and devised a strategy for Anglo-American alliance, as I show in
Chapter 3.
In 1970, Robinson elaborated on this theory in a further article, "Non-European
foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration," 4 2 which was written
to respond to Euro-centric theories of imperialism. Robinson argued that the reasons for
transition from informal to formal empire lay primarily in the periphery, specifically in the
actions of "local collaborators." He used the idea of collaborating elites to give agency to local
elements, and explain how nations may eventually replace empires through a policy of non-
collaboration. Robinson explains key characteristics of collaborating elites that are valuable to
this thesis. Collaborators do not form an identifiable group, rather, they are shifting collections of
political groups or parties. The perception of a certain group as collaborator depends on its
effectiveness as a mediator between the empire and the colony. The collaborating elite have the
difficult role of appeasing the empire while simultaneously reconciling its demands with local
and proto-nationalist agitators. To do the latter, the empire must grant local collaborators some
semblance of power and authority in the imperial equation. Faced with nationalist leaders such as
Sa'd Zaghlul, Western powers in Egypt (including the Breasted-Rockefeller team), considered
the King, the Prime Minister, and various Ministers in the Cabinet, as their collaborating elite.
Although the notion of local collaborators and the idea of the periphery shaping the metropolitan
center's approach to imperialism are useful with respect to U.S. imperialism in Egypt (and to
42 Ronald Robinson, "Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration," in
Studies in the Theory ofImperialism, Eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, (London: Longman, 1972).
some extent British imperialism), the theory weakens with respect to the very beginnings of
modem European engagement with Egypt, as I show with Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition in
Chapter 2.
In addition to Robinson and Gallagher, writings by George Steinmetz are illuminating
with respect to the museum. In his article, "Imperialism or Colonialism?" 43 Steinmetz writes of
imperialism and empire. He defines empire as "... a relationship of political domination between
a core state and one or more peripheries,"A4 and describes four types of empires: classical land-
based empires, modem land-based empires, colonial empires and imperialism (which he terms as
the "control of far-flung areas without territorial annexation.") 45 With respect to U.S. interests in
the Near East, in 1926, this last definition of empire - imperialism - is most suitable; the United
States did not appear to have any ambitions of physical annexation in the Near East, in 1926.
What it did seem to show, is a desire for archaeological "bases"A6 throughout the Near East. And
this we see clearly in Breasted's idea of establishing expedition houses (offshoots or "outposts"
of the Oriental Institute) in all major civilizational centers in the Near East. The museum, of
course, was imagined as one such "outpost."
What Steinmetz refers to as "imperialism," Robinson and Gallagher would term,
"informal empire." His definition of colonialism corresponds to Robinson and Gallagher's term,
43 George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, By Way of Basra," in Lessons
ofEmpire: Imperial Histories and American Power. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin W. Moore. (New
York, London: The New Press): 135-156.
44 Ibid., 153.
4s Ibid., 140.
46 Steinmetz includes a quote by Chalmers Johnson, "The developing American form of empire... is solely an empire
of bases, not of territories, and these bases now encircle the earth." (2004).
"formal" empire. Like Robinson and Gallagher, Steinmetz argues that colonialism and
imperialism are continuous: where colonialism depends on "on the spot" decision making,
imperialism takes a broader view of the situation, sometimes putting the two at odds with each
other, within the same empire. (This may explain the different positions of the British Foreign
Office in London and the British Army in Cairo, to the Breasted-Rockefeller project, as I show
later in the thesis).
Most pertinent to this thesis, however, is Steinmetz's further definition of imperialism as
the "political ordering of space" vs. acquisition of territory. Of the strategies for politically
ordering space, Steinmetz writes of cultural imperialism, in which the empire's contribution to
medicine, education, and science are more effective ways of establishing hegemony and ensuring
compliance, as opposed to "bullying." Finally, Steinmetz writes of the importance of imagined
relations between past and present empires, whereby present empires model themselves in the
image of past empires to establish their legitimacy. To illustrate this concept, Steinmetz
describes how both Germany and the United States drew on the powerful symbolism of ancient
Rome. In my thesis, I show how Breasted's appropriation of the ancient Near East - specifically
ancient Egypt - was used to establish both the U.S. right to be in these ancient lands and to
create what Breasted termed, a "New Past"47 for a new emerging power.
Breasted also understood the use of cultural institutions in the "political ordering of
space." To Fosdick, he wrote of the benefits to be gained from the generous act of creating a
47 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 316.
museum. The excerpt below is one of the few from his correspondences in which he allows the
"Orient" their ancient past:
... New World to the Old, - from the youngest of the great nations to the
oldest, - apart from its peculiar fitness would by its very presence in the
greatest city of Islam, form a moral lesson of tremendous power. It would
go far toward healing the present unhappy breach between the Near East
and the West; it would proclaim to the men of the Orient the sacredness of
their past, which brought forth the great religions of the modem world;
and it would demonstrate to them the unselfish zeal of the men of the West
to preserve forever the priceless values which they find in our great
common heritage from the Ancient Orient. 4
That this diplomatic, cultural project would be funded by a private source, leads to
questions of the relationship between private philanthropy, cultural imperialism, and the
government, and hints at the role of the United States' private philanthropists in the creation of
U.S. hegemony.
Are these drives for empire visible in architecture and site? In his 1924 letter, Breasted
does not specify a particular architectural style, but he does address what the architecture (and
site) of the museum must convey: permanence, solidity, and arrival.
Thesis Structure
Four overarching themes thus appear across the 1919 letter(s) and the 1924 letter, which I
use to structure my thesis: the Breasted-Rockefeller team's imperial vision and its private
character, its "civilizing mission," the political deployment of architecture and site, and the use
48 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project, Breasted Papers, OIA.
of science and ideology to achieve political goals. In Chapter 2, I trace the political and
archaeological circumstances of Egypt in 1926, back to British and French engagement with the
country through the long nineteenth century, beginning with Napoleon's 1798 Egyptian
Expedition. I describe why these rival empires were interested in Egypt, and how their rivalry
played out in the realm of Egyptian archaeology. Understanding this larger imperial field helps
to situate and interpret Breasted's subsequent interest in controlling Egyptian archaeology, which
I also describe in this chapter. Chapter 3 chronicles and analyzes the complete story of the
Breasted-Rockefeller team's failed negotiations with the British, French, and Egyptians over the
New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute in Cairo: from the careful formulation of the
team's overall strategy in New York, to consultations with the State Department in Washington
and the British Foreign Office in London, to political maneuverings in Cairo. The team's
ambitions were embodied in the design and site of the museum. Design and site were also used
as a lure to convince the Egyptians to agree to the otherwise unfavorable terms and conditions of
the gift, and Chapter 4 focuses on an architectural and spatial analysis of the museum complex.
Chapter 5 concludes the main body of the thesis by analyzing the mechanism of cultural
philanthropy in the project, and the relationship between scholar, philanthropist and the U.S.
government. Something failed. What succeeded? The Epilogue will answer this question, and
examine the afterlife of the project.
Status of Literature
The museum's conception and failure has been interpreted and chronicled in two types of
writings: earlier books written by men closely involved in formulating the proposal, 49 and recent
articles and books by scholars writing on cultural imperialism. The first category includes such
books as Raymond Fosdick's biography of John D. Rockefeller Jr., Charles Breasted's biography
of James Henry Breasted, and the memoirs of the Oriental Institute Egyptologist, John A.
Wilson.5 0 These books present the proposal as an altruistic gift to Egypt and science, and its
failure arising primarily from the pettiness of the Egyptian government, with hints of French and
British interference. Wilson, for example, writes:
We shall never know all of the forces of uncertainty, suspicious
nationalism, and international jealousy that led to the withdrawal of this
offer in the spring of 1926.
The second category approaches the museum project as an example of cultural
imperialism, rather than an altruistic project. This category includes (amongst other writings)
two articles by Jeffrey Abt, and two chapters in a book by James F. Goode. Abt's articles are
titled, "The Breasted-Rockefeller Egyptian Museum Project: Philanthropy, Cultural Imperialism
49 The earlier books were published no later than 1972.
50 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past; the Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist. (Originally printed in 1943,
reprinted in 2009).
Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait.
John Albert Wilson, Thousands of Years; an Archaeologist's Search for Ancient Egypt (New York,: Scribner, 1972).
5 Wilson, Thousands of Years; an Archaeologist's Search for Ancient Egypt, 51.
and National Resistance,"52 and "Towards a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller
Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine and America." 3 Goode's book is titled, Negotiatingfor the
Past.54
Abt examines the museum in the light of "...successful nationalist resistance to western
cultural hegemony,"5 5 cultural philanthropy, Breasted's ideological view of the ancient Near East
and his Orientalism, and he ends by writing, "The seed of the project's failure was contained
within its very conception."56 He perceives the museum's design as bait for the Egyptians, but
makes no mention of the importance of site and the negotiations over it, which I consider crucial.
Goode, drawing more widely from the archives, begins the story with Breasted's role as a
mediator between Howard Carter and the Egyptian government in the Tutankhamun controversy,
and describes Breasted's resulting contentious relationship with Pierre Lacau (the French
Director-General of the EAS).57 He writes that Breasted was probably motivated by the new
antiquities law which restricted acquisition of archaeological artifacts by Western museums, and
was concerned by what he perceived as unscientific methods of native Egyptologists. Goode
52 Jeffrey Abt, "The Breasted-Rockefeller Egyptian Museum Project: Philanthropy, Cultural Imperialism, and
National Resistance." Art History (December 1996).
5 Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine,
and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194.
5 James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past : Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-
1941, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).
ss Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine, and
America."
56
57 See, Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941.
gives more agency to the British and the French players and he mentions official US support for
the museum.
My thesis also approaches the museum as a project of cultural imperialism, but it does
not perceive the failure of the project only in terms of a unified nationalist Egyptian resistance
against a homogeneous West. Rather, I argue that the project's conception and failure reveal
rivalries and shifting alliances within the Western bloc, within the Egyptian ruling elite, and
across the Western powers and Egyptian elite. I show how the Breasted-Rockefeller team
deployed Near Eastern archaeology - and the museum - as a means of establishing U.S. interests
abroad. In the process, the team - led by Breasted - used both science and Egyptian antiquity to
define an emerging U.S. power. I describe the 'private' aspect of U.S. imperialism.
Breasted contrasted the United States' 'rationality,' 'logic,' and 'democratic ideals,' in
varying degrees against the British, the French, and the Egyptians. I show how he used ancient
Egypt as a metaphor for an emerging U.S. civilization, thereby directly confronting the
Egyptians who looked to this past to define themselves as a nation. And I show how site and
architecture embody these concepts and ambitions.

Chapter 2
BREASTED IN EGYPT
"The University of Chicago Egyptian Expedition measures the fagade of the temple of Ramses II
at Abu Simbel, February 1906. Breasted [the man in the white hat] sits atop the statue's uraeus,
his wife and son are near the base of the ladder."
Source: Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past: The Story of James Henry Breasted,
Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles Breasted. (Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University
of Chicago, 2009).
Historians consider the long nineteenth century, ending with the First World War, as the
"European century"1 in the Near East: the United States' rise as an imperial power in these lands
began with the Second World War. The inter-war period in the Near East was marked by
uncertain U.S. foreign policy, gradual weakening of the British and French empires, and the rise
of Arab nationalism. The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo was conceived
in this politically volatile period.
This chapter establishes the political and cultural circumstances in Egypt in 1926, which
shaped the Breasted-Rockefeller team's vision for the New Egyptian Museum and the team's
political strategy of achieving a favorable outcome for the project in the face of conflicting
political interests in Egypt. The failure of this strategy was in turn a direct result of this same
political and cultural moment. With the project, the Breasted-Rockefeller team sought to
translate Arab goodwill towards the United States at the end of the First World War, into a
political opportunity for the U.S. In turn, the vision of a larger political opportunity for the
United States provided a professional and personal opening for James Henry Breasted, neatly
dovetailing his professional ambitions with his imperial vision in the context of Egypt and the
greater Near East. A fuller version of his story is central to this thesis: ultimately, he is the main
protagonist of the project's conception.
To understand Breasted's motivations on behalf of the United States, the museum, and
his own career, to comprehend John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s support, and to contextualize the
conception and failure of the project, I begin with Great Britain and France's rivalry in Egypt in
See, John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis,: University of
Minnesota Press, 1963).
the long nineteenth century. This rivalry demonstrates both the geo-political and the symbolic
significance of Egypt for rising, competing Western empires. The British and French wished to
outdo each other in their imperial conquests.2 Control of Egypt was crucial to this ambition, but
its manifestation was very different. The British eventually colonized Egypt militarily and
administratively, but the French turned it into their "archaeological protectorate." 3 Archaeology
became a contested field in Egypt and was intimately tied in with imperial ambitions. Eventually,
the Egyptians themselves came to recognize the political power of Egyptian archaeology and
began to contest the Europeans in this field, in their quest for independence. In this chapter, I
chronicle the arrival of Britain and France in Egypt, and their political use of archaeology. I then
describe the struggle over archaeology between Europeans and Egyptians during the nationalist
period in Egypt; these struggles and aspirations peaked with the Tutankhamun controversy in
1922.
Meanwhile, Breasted was waging his own battles against European domination of the
field and U.S. indifference to Near Eastern studies. In the second part of this chapter, I describe
his calculated rise to power in Egyptian archaeology. In the process, I establish his professional
and imperial ambitions. The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute was conceived
in the wake of the Tutankhamun controversy and the creation of the Oriental Institute in
2 The French Revolution sparked a series of imperial conquests between the British and the French. The latter were
motivated by their "mission civilisatrice." The British were less ideological at first; they were primarily concerned
with their political and economic security. See also, Maya Jasanoff, Edge of Empire : Lives, Culture, and Conquest
in the East, 1750-1850, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 2005), 120.
3 Quoted in, Donald M. Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from
Napoleon to World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 175-76. Reid is quoting R. S. Poole, the
founder of the Egyptian Exploration Fund. This quote is originally from Margaret Dowers, Flinders Petrie: A Life in
Archaeology (Madison, Wis., 1995), 312.
Chicago. The fiasco of the first and the success of the second shaped the museum's conception.
They also shaped Breasted's appeal to Rockefeller. Breasted convinced Rockefeller to provide
$10 million for the construction and upkeep of a museum and research institute in a field that the
latter had at first shown little interest in, and in a country that he had never visited.4 This points
to Breasted's persuasive powers and the strength of his imperial vision. It also compels us to ask
whether Rockefeller shared this vision or whether his motivations were purely altruistic. The fact
that Breasted turned to Rockefeller instead of the U.S. government, demonstrates the power of
U.S. foundations and philanthropists, and the unreliability and weakness of U.S. foreign policy in
the Near East in the 1920s. The team eventually informed the U.S. State Department of the
project, but dictated the Department's level of engagement. What was the relationship and power
balance between the scholar (visionary), the philanthropist, and the U.S. government? Where
was the imperial drive ultimately located? Though Breasted seems to be the one with the
imperial vision, Rockefeller and the U.S. State Department were not immune to such a vision
themselves. I begin to address the question in this chapter and pick it up again in Chapter 5.
European Engagement With Egypt
Although a constitutional monarchy ostensibly ruled Egypt at the time of the Breasted-
Rockefeller proposal, a large British army was then garrisoned in Cairo in the Kasr al-Nil
4 Rockefeller's first visit to Egypt was in 1929 after the project failed. Breasted arranged this visit and took him to
see the ancient sites of Egypt. When asked if he was there to restart the project, Rockefeller expressed surprise and
stated that sightseeing was his only goal. But he did meet privately with the U.S. Minister to Cairo to discuss the
project. What these discussions were, we do not know. See also, James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past :
Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2007), 115. See also, Newspaper clipping, January 21, 1929, folder 259, box 25, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
barracks, which were located on the West edge of the city along the Nile (Fig. 1). British troops
remained in Egypt in some capacity until 1956. The French-run Cairo Museum, which Breasted
hoped to replace, was located adjacent to the barracks (Fig. 1). The Egyptian Antiquities Service
(also called the Service des Antiquitds and hereafter referred to as the EAS) was part of the
Department of Public Works, and controlled the museum. But though the EAS was an Egyptian
government department, a French Director-General, Pierre Lacau, presided over it.5 The French,
in fact, founded the EAS in 1858 during the rule of Sa'id Pasha and controlled it until 1952. Also
in 1926, the nationalists led by Sa'd Zaghlfil were fighting for complete independence from the
British.6 On this political stage, with its complicated story line and multitude of characters, the
Breasted-Rockefeller team entered with their project. The story of this bewildering tangle begins
with Napoleon.
Napoleon's 1798 Egyptian Expedition marked the beginning of modem European, and,
subsequently, U.S. imperial interest in the country. Egypt had been part of important empires
throughout history: the Persian, Ptolemaic, Roman and Islamic Caliphate empires followed the
Pharaonic period.7 (Alexander the Great's invasion and subsequent rule (332-323 BC) marked
Lacau held the post from 1914-1936. He was preceded by the widely respected Gaston Maspero and succeeded by
Etienne Drioton - the last Frenchman to hold the post.
6 Zaghlfl was the leader of the Wafd party and responsible for the nationalist movement of 1918-1919, which
resulted in the creation of a constitutional monarchy. He was briefly Prime Minister in 1924. He died in 1927, in
Cairo.
7 The Egypt that Breasted vested with human spirit and innovation, and which he called the birth-land of morals,
justice and social values, was geographically well suited to be a part of major empires. The land's strategic location
turned it into a "bridgehead" between Africa and the Old World. See also, Ian Shaw, The Oxford History ofAncient
Egypt, New ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16. From a civilizational perspective, the land
was also well suited as a stage for the "human career," a term that Breasted frequently uses to refer to the rise of
civilization from prehistoric barbarism to the high period of civilization as exemplified by ancient Egypt. The Nile
created a fertile valley, and this allowed for the presence of man all the way back to the Paleolithic Period. This fact
the beginning of the Ptolemaic period in Egypt). In the middle of the 1st Century, local
Egyptians converted to Christianity, resulting in the creation of the Coptic Christian community
and the Coptic Church. In 639 AD, Arab armies conquered Egypt and introduced Islam.8 This
multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and religiously diverse country, with its glorious past and
geographically strategic location, caught the attention and imagination of Napoleon who, acting
on a complex set of imperial motivations, invaded Egypt in 1798.9
The invasion marked a turning point in Anglo-French rivalry and in Egypt's history.
Napoleon's invasion was not motivated by events at the periphery. It was the first "overt imperial
conquest in modern history"' 0 and the "first Orientalist project."" The French occupation was
motivated, in part, by geo-political considerations. The occupation threatened British trade routes
to India.12 But Napoleon was also motivated by thoughts of grandeur and by notions of Western
superiority.13 Egypt was also the birth-land of civilization and writing. Great empires and princes
had conquered the land: taking control of Egypt was akin to making the ultimate claim to
was important to Egyptologists (such as Breasted) because it allowed them to emphasize the subsequent progresses
and achievements of the periods of high civilization - the Pharaonic period - with which they were primarily
concerned: the invention of writing (which, according to Breasted, emerged in Egypt independent of a similar
invention in Babylonia), the emergence of religion, and the construction of impressive monuments.
8 The Ottomans conquered Egypt and turned it into a province of the Ottoman Empire in 1517, but allowed the
Mamluks to continue to rule. Mamluk rule was ended by Napoleon's invasion and Muhammad 'Ali's dynasty.
9 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 79-81.
'0 See, Jasanoff, Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850, 122.
See, Said, Orientalism, 79-81.
" Ibid.
1 In the future, in this same area, the Suez Canal would become an important short cut and trade route: safe-
guarding the security of the canal was the excuse for the British invasion of Egypt in 1882. Security concerns over
the Canal also led to the Suez crisis of 1956.
13 Said, Orientalism, 79-81.
civilization, and to presenting oneself as the heir to past empires. By Steinmetz's theory of the
significance of imagined relations between past and present empires, Egypt would be considered
an important notch in France's imperial belt.14 The following extract from Jean-Baptiste-Joseph
Fourier's preface to the Description de l'Egypte15 in 1809, demonstrates this:
Placed between Africa and Asia, and communicating easily with Europe,
Egypt occupies the center of the ancient continent. This country presents
only great memories; it is the homeland of the arts and conserves
innumerable monuments; its principal temples and the palaces inhabited
by its kings still exist... Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Pythagoras, and Plato all
went to Egypt to study the sciences, religion, and the laws. Alexander
founded an opulent city there, which ... witnessed Pompey, Caesar, Mark
Antony, and Augustus deciding between them the fate of Rome and that of
the entire world. It is therefore proper for this country to attract the
attention of illustrious princes who rule the destiny of nations.
No considerable power was ever amassed by any nation... that did not
also turn that nation toward Egypt, which was regarded in some measure
as its natural lot.16
Like Alexander, modern emperors and empires viewed Egypt as the land from which
they could control the fate of the world. In light of the future attempted U.S. entry into Egypt
(through the museum project), this would prove to be a prescient observation. Fourier's view of
Egypt as a land presenting "only great memories" points to the West's selective vision with
regards to Egypt's full history: it was interested in only looking back to ancient Egypt, and in
14 George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, By Way of Basra," in Lessons
of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin W. Moore. (New
York, London: The New Press), 135-156.
15 The Description de l'Egypte was compiled and published on Napoleon's orders after France's expulsion from
Egypt (1809-1822).
16 Quoted in, Said, Orientalism, 84.
symbolically appropriating the ancient civilizations. To do so, Western powers chose to see
modern-day Egyptian presence in the country as an unfortunate inconvenience.
French occupation also marked the beginning of Western scholarly interest in Egypt, as
illustrated by the Description de l'Egypte, which was compiled and published under the orders of
Napoleon. This scholarly interest was driven by a desire to control the "Other," and to define
France against Egypt.17
In 1801, driven by strategic and imperial motivations, the British joined forces with the
Ottomans to drive the French out of Egypt. In the power vacuum left behind, an Albanian soldier
from the Ottoman army, Muhammad 'Ali, became Viceroy of Egypt. The British military
assured the Ottomans it would depart Egypt after liberating the province from the French. With
the exception of one significant battle, it did so. 18 For strategic reasons, Britain and France no
longer directly occupied Egypt: further battles over an Ottoman province could trigger the
Ottoman empire's collapse - an outcome that both the British and French empires agreed was
not in their interests yet.19 Instead, their rivalry with each other and their desire to control Egypt,
found expression in a frenzied archaeological and collecting activity. In the words of the
historian Maya Jasanoff, the two powers turned from their attempt to colonize Egypt towards an
attempt to "collect" Egypt.2 0
"7 Ibid., 79-81.
18 See, Jasanoff, Edge of Empire : Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850.
19 Ibid., 216.
20 Ibid.
Egypt's Viceroy, Muhammad 'Ali, facilitated this collecting activity when he embarked
on a modernization campaign, which required European technical and financial assistance. To
secure European assistance, Muhammad 'Ali opened up Egypt to British and French
archaeologists, allowing them to dig throughout the land and remove priceless Egyptian
antiquities out of Egypt and into Europe, where they found their way into museum collections
such as the ones in the British Museum and the Louvre.2 1 But by 1835, Muhammad 'Ali was
alarmed at the rate of flow of antiquities out of the country, and restricted this by trying to create
a museum in Egypt itself, along the lines of existing collections in Europe:
It is also well-known that the Europeans have buildings for keeping
antiquities; stones covered with paintings and inscriptions, and other
similar objects are carefully conserved there and shown to the inhabitants
of the country as well as to travelers...such establishments bring great
renown to the countries which have them.
The Europeans interpreted this move as a deliberate attempt to "disrupt"23 their
archaeological and collecting activities, rather than as a sign of either authentic interest in
Egyptian antiquity or of Egypt's recognition of Egyptian antiquity's symbolic power, and
nothing came of this decree. The next iteration was the Bulaq Museum created by the French
Egyptologist and first Director-General of the Egyptian Antiquities Service, Auguste Mariette, in
21 Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I,
55-56.
22 Ibid. In addition to European collections and to European Egyptian collections (such as the one at Musee Charles
X), Muhammad 'Ali may have been inspired by Greece's Aigina National Museum created in 1829. He probably
realized that he who controls the antiquity of Egypt, controls Egypt.
21 Ibid.
1858.24 Although Mariette primarily targeted European tourists he also hoped to educate local
Egyptians towards whom he had a paternal attitude and who he felt were not yet impressed by
Pharaonic antiquity. The Bulaq Museum was an interlude to a more elaborate museum that
Isma'il Pasha (Muhammad 'Ali's grandson, and Viceroy from 1863 to 1879) promised Mariette.
Isma'il imagined a grand inclusive museum with separate buildings for Arab, Greek and
Pharaonic Art - a "true scientific center of Egypt." 2 6
Perhaps Isma'il conceived of this museum as part of his modernization scheme for Cairo,
which had already resulted in urban changes, the construction of the Khedivial (Royal) Opera
House, and the construction of bridges and palaces, all in preparation for the Suez Canal opening
ceremonies in 1869, in which the Viceroy expected to entertain European monarchs and
dignitaries. His plans for the museum, however, were derailed by Egypt's bankruptcy and
Britain's subsequent invasion.
24 Ibid., 99-100. Reid writes that the Louvre sent Auguste Mariette to Egypt in 1850, to find early Christian
manuscripts. Failing this task, Mariette instead made an important archaeological discovery at Saqqara. Reid writes
that the French, excited by the prospect of Mariette's finds, made provisions for the export of items to the Louvre
before Abbas Pasha (then Viceroy of Egypt) had agreed to the plan. In retaliation, and urged on by France's British
and Austrian rivals, Abbas stopped Mariette's activities. The French consul general Arnaud Lemoyne intervened;
Mariette was allowed to send some objects back to the Louvre but all future archaeological findings had to stay in
Egypt. Eventually, the French convinced Abbas' successor, Said Pasha, to (re)found the Egyptian Antiquities
Service and name Mariette, Director General. Mariette was given sweeping powers, which included corv6e labor
and exclusive excavation rights throughout the country. His successor, Maspero, would later say: "This was like
taking possession of Egypt for the cause of science." The antiquities that Mariette unearthed were housed in the
Bulaq Museum, which Mariette founded.
2 Ibid., 106.
26 Ibid., 104. Isma'il also planned to house the Institut Egyptien in this complex. All information regarding Isma'il
Pasha's museum, has been synthesized from Reid's book.
After Egypt became a British colony in 1882, archaeological societies from Britain and
France revived the campaign for a new museum building.27 In 1895, Lord Cromer (and others
responsible for Egypt's finances) decided that financially the time was right to move ahead with
plans for a new museum. Accordingly, Egypt's European community organized a design
competition, which was juried by an all-European panel. The commission was awarded to the
French architect Marcel Dourgnon, who drew up a neo-classical museum building in the Beaux-
Arts tradition. After several delays caused by squabbling between the British (who were
overseeing the finances) and the French, the new museum building finally opened to the public
in 1902.28
Although James Breasted was already active in Egyptology at this time, he and other U.S.
Egyptologists were not as well recognized or long-established in the field as the Europeans -
particularly the British, French, Germans, and Italians. Breasted was certainly the father of
Egyptology in the United States and he was well respected by his professors in Germany (where
he had studied Egyptology), but as the U.S. and Germany did not control Egypt, neither his
national affiliation with the U.S., nor his scholarly affiliation with Germany carried much weight
in Egypt. Instead, the British and the French made all decisions regarding the museum, its
finances, and its design and administration, reflecting a political and archaeological period in
27 Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I,
182.
28 Ibid., 195. In between the transfer from Bulaq to the new museum (1889-1902), the collection was briefly housed
at Isma'il's palace in Giza.
Egypt dominated by these powers. Egyptians were completely excluded from these decisions as
well, reflecting their peripheral status in their own country's archaeology and politics.
With Britain's 1882 invasion of Egypt, it was clear that in political and military matters
Britain would reign supreme in the country. In exchange for French cooperation, however, the
British officially recognized French authority in Egyptology and the EAS with the 1904 Anglo-
French Treaty. British Viceroy to Egypt, Lord Cromer, went so far as to declare France "the
mother of Egyptology."29 The French certainly believed this themselves. Napoleon's Egyptian
Expedition uncovered the Rosetta Stone in 1799, a Frenchman, Jean-Francois Champollion,
deciphered the hieroglyphics in 1822, and Frenchmen (Auguste Mariette with the help of Suez
Canal engineer Ferdinand de Lessep) founded the EAS in 1858.
In its initial engagement with Egyptian antiquity, France was uninterested in the rights of
modem Egypt. The idea of keeping antiquity in Egypt may have begun with Muhammad 'Ali's
decree in 1835, but it only gathered force in 1858 with the founding of the EAS, eventually
peaking in 1922 with the discovery of Tutankhamun's tomb. Until then (and often, even later)
the French (and other Europeans) considered the removal of antiquity to Europe as part of good
stewardship:
France, snatching an obelisk from the ever heightening mud of the Nile, or
the savage ignorance of the Turks...earns a right to the thanks of the
learned of Europe, to whom belong all the monuments of antiquity,
29 Donald M. Reid, "French Egyptology and the Architecture of Orientalism: deciphering the fagade of Cairo's
Egyptian Museum," in Franco-Arab encounters : studies in memory of David C. Gordon, ed. L. Carl Brown and
Matthew S. Gordon (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996), 55.
because they alone know how to appreciate them. Antiquity is a garden
that belongs by natural right to those who cultivate and harvest its fruits.3 0
(E. de Verninac Saint-Maur, 1835)
This quotation shows both a marked disdain for Egyptian ability to understand,
appreciate, and safeguard Egyptian antiquity, and France's unwavering belief in its right to claim
this antiquity. It also shows France's imperial and intellectual rivalry with Great Britain. As the
French found themselves in a secondary position of political power in Egypt, behind the British,
they turned once again to intellectual and cultural leadership.31 The French consul-general
Cogordon, insisted on:
retaking here [at Cairo] the Egyptological terrain, the rightful place to
which we are entitled by the French origin of this science, the work of
Mariette, and the sacrifices France has always made for knowledge of
Ancient Egypt, from the expedition of General Bonaparte to the creation
of the Institut d'arche'ologie orientale du Caire.32
French domination of Egyptology, however, was thrown into question as the balance of
power tipped once again, this time in the inter-war period. At the beginning of the First World
War in 1914, the British declared Egypt a Protectorate and imposed martial law. But by 1922
they had to declare a constitutional monarchy to appease nationalist sentiments, reserving their
30 Quoted in, Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to
World War I, 1. E. de Verninac Saint-Maur was a French naval captain.
31 See also, Jasanoff, Edge of Empire : Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850.
32 Donald M. Reid, "French Egyptology and the Architecture of Orientalism: deciphering the fagade of Cairo's
Egyptian Museum," in Franco-Arab encounters : studies in memory of David C. Gordon, ed. L. Carl Brown and
Matthew S. Gordon (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996), 54. The French dominated in other
cultural areas as well. For example, French was the main language in the area until 1914.
right to only four spheres of control within Egypt.3 3 Archaeology was not one of the four
spheres: the British no longer had any official say in Egyptian antiquity. Furthermore, the
creation of a constitutional monarchy put the 1904 Anglo-French treaty into question. Although
the French were long entrenched in the EAS, their domination was no longer guaranteed; they
now had to consider Egyptian sentiments in their management of Egyptian antiquities. In his
book, Negotiatingfor the Past, James Goode writes that nationalists, who came to power in early
1924, saw archaeology as a field that could be contested due to the absence of official British
control over it.34 Egyptians had come to see the Pharaonic past as their heritage. Writers, poets,
and politicians wrote of finding Egyptian origins in this past. And non-Muslim Egyptians saw
ancient Egypt as a 'national' symbol that could unite them with the Muslims. All of this
coincided with Howard Carter's discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamun in 1922. Foreign
archaeologists working in Egypt hoped to get a share of the findings for their museums. But for
the Egyptians the discovery became a metaphor for nationalism.35
Carter discovered the tomb intact on November 4, 1922. News of the discovery swept
through Egypt and the West. Carter's sponsor, Lord Carnarvon, entered into an exclusive
agreement with the London Times for the story, and in the process upset the local press and the
rest of the foreign press. To add to the situation, Lacau and the Egyptians believed that the
33 The British reserved the right to defend Egypt against foreign aggression, to protect the Suez Canal, to protect
foreign and minority interests, and to protect the Sudan.
3 Goode, Negotiating for the Past : Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 80-
86.
* Ibid., 83-84. Example: Muhammad Husayn Haykal. And the Egyptian poet Ahmad Shawqi who wrote, "...the
pharaoh rising from the tomb only to be shocked by the lowly state of his country under foreign domination."
tomb's contents belonged to Egypt. By most accounts Lacau was not pandering to Egyptian
nationalists: he sincerely believed that Egypt should keep whatever it needed from any
archaeological dig.36 His policies had upset most Western institutions and archaeologists,
including his own countrymen.37 Carter, refusing to play by Lacau's rules, shut down the tomb of
his own accord. The government responded by taking it over, resulting in a lawsuit between
Carter and the Egyptian government.
Signifying the complicated nature of Egyptian politics, the British authorities chose to
remain in the background and apparently approached James Breasted instead, who was present
for the tomb's opening, to mediate in the case.38 But Breasted clearly sided with Carter, and in
the course of these negotiations he made an enemy of Lacau.39
Observing the pro-Egyptian attitude of Lacau, Breasted was concerned by the rising trend
of local Egyptologists who could presumably threaten the standing of Western Egyptologists. He
also believed that local Egyptologists were not qualified to care for Egyptian antiquity. His
36 See, Ibid., 67-97.
3 Lacau did have the support of some western archaeologists, such as George Reisner of the Boston Museum of
Fine Arts and Cecil M. Firth of the British Museum.
38 Goode, Negotiating for the Past : Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 88-
89. Goode also writes that Lacau believed that archaeological finds should not be divided in half with their
discoverers. Instead, the Egyptian Government should take whatever it considered necessary for its collection.
Furthermore, antiquities should not become a part of private collections, and concessions were to be granted only to
major museums. Goode writes, "He was anxious that antiquities go to established centers of Egyptology, where they
would be studied, and not lost in such isolated outposts as Bucharest, Tokyo, or Sydney." Goode also writes that
though this policy would seem enlightened today, in 1922 it angered the western archaeologists, particularly
Breasted. (The tomb was eventually reopened on January 13th, 1925). See also, Breasted to Fosdick, October 30,
1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project,
Breasted Papers, Oriental Institute Archive (hereafter designated as OIA).
39Ibid., 89-90.
letters to colleagues are peppered with comments on the indifference and ignorance of the
Egyptians to such an extent that it appears he could not under any circumstances believe that
local Egyptologists could be qualified for this work. He wrote to his close friend and colleague,
the astronomer and scientist George Ellery Hale, "... the result will be disastrous unless we can
hold them off for another generation." 40 Breasted was also concerned with his own standing in
the field. To add to the matter of European domination, he now had to contend with the
Egyptians themselves. Breasted, on his own, could have no leverage: he did not have direct
authority (unlike the British) or longstanding presence in the field (unlike the French). He
realized that a collective Western effort was necessary, and that this must include the British and
the French - the official and unofficial rulers of Egypt respectively. However, his vision for the
New Egyptian Museum shows that he was clearly thinking of U.S. superiority in this relationship
and in the general field.
George E. Vincent, the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, visited Egypt when
Breasted was involved in the Tutankhamun case. Breasted showed Vincent around the French-
run Cairo Museum, pointing out its state of disrepair. The tour ultimately led to the proposal for
a new museum building and administrative body, which were Breasted's way of asserting control
over Egyptian antiquities and Egyptology. If antiquities could not leave Egypt, they would at
least be housed in a U.S. museum, which he could control. Breasted's role as mediator in the
Tutankhamun case demonstrates his rising stature in the international field of Egyptology at the
time. And his role in convincing Rockefeller Jr. to donate $10 million for the museum shows the
40 Ibid., 101.
importance and respect accorded to him within the United States. But it took him a long time to
reach this point.
James Henry Breasted: A Brief Sketch
Charles Breasted begins his father's biography by describing him as "an intensely
American scientist,"41 who achieved fame and respect that no one - least of all him - expected:
[His was a story] in the tradition of Mark Twain, William Dean Howells,
Howard Taylor Ricketts, William Rainey Harper, and a whole sturdy
procession of American country boys who had wandered out of Main
Street into the world.42
This sentiment of unexpected, accidental success runs throughout Charles Breasted's
book. It begins with his recollection of Breasted's reaction to the idea of publishing his life story.
Breasted could not believe his was a story worth telling, but he eventually admitted that there
could be some interest in "the long climb from the provincialism of a prairie village to the
command of an archaeological 'firing line' stretching from the Black Sea to the Sudan."4' This is
a truer sentiment; it shows, perhaps unintentionally, Breasted's connected vision of archaeology
and imperialism, and hints at the difficulty of his "climb." A study of his archives reveals that the
rise was not accidental or unintentional; rather, Breasted was a meticulous, compelling, and
41 Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son
Charles Breasted (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2009), 4.
42 Ibid., 3-4.
43 Quoted in, Ibid., 3.
convincing scholar and writer. At the same time he was politically ambitious and savvy, and
could play the part of a politician while maintaining his identity as an archaeologist.
The story of his personal life and struggles is irresistible in itself, but his professional
obstacles, his strategy for overcoming them, and his imperial ambition are the key to his (mostly)
successful career, of which the plan for, and conception of, the Breasted-Rockefeller museum
was a major aspect. Though the obstacles were significant, Breasted had a strong belief and faith
in his method and abilities and in the potential and skill of U.S. Egyptologists and institutions in
general. He wrote:
I began to see that it is not so much the comprehensiveness of a man's
learning, as his rational and careful method, which will bring reliable
results, and I am very sure I have such a method.44
Breasted's claim to logic, rationality, and precision, was designed to counter the
advantages of European and native competitors. Europeans, funded by their governments, had
years of experience in the field. But Breasted believed he could claim superior, accurate
scholarship, through the use of scientific methods. Science and rationality gave him the upper
hand with respect to local Egyptologists as well.
A "rational" approach supported his belief that the study of ancient Egypt was the United
States' birthright and duty. The 'American civilization' was heir to ancient Egypt. Egypt had
invented early technology, writing, religion, law, morals, and social justice; all inventions and
44 Ibid., 48.
disciplines that Breasted asserted had re-emerged in the United States.45 This ideological
standpoint and positivist view shaped the conception of the New Egyptian Museum and
Breasted's approach to the larger field of Near Eastern studies.
Before Breasted became an Egyptologist, he was a minister-in-training, and a Hebraist.46
Through a process of self-realization he decided to join the ministry.47 But Breasted's mastery of
Hebrew had the unexpected consequence of revealing to him mistranslations in the scriptures,
and this in turn worried him about his "intellectual receptivity to the ministry which lay
imminently beyond." 48 His faith remained strong, but he did abandon his training as a minister
and instead became a scholar of Hebrew and Oriental languages at Yale, under William Rainey
Harper - a Hebraist and future President of the University of Chicago.
During Breasted's days at Yale, the U.S. capitalist John Rockefeller Sr. created and
endowed the University of Chicago. Rockefeller recruited Harper as the first President of this
nascent institution. Breasted, meanwhile, was considering a career in Egyptology, and Harper
promised him a position at the new university if he were to enter the field. Accordingly, Breasted
45 Breasted to Rockefeller, February 16, 1919, folder 812, box 112, series G, Record Group 2, OMR, RAC.
46 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 18-20. Breasted was born on August 27, 1865 in Chicago, Illinois (to Charles and Harriet Breasted) but
grew up in Downer's Grove. The Illinois native showed an early inclination towards science (he had ambitions in
chemistry and botany) and became a pharmacist at age twenty-one. He renounced this career for one in the ministry.
47 Ibid., 14-17. To this end, in 1887, he was admitted to the Congregational Institute (Chicago Theological
Seminary, and wrote, "And though it has cost me more than in my best moments I ever imagined I could renounce,
yet by God's help, I am now where I can say, 'I would rather be a useful man than rich man!' and I am happier, far
happier than ever I would have been, since I am accounted to 'spread His banner upon the mountain tops."
48 Ibid., 18.
went to Germany (like many other U.S. academics and scholars at the time), where he pursued a
doctorate in Egyptology at the University of Berlin, under the premier Egyptologist, Adolf
Erman.
On Erman's recommendation, the Royal Prussian Academy hired Breasted to compile the
first comprehensive Egyptian dictionary, and the latter went to Egypt for the first time in 1894.49
On this journey Breasted formed his impressions of the political and archaeological situation in
the country, and the role of the British, French, and 'confirmed' his impressions of the natives in
both respects. These opinions remained essentially unchanged and would affect the conception
of the New Egyptian Museum. Breasted believed the British were doing admirable work in
Egypt, helping it to recover from "some two thousand years of depredation, persecution,
enslavement and warfare."50 The British had delivered the 'fellahin' (Egypt's peasant class) from
the "infinitely cruel, dissolute, shambling sovereignty of Egypt's foreign overlords."5' Charles
Breasted writes that for James it was, "a fascinating time to be in Egypt and to watch the passing
of an era."s2 But though Breasted admired British political administration, he felt they neglected
the archaeological situation in Egypt. The EAS met once a year to dole out excavation sites. The
49 Ibid., 52.
50 Ibid., 60. Unless specified, these quotations are Charles' description and impression of Breasted's feelings and
opinions. However, I argue that they can be a reliable measure of how Breasted felt. Father and son were very close
and often traveled and worked together. Furthermore, most of the biography was written with the help of James
Breasted.
51 Ibid., 61. By "foreign overlords," Breasted is referring to Mohammad 'Ali's Albanian dynasty.
52 Ibid., 61.
best sites went to the Egyptians, whereas the least promising ones were given to the Europeans. 53
Breasted blamed this state of affairs on the French who he believed had usurped the EAS, on the
British who as was their "custom" had neglected archaeology in their conquered lands, and even
on an "unsavory" German individual who then controlled the Cairo Museum, Emil Brugsch.
As for the Egyptians, Breasted believed they haphazardly dug through the country and were
interested only in profit. Charles makes an interesting observation about Breasted's perception of
Egypt and Egyptians:
James had been so long submerged in Egyptian history that he felt almost
as if in some previous incarnation he had lived among the scenes he was
now beholding. From a thousand Egyptian inscriptions and Arabic texts he
had pictured the clamorous actuality of oriental life with its extremes of
drabness and beauty, disease and hardiness, its stenches and filth, its color
and unconscious grace, its immemorial din of barking dogs, braying
donkeys, wailing children, imploring beggars, chaffering merchants,
pedlars calling their wares, muezzin chanting the call to prayer, fellahin
singing to the rhythm of creaking well sweeps scooping Nile water into
thirsting fields.
During this first trip to Egypt, Breasted confirmed all of his pre-formed impressions regarding
Egypt, Egyptians, and very likely, Egyptian archaeologists.
The trip revealed to Breasted the lack of scientific precision in Egyptology. In Germany
he had become familiar with the methods and work of French Egyptologists and considered their
5 If this is true, it already demonstrates the effects of a proto-nationalist movement in 1894.
5 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 76.
ss Ibid., 61.
scholarship, "slipshod."5 6 He was surprised that even eminent French Egyptologists such as
Gaston Maspero (the Director-General of the EAS at the time and someone with whom Breasted
developed a good working relationship) would be similarly "inaccurate" 57 and unfree of
scientific errors. Charles writes that a sense of his scientific mission apparently dawned on
Breasted during this trip: his life's work would be to gather and reconstruct the story of human
progress and civilization in Egypt, for the first time in history.58
Here then, is the stuff that Breasted's ambitions were made of. His first visit to Egypt
defined his professional and imperial goals and strategy. Science, logic and rationality could
result in superiority over deeply entrenched scholars and allow an opening for U.S.
archaeologists. The United States had the duty and birthright to study these lands. Breasted's
dismissive view of the natives, of the former "foreign overlords," and of French control of the
EAS, convinced him of the duty of U.S. institutions to take the lead in archaeological work in
Egypt. And, although he admired the administrative work the British were doing in Egypt, he
believed that their neglect of Egyptology had allowed the French and the Egyptians to wreck
Egyptian archaeology. The time seemed right for U.S. entry in the field, but Breasted was aware
of his own marginal status. He lacked financial backing. His work in Egypt was at the behest of
the Germans. And he was aware of European domination in the field:
56 Ibid., 83.
" Ibid., 83.
58 Ibid., 78.
[He was] hypersensitized by the realization that he was a lone young
American Egyptologist pitted against the rather self-superior complacency
of Old World scholarship. With a sense of elation he set about copying
and translating the historical inscriptions, which Erman had designated in
the Cairo Museum. 59
Though the obstacles worried him, they clearly also inspired him and gave him a sense of his
own pioneering role in the field.
Back in the United States, the U.S. public and scientific community's disregard for
Egyptology deflated some of this tenacious enthusiasm. If Egyptology was filled with
challengers in Egypt and Europe, in the United States it had yet to be recognized as a worthy
pursuit.60 At the University of Chicago, it was temporarily given a backseat:
Amid the hurly-burly and travail of a great university's birth Egyptology
was a supernumerary item of anticuarian bric-a-brac to be laid aside until
the rest of the house was in order.
Dismayed by this indifference, and beset with financial concerns, Breasted took to the
lecture circuits to educate the public about Near Eastern studies and to supplement his income.
Finally, in 1899, he left the United States again for a two-year stint in Germany, the "land of his
59 Ibid., 65.
60 At this time, there were few U.S. institutions active in the field: The University of Pennsylvania Museum of
Archaeology and Anthropology and Boston Museum of Fine Arts are two examples.
61 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 93. President Harper was also administrative head of the Department of Semitic Languages, which had
few books, no original monuments, and no dedicated building. The latter was remedied by a generous donation from
an Elizabeth Haskell, which resulted in the creation of the Haskell Oriental Museum in 1894. The building housed a
museum, the Departments of Comparative Religion and Semitic Languages, and the University's Baptist Divinity
School. Breasted was made Associate Director of the museum, but the museum only had a minor collection.
scientific salvation," 62 to copy inscriptions in European museums for the Royal Academy in
Berlin. When he returned to the U.S. in 1901, he made the first of a series of appeals - some
successful, others less so - to philanthropists and foundations, such as the Rockefellers Sr. and
Jr., and the Rockefeller-endowed foundation, the General Education Board. The 1919
foundational letter, and the themes I have already distilled from it, resulted in the creation of the
Oriental Institute.
Science, rationality, and logic - the tools that Breasted used to rise above European and
native archaeologists - also helped transform U.S. perception of Near Eastern archaeology in the
early twentieth century from merely a curiosity to a scientific field with scientific techniques of
research and documentation, such as stratigraphy and photography. By redefining Near Eastern
studies as a scientific field, Breasted attracted the Rockefeller philanthropic network, due to its
interest in scientific work.63 In his book, American Genesis, Thomas Hughes writes that more
than a democratic nation, the United States was "the modern technological nation." 4 He terms
the century from 1870 to 1970 as the "American Genesis," 6 5 describing it as a time of
6 1 Ibid., 102.62
63 For example, between 1907 and 1948, the Rockefeller Foundation funded George Hale, (Breasted's friend) an
astronomer partially based at the University of Chicago, to build a series of telescopes and observatories in
California that were the first to measure the size of the galaxy and the solar system's position within it. Hale was the
foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, which was created during the Civil War to advise the
government in its military efforts. He nominated Breasted to the NAS, making him the first archaeologist on the
Academy. Breasted gained recognition as a legitimate scientist through association with Hale, and promoted
archaeology by comparing its methods and techniques with astronomy - an established science. The archives show
that Breasted and Hale corresponded regularly and took a keen interest in each other's work. See, Raymond B.
Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait, [1st ed. (New York,: Harper, 1956). See also Chapter 1 of this thesis.
64 Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis : A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970
(New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Viking, 1989), 2-3.
65 Ibid.
technological achievement and invention in the U.S., when processes of acquiring, archiving,
and studying information were celebrated. Cognizant of this enthrallment with science,
technology, and rationality in the U.S., Breasted had positioned himself as a 'New Orientalist,' a
man of science.
As American astronomers used scientific technology to look to the skies to understand
the place of the Earth in the galaxy, Breasted used scientific technology and looked to the Near
East to construct the story of the modem American. Particularly interesting is his use of
photography to construct the idea of superior U.S. scientific archaeology and responsible
custodianship (Fig. 2). These themes appear in stereographs produced for Breasted's popular
guidebook, Egypt through the stereoscope.6 6 (Fig. 3-4) The guidebook used stereographs to
transport those Americans who could not afford to travel, to the ancient sites. Breasted used the
three-dimensionality of landscapes, monuments, and natives, achieved through stereoscopy to
present the captured scenes as absolutely true reproductions - as good as being in Egypt and
seeing for oneself. In the accompanying text, he writes about the people in Egypt that one would
find on an actual trip:
Egypt still survives with a people of the same mental characteristics and
the same physical peculiarities as we find in those subjects of the Pharaohs
who built the pyramids.
They have changed their language once and their religion twice, but they
are still Egyptians as of old, pursuing the same arts, following the same
occupations, holding the same superstitions ... which the student of the
66 James Henry Breasted, Egypt through the Stereoscope: A Journey through the Land of the Pharaohs (New York,
London: Underwood & Underwood, 1900).
monuments finds among their ancestors five thousand years ago.67
Reminiscent of his earlier pre-conceived impressions of Egyptians, Breasted here
demonstrates an unchanging people, their unchanging life and, significantly, their unchanging
technology in the face of modem U.S. technology: a kind of technological Orientalism.
Rationality and science did many things for Breasted. They gave him the upper hand in
Egyptian archaeology. They attracted Rockefeller. They 'proved' that the ancient Egyptian
civilization was the forerunner to the 'American civilization.' Emphasis on rationality and
science, allowed Breasted to present the New Egyptian Museum proposal to the Egyptians as a
gift to science, and the building as a "Temple to Science." 68 Indeed, Breasted 'rationally' and
'logically' conceived of the entire plan for the museum, and the strategy he would adopt for its
successful outcome. The failure was blamed on Egyptian irrationality. Chapter 3 examines the
strategy and presents the complete negotiations over the museum.
67 Ibid., 17. (Emphasis mine)
68 See, The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925).
Chapter 3
THE PROPOSAL
TouR JfAJESTY:
HE present transition period in the national ife of Egypt has necessarily created many
new responsibilities which ar o be met by the Egyptian peoplk for d fir time.
Among thes there s perhaps none which has Aoused wider interest md sympathy
Among the other peopks of the world than the responsibility for Egypt's marvelou heritage fomR
the pan,-a heritage of noble monument which haie in srct years attracted increuing numbers
of deeply interesed travels These visitors from all the world hod in the Nile Valky the
common cultural ancestry of us all, and returning do their v hom, y carry back iid
feling ofdkinhip with all other civilized peoples. The value and significance of Egypt's enrosabe
pot hoe made the land of the Nile, therefore, a common center of imerest and internaiol
good will.
Because of my proound imerest in this matter I Should count it a privilege to make a gift
of te million dolss to be primarily devoted : in to the erection of a new and mor
commodious building fo the Cairo Museum and an additional bslding for archaeological research ;
and seond, to the mainooce of these buildings and colletions, with special reereoc to their
edupational valu and their usefulness a a great reasury of materials for scientific rsoarch.
In proffeing this gift to the Egyptian peopl and to Science, I ventur to hope that the
program of cooperation which it would permit my prose acceptabk to Your Majesty and to the
Egyptian Government. May I call the temion of Your Majesy to the accompanying plot. and
drawings and to the papers, particularly the indenture of trust, more fully outining the project and
the proposed gift ?
I hav the honor to remain, Your Majesy, with expressions of all good will and profound
Very ath ly your.,
(Signed)
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THE PROPOSED NEW EGYTrIAN MUSEUM AND RESEARCH INSTTUTE AT CAIRO
A SKETCH BY JAMES HENRY BREASTED
Views of the Proposal Book (Publicity Brochure)
Source: The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925).
The correspondence of the Breasted-Rockefeller team at the Oriental Institute Archives
and the Rockefeller Archive Center shows us how the team perceived the political and
archaeological state of affairs in Egypt in 1926, and how it systematically planned to negotiate
them. I use the evidence to chronicle and analyze the team's strategy to gain approval for the
museum project, thereby maintaining foreign (Western) control of Egyptian antiquities, while
allowing for the first time U.S. Egyptologists and institutions, such as the Oriental Institute, to
directly steer the course of Egyptian archaeology. When the project was finally launched, it
immediately encountered a series of failures and setbacks that revealed flaws in its overall
conception, in the team's strategy, and in their understanding of the situation. First, the team
entered into negotiations with the British for evacuation of the existing barracks, in place of
which they wished to build their new museum. Despite a promising beginning, the negotiations
failed and the Americans had to switch to an alternate site. In the process they sacrificed what
they believed to be their "trump card" 1 - the symbolic displacement of the British. When the
project was finally presented to the Egyptians, they subjected it to a round of negotiations
surprising the Americans who were expecting gratitude and immediate acceptance. During the
negotiations, Breasted and his son, Charles, released a press statement announcing the proposed
gift. Although the announcement was met with nearly resounding approval in the local and
1 William Welles Bosworth (hereafter designated Bosworth) to Breasted, August 4, 1926, folder Cairo Museum
Project - Correspondence: B, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. Bosworth
wrote to Breasted describing a meeting with Lord Balfour in England, after Rockefeller withdrew the offer, where
Bosworth said, " I reminded him that we could not adequately reply to many of the criticisms that were being made
about the way the matter was presented to the Egyptians without sufficient introduction because, as he so well knew,
we had had to sacrifice our trump card in the barrack situation, and that our loyalty to the British forbad [sic] our
making any mention whatever of this fact..."
foreign press, it reportedly angered the French Director-General, who - much like the Egyptian
government itself - had no prior knowledge of the project and had not been consulted in its
conception. In addition, he had been left entirely out of the proceedings and negotiations that
followed the project's presentation to the Egyptian King and Prime Minister. A second round of
negotiations resulted in the Egyptians asking for further concessions, which the Breasted-
Rockefeller team was not willing to grant. Instead, after assessing the situation the team
concluded that Egyptian approval was unlikely and withdrew their offer, thereby ending the
project. A few months after the project's failure, the Egyptian government and the Breasted-
Rockefeller team tried to re-engage with each other, but despite a few tentative attempts, they
failed.
As with Egyptology, Breasted believed in a rational, scientific approach to politics. He
had carefully studied the overall political situation and believed he understood it. The team's
strategy - guided in large part by Breasted - was based on this understanding. Breasted believed
he 'knew' the Egyptian mind. He believed it could be led down a desired path by gratifying
Egyptian vanity. He believed he was on excellent terms with the British army and could
convince them to evacuate their only barracks in Cairo. As for the French, Breasted's personal
rivalry with Pierre Lacau (and indeed, rivalry with other French Director-Generals in the Near
East) had combined with his disdain for the 'unscientific' methods of French scholars. As it turns
out, Breasted had underestimated and misunderstood all three political players in Egypt,
particularly the Egyptians. He had also underestimated the shifting political alliances between
the three, and the divisions within each side. Throughout this Chapter, I will demonstrate how
the Breasted-Rockefeller team's carefully conceived strategy unraveled.
Presentation to the King
Breasted and his son, Charles, sailed for England in the fall of 1925 to check on the
progress of the proposal book (publicity brochures) and for further meetings with the British
before proceeding on to Egypt, where they met up with Chauncey Belknap (a partner in the law
firm representing Rockefeller Jr.: Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap) who had traveled separately from
New York. Breasted, Charles, and Belknap were the men on the ground, representing the rest of
the Breasted-Rockefeller team in New York.
On January 4 th, 1926, James Breasted, accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, J.
Morton Howell, presented the proposal for the New Egyptian Museum & Research Institute at
Cairo to King Fua'd 1.2 The proposal was in the form of a beautifully illustrated leather-bound
book3 and had four parts to it:
- Letter to His Majesty King Fuad The First From James Henry Breasted.
- Letter to His Majesty King Fuad The First From John D. Rockefeller Jr.
- The Proposed New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo: A
Sketch by James Henry Breasted.
- Sixteen plates: Frontispiece and Illustrations.
2 Formality dictated that the U.S. foreign minister / ambassador to Egypt officially introduce Breasted to the King.
Breasted and Howell actually did not have good relations, and the former would have probably preferred to handle
the meeting without Howell. Breasted at one point tried to remove Howell from his post. He felt that Howell was not
sympathetic to the needs of U.S. Egyptologists working in Egypt. Also, Howell was not told of the project until just
before the audience with the King. See also, James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism,
and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 105.
3 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925).
An Indenture of Trust and an Agreement drawn up by Rockefeller's lawyers in New
York, accompanied the book. 4 If the Egyptian Government approved the proposal, it would be
expected to sign off on the Agreement.
In a calculated move, Breasted chose to begin the book with a black and white
photograph of King Fua'd I in full regalia, followed by open letters from both himself and
Rockefeller, and then by fifteen beautifully illustrated perspectives and plans of the museum and
research institute. The book was meant to flatter and impress the King, but the Breasted-
Rockefeller team also had a larger audience in mind: the book was designed to double as a
publicity brochure announcing the American gift to archaeologists, museum directors, and
4 I am unable to locate the original Indenture of Trust and Agreement at the RAC. However, I did find the revised
Indenture of Trust as well as several significant letters between the team, which allowed me to reconstruct the
original Indenture and Agreement. An explanation of this process follows: The original Indenture and Agreement
are extensively discussed in internal correspondence throughout the project. The revised Indenture and Agreement
were also carefully analyzed in official documents by both the Egyptian government and the Breasted-Rockefeller
team, by referring back to the original. Both the Egyptian government's analysis and the team's analysis of the
revised Indenture and Agreement are at the RAC, and they correspond with each other on the details. Using these
analyses and the actual revised Indenture and Agreement (also at the RAC), it is possible to reconstruct the terms
and conditions of the original Indenture and Agreement. The following documents provide us with the information
regarding the original Indenture and Agreement:
1. "[Egyptian] Government Communiqu6 on the Rockefeller Gift to Egypt: (Translated from the French
original, appearing in L'Espoir, a Cairo daily, of May 1, 1926)," May, 1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E,
RG 3, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller (hereafter designated OMR), RAC. Charles Watson at the
American University of Cairo sent this report to Rockefeller for his records.
2. "Egyptian Museum Negotiations: 1925-1926. Report by Chauncey Belknap," Received March 10, 1926,
folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC. Belknap sent this advance report to Rockefeller and
Fosdick, as he was heading back to New York for the purpose of revising the original Agreement and
Indenture based on the Egyptian government's demands.
3. "[Revised] Agreement," March 10, 1926, folder 260, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
4. "[Revised] Indenture," March 10, 1926, folder 260, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
5. Chauncey Belknap (hereafter designated Belknap) to Breasted, March 10, 1926, folder Cairo Museum
Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M,
Breasted Papers, OIA. Belknap sent this letter to Breasted to explain the revised Indenture and Agreement.
He noted the changes item-by-item that had been made to the document, based on the Egyptian
government's demands. He also noted that Rockefeller and Fosdick had modified these demands and
inserted some new stipulations: the revised Indenture and Agreement did not correspond exactly with the
Egyptian government's demands.
politicians in the Near East, Europe, and the United States. The team included a card in each
book, which read, "With compliments of His Majesty King Fuad the First of Egypt,"5
presumably to indulge the King's 'vanity.' When the book was published the team was certain of
the King's approval, and in its presumption, it ordered 5000 copies, of which amount 200 were
definitely printed prior to Breasted's audience with the monarch.
Indenture of Trust and Agreement
With the exception of a 'gentle' reference to the transfer of Egyptian antiquity to an
international corporation, the legal details of the project were not contained in the book. They
were in the Indenture of Trust and the Agreement, and are outlined below. The heavy-
handedness of the team's approach to the control of Egyptian antiquity is immediately apparent.
The two parties named in the Agreement were the Council of Ministers (the Egyptian
Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister) and the Board of Trustees for the Museum: James Henry
Breasted (Chair), V. Everit Macy, and Raymond B. Fosdick. The Indenture of Trust (called
Exhibit A) was between the Donor (John D. Rockefeller Jr.) and the Board, and would go into
effect only if the Egyptian Government approved both documents. The package also included (as
5 Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine,
and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 175. When the project failed, the
team removed the card, inserting it with a new one describing their view of the failure (Egyptian stubbornness)
before mailing out the proposal books. See also, Charles Breasted to John Johnson (Director, Oxford University
Press), May 1, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: 0, box Cairo Museum Project
Correspondence, Breasted Papers, OIA.
6 James Breasted to Raymond Fosdick, October 26, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis
Fosdick Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
7 V. Everit Macy was a close friend and confidant of Rockefeller Jr. Incidentally, Rockefeller and William Welles
Bosworth knew each other through Macy.
Exhibit B), a site map for the proposed plot of land for the museum and research institute (Fig.
5). Although the Indenture of Trust and the Agreement (hereafter designated Indenture-
Agreement) made references to the new buildings for the museum and research institute on Plots
A and B respectively, they were mostly concerned with details of administration and control. The
buildings, meanwhile, were given their due in the proposal book.
The Indenture-Agreement called for the creation and incorporation of an "Egyptian
Museum Commission," consisting of six foreign and two Egyptian members. Of the foreign
members, there would be two each from the United States, Great Britain, and France.8 One of the
two members from each country would be chosen by a major museum in that country. The other
member would be chosen by an overarching archaeological or scientific organization within said
country.9 The Egyptian government was expected to agree to this "in recognition of [the]
generous offer and in order to demonstrate its great appreciation of the value of foreign scientific
collaboration in the preservation and study of Egyptian Antiquities."10 The government would
have no input or say in the appointment of these permanent members. The two Egyptian
members were the Minister of Public Works and the Director General of the Egyptian
Antiquities Service (EAS). Additionally, the Commission could choose to include - for brief
periods only - members from other countries active in Egyptology. The Commission was the
main administrative and finance body for the project. It would manage the Donor's funds and
8 The team left out any German representation due to expected French objections. This is covered later in the thesis.
9 American members would be appointed by the National Academy of Sciences at Washington and by the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in NY, British members by the British Academy and by the Trustees of the British
Museum, and the French members by the Academie des Inscriptions of the Institut Francais and by the Musee du
Louvre.
10 "[Revised] Agreement," March 10, 1926, folder 260, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC, pl.
appoint all staff members without any input or interference from the Egyptian government.
Reflecting just how much the Commission was not an Egyptian body, a provision in the
Indenture-Agreement stated that it could be incorporated in "such jurisdiction as they [Trustees]
shall deem best."" Although the Indenture does not state possible options, the Breasted-
Rockefeller team was internally considering England, as a way of safeguarding the funds. 12
About the plot and buildings, the Indenture-Agreement only stated that the Egyptian
government would agree to authorize the Trustees to build the new museum on Plot A on the
map. The government would issue the Trustees - upon signing the document - a license granting
them permission to take over the land. For the Research Institute, the Indenture-Agreement asked
for a more permanent "absolute title" to Plot B. Both buildings would be constructed according
to plans approved by the Trustees, but these could be modified at the suggestion of the EAS.
Here, the Trustees reserved the right to make these changes only if they were "practicable,"
thereby maintaining overall control of the design and layout. This underscores the importance
and centrality of the museum's design to the Breasted-Rockefeller team's conception of the
museum and overall strategy. The Egyptian government was also asked to permit importation
and entry of all materials and equipment needed for the construction and maintenance of these
buildings, and for future work, without levying any import tax or duty. Upon completion of
construction, the antiquities from the current Cairo Museum would be transferred over to the
" "[Revised] Agreement," March 10, 1926, folder 260, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC, 4.
12 Thomas Debevoise (hereafter designated Debevoise) to Gumbel, July 28, 1925, folder 0258, box 025, series 2E,
RG 03, OMR, RAC.
new museum. All future items that the government acquired through native excavation, or as a
result of its share from foreign excavation, would be turned over to the Commission.
Rockefeller's total monetary contribution was $10 million. Upon acceptance of the terms
and conditions stated by the Indenture-Agreement, the Donor would transfer $5.4 million of this
money to the Commission, via the Board of Trustees, for construction of the new buildings.' 3
After the completion of construction, the remaining $4.6 million would be handed over to the
Commission, whereupon the Commission would undertake to move all the items from the
existing museum to the new one.' 4
In the "spirit in which the ... gift is proffered,"' 5 the Egyptian Government would agree
to turn over its collection to the Commission for a period of thirty-three years. (The antiquities
would technically remain government property, but the latter would have practically no control
over them). The Commission would hand back the collection to the government at the end of the
agreement period or to "such Service [organization] as it [Egyptian government] may designate."
The principal of $4.6 million would remain untouched (by the Commission) during the thirty-
three years. Only the income from it would be used to run the museum and research institute.
Though the government would get control of the collection at the end of thirty-three years, it
would have no further claim on the principal of $4.6 million or the income from it. Instead, the
Commission would keep this sum and continue to use the resulting income for the work of the
13 A sum of $5 million was earmarked for the museum and $400,000 for the research institute.
14 Several of the heavier items would be moved before this payment, to facilitate their installation in the new
building at an earlier stage.
15 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 13.
Research Institute for seventeen more years - completing a period of fifty years.' 6 After this
time, the Commission (not the Egyptian government) could begin to use the principal. As a final
condition of the Indenture-Agreement, the government would take whatever legal or
parliamentary steps necessary to achieve the goals of the project.
In the Indenture-Agreement, Rockefeller's lawyers noted that the money would be
"devoted primarily" to research and museum administration in Egypt. The word, "primarily" was
added for legal reasons as a qualification to the original statement.' 7 The funds would actually be
16 After thirty-three years, the Commission, the Research Institute and Rockefeller's endowment would spin off
from the museum. It would seem from the Indenture-Agreement that the Egyptian government would have to
assume financial responsibility of maintaining the museum after the stipulated period. The Indenture also stated that
the Commission would pay for any damages or losses to the antiquities at the end of the thirty-three year period.
However, it was unclear how this would work if the principal sum could not be accessed for a further seventeen
years.
17 There was some internal debate between Rockefeller's lawyers and the rest of the Breasted-Rockefeller team,
regarding the purpose of the Commission and whether it should be explicitly stated in the proposal. The lawyer
Thomas B. Debevoise initiated this debate, "[The Indenture-Agreement} does not show 'the intent of the donor' that
the research building shall be maintained by the corporation [Commission] after the expiration of the thirty [three]
year period, nor does it seem to me to state satisfactorily the conditions for the payment of the additional sum of
$4,600,000. In this connection it may be noted that the first recital does not state accurately how the sum of
$10,000,000 is to be used."
,d
Similarly, Debevoise wrote on July 22n , 1925 to say that the reference to a gift for the "Egyptian People" was
misleading, "...for only part of the money goes to Egypt and that in the form of a building erected on land which
belongs to the Egyptian Government and is to be leased for a long term of years to trustees appointed by Mr.
Rockefeller, the trustees after the building is completed assigning the lease to a corporation organized as provided in
Mr. Rockefeller's deed of trust.
In a later letter, Debevoise seemed to meet the rest of the team halfway. He understood that if the agreement
between government and Trustees were to be terminated for any reason - with respect to either the museum or the
research institute - the land and the buildings would go to the government of Egypt, ultimately benefiting it. And the
Commission - though its work would not be limited to Egypt - was in fact representing the Egyptian government in
the rest of the Near East. But he maintained that the corporation was independent enough to chart its own course and
that the Egyptian people would only indirectly benefit from it. He therefore suggested that the phraseology be
amended to give legal reference to this. So in the letter written by Rockefeller for the proposal book, the team added
the word "primarily" after "devoted" to show that the money was not entirely allocated for work in Egypt. And - on
Debevoise's advice - the team did make explicit reference to the Indenture-Agreement in Rockefeller's letter,
though the earlier decision was not to do so. It is important to note that Debevoise' concerns are entirely from a legal
standpoint. He wished to make sure that the documents would hold up to legal scrutiny in the future. There is no
evidence that his concerns stemmed from general welfare of the Egyptian people.
used in whichever way the Commission saw fit. They could be used for archaeological research
anywhere in the world and to make available monuments for study, located in any part of the
world.
Contrary to the claims made by Rockefeller and Breasted in their introductory letters to
the King, the Commission in effect was designed to solidify - rather than decrease - foreign
control of Egyptian antiquity. French control of the EAS was no longer guaranteed in the
aftermath of British declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Egypt. Antiquities were the one
area in which the British had no official power, and it was therefore the easiest, and one of the
most prominent spheres, in which the emerging Egyptian nation could begin to assert its rights.18
Western Egyptologists worried that Egyptians would oust all European (mostly French) officials
and Egyptologists from the EAS, despite their long history of running the Department. They
were also concerned about the French Director-General himself, but for the opposite reason.
Pierre Lacau had incurred the wrath and displeasure of most U.S. and European Egyptologists
(including his own country men) by changing the antiquities law in Egypt, thereby severely
limiting the antiquities that could be taken out of the country. The terms and conditions of the
Breasted-Rockefeller project were designed to guarantee Western control of Egyptian antiquity
while simultaneously diluting Pierre Lacau's authority and, for the first time, expanding the idea
of "Western" control to include the United States. In fact, U.S. interests actually outweighed
See, Thomas B. Debevoise to Chauncey Belknap, June 13, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
And, Debevoise to Gumbel, July 22, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC. And, Debevoise to
Gumbel, July 28,1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
18 Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 86.
those of Europeans in the proposal. They were better represented. For instance, the Trustees (all
of them Americans) had the right to modify the Commission's powers. Furthermore, the Director
of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago (an American) would be appointed as
Research Director at the Research Institute.19 The terms of the gift proposed to create a foreign
base in Egypt, from which this Western (U.S.) Commission could control and command
archaeology anywhere outside of Egypt.
The Commission was in effect a microcosm of the political situation in Egypt.
Representatives of foreign countries would control Egyptian antiquity, and the future of the
museum and research institute, with the required token gesture of Egyptian membership. The
inclusion of Egyptians was conceived as a tactic for giving the collaborator, agency. 0 On the
other hand, the Breasted-Rockefeller team also required British and French cooperation in the
matter and their inclusion in the Commission was also a tactical decision.2 ' (The idea of "local"
collaborators has been expanded here to include other imperial powers - the British and the
French - who were actively present in Egypt). Furthermore, despite Breasted's rivalry with the
19 The Research Director would appoint research staff and oversee and manage all research work at the Institute and
the museum. In 1926, the Director of the Oriental Institute (and therefore Research Director-in-waiting for the
museum) was James Henry Breasted.
2 See, Ronald Robinson, "Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of
collaboration," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, Eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. (London: Longman,
1972).
21 The Indenture of Trust between Rockefeller and the Trustees actually stated that the project could not succeed
without British and French cooperation. The Trustees were expected to garner this support. The British were the
official colonizers in Egypt, as it was their army that was stationed in Cairo. Though the French were now only
unofficial holders of Egyptian archaeology, Pierre Lacau had a close relationship with King Fau'd, giving the notion
of "local collaborators" an interesting twist. French inclusion and support for the project was therefore essential. In
fact, a "Franco-Egyptian" alliance was the greatest worry for the Breasted-Rockefeller team. See, Breasted to
Fosdick, May 16, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap, box Cairo
Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
French and his dismissal of their scholarship and methods, he clearly saw them as better
custodians of Egyptian antiquity than the Egyptians themselves. Anticipating French objection to
any inclusion of German Egyptologists in the wake of the First World War, the Breasted-
Rockefeller team purposely left the Germans out of the Commission despite the fact that German
scholarship had arguably become more important than French scholarship.22 The initial
inclination to include the Germans obviously points to scientific considerations in the make-up
of the Commission, since the Germans did not have any real power in Egypt. But their eventual
exclusion undermines Breasted's scientific reasoning for the entire project. Ultimately, the
French Egyptologists had closer connections to the King. By virtue of a shaky but still lingering
1904 Treaty, and by virtue of their longstanding involvement in Egypt, the French trumped
German scholarship.
After 1882, each Department or Ministry of the Egyptian government had included one
British and one French officer. The Commission seems to have been modeled on this earlier
colonial administrative make-up in Egypt, with the difference being that the Americans were
hoping to partake of it in the antiquities sector.
22 Breasted to Fosdick, October 5, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. (Breasted himself had studied Egyptology
at the University of Berlin under Adolf Erman, whom he considered the foremost Egyptologist at the time).
The Book and its Presentation to the King
An Indenture-Agreement drawn up by lawyers in New York is bound to be formal,
legally tight, and dry. In addition to legal jargon, the terms and conditions were clearly not
favorable to the Egyptians. U.S. and Western control was almost absolute. It was the job of the
proposal book, however, to cast the project in a softer light. The book was conceived with the
intention to flatter the King, to impress him with the size and scope of the proposed gift, and to
lead him down a desired path. Confident that he understood the Egyptian mind and Egyptian
vanity, Breasted arrogantly declared to his friend, George Hale:
...with this ammunition [the book's illustrations] I hope to intoxicate the
King and give him such a pipe-dream of the Arabian Nights possibilities
presented by our project that we shall be able to stampede him and his
whole group into it.2 )
Breasted expected the book and its illustrations to stun the Egyptians, so that they would -
presumably in a daze and incapable of coherent thought - align themselves with the project. The
book, as we have seen, was also for the benefit of opinion leaders, and Breasted was particularly
gratified that all those who had so far seen it (before even the Egyptians) were impressed with
it.
2 Breasted to Hale, July 20, 1925, OIA, folder 1925, box Correspondence between George Ellery Hale and James
Henry Breasted, James Henry Breasted Papers, OIA. See also, Breasted to Hale, February 23, 1925, OIA.
24 Such as, Lord Balfour, Sir Frederick Kenyon at the British Museum, The American ambassador to London, etc.
Rather than focusing on U.S. and European control, the book presented the museum as a
gift of cooperation from the "great Democracy of the West" (the United States) to an Egypt that
was struggling to gain its full independence from the British and French imperial machinery.2 A
key tactic was to identify Egypt's political and cultural struggles with the United States' political
and cultural struggles:
We in America, like you in Egypt, are politically a very young nation; and
culturally too, the higher development of America has been very recent. 26
The Breasted-Rockefeller team was clearly aware of nationalist sentiments in Egypt. It was also
very aware of the favorable image of the United States in the Near East after the First World
War, as a result of Wilson's support for self-determination in these lands. The team tried to use
this to its own advantage. Initial correspondence shows an awareness of Egyptian sentiments and
perhaps a wary recognition that Egyptian independence was imminent. This recognition
mobilized Breasted into strategizing to control Egyptian antiquities. Part of this strategy was to
emphasize to the Egyptians that the gift came from a "democracy." Emphasizing the United
States as a democratic nation, also allowed Breasted to assume the moral high ground when
necessary, such as during negotiations with the British army over the initial site. But as the
general museum negotiations drew on, Breasted (and Belknap) admitted to the team in New
25 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 11.
26 Ibid
York that it was probably beneficial to their project that the British army was staying on in
Egypt.27
In the letter to the King, Breasted drew further comparisons between the United States
and Egypt, this time of a scientific nature. He wrote that the obstacles to Egyptology in Egypt
were similar to those that the U.S. had faced (obstacles that Breasted, himself, had directly
overcome):
The scientific administration of these precious survivals is a great and
difficult responsibility. In this connection it may be of interest to Your
Majesty to know that a little over thirty years ago there was not a single
teacher of the Ancient Egyptian language and writing in any American
university. 28
Emphasizing ancient Egypt as the common heritage of both Egyptians and the West, Breasted
wrote that for all these reasons Rockefeller Jr. had agreed to fund the construction and
maintenance of the new museum and research institute. The terms and conditions of the
Indenture-Agreement are referred to only obliquely in this letter:
We hope that the spirit in which the above gift is proffered will lead Your
Majesty and the Egyptian Government to accept as a condition of the gift
the cooperation of America and other nations of the West, in the
maintenance of the Museum during the next thirty years.29
27 "Egyptian Museum Negotiations: 1925-1926. Report by Chauncey Belknap," Received March 10, 1926, folder
258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
28 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 11. Breasted writes that the existing
French run Cairo Museum was a generation behind.
29 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 13.
Moving on from this mention of U.S. and Western "cooperation," Breasted emphasized
the value of the gift: the building would be the most magnificent museum in the world and the
finest modern monument in Egypt. Rockefeller's letter was brief and characteristically
restrained, but along the same lines. 30 Though Breasted's initial letter was somewhat restrained
as well, he allowed himself free rein in a lengthier outline of the gift.3 1 While establishing
"Egypt's unique place in the course of man's unfolding life," he wrote of how western
civilization was now heir to ancient Egypt, betraying his ideological standpoint.
The proposal book and the Indenture-Agreement reportedly met with a strange,
unexpected reception from the King, who barely looked at it and tossed it aside.3 2 He is said to
have claimed that the funds marked out for the project were too limited, and complained about
U.S. interference in Egyptian matters.3 3 Insulted by these remarks, Breasted prepared to leave but
stated that the King changed his tune at once, and asked that the matter be brought before Ziwar
Pasha (the Prime Minister). James Breasted put the King's unfavorable response down to
jealousy and greed for money that he could not "get a single finger on" due to the tight legal
30 Rockefeller's correspondence is typically quite restrained. A letter from Breasted to Rockefeller on August 20,
1925 shows that Rockefeller advocated toning down the language and downplaying his own importance.
Accordingly, Breasted replied: "I enclose also the new revision of the text of the brochure, which includes all over-
explicit statements which might later prove embarrassing. The change you suggested regarding Bosworth's work for
you in France has of course been carried out carefully, but pray forgive me for retaining the reference to your
splendid gift for restoring Rheims, Versailles, etc., which you struck out. The world ought to know it, and I think it
will help both in England and France."
See, Breasted to Rockefeller, August 20, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
3 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 21.
32 Charles Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son
Charles Breasted (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2009), 388.
" Ibid.
terms and conditions. 34 But did Breasted judge the King's reasons or motives accurately? Did he
come to this conclusion because of his preconceived idea of Egyptian vanity? It is possible that
the King, in fact, was negotiating with Breasted in the only manner possible by pretending
disinterest. At about this time the new British High Commissioner, Lord Lloyd, acting under
instructions from London informed the Egyptian Prime Minister of the British government's
support for the project. The American team had a favorable opinion of Ziwar Pasha, who they
believed was honest and brave. It helped that when Breasted presented the project to Ziwar, the
latter supposedly flattered him:
You know, Egypt has no civilization except what comes to us from
Europe and America. We must rely on foreign scientists - but I cannot say
that in public! Therein lies our chief difficulty in carrying out your
project.
Breasted, despite his shrewdness - and perhaps betraying some vanity of his own - took this
statement at face value, without considering if Ziwar did indeed hold this opinion, or if he hoped
to present himself as an ally of the Breasted-Rockefeller team, while simultaneously distancing
himself from a likely rejection of the offer. Ziwar's political position as Prime Minister was
rather tenuous at the time.
Charles Breasted, who helped his father manage the project, presented his version of its
failure in, Pioneer to the Past. He wrote that the Egyptian Ministers "consumed weeks objecting
34 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 389.
to every constructive suggestion from the American side," 36 causing Belknap to suggest that they
draft up their own version of the proposal. They did so, Belknap approved it, and took it with
back with him to New York. The Prime Minister assured Breasted and Belknap that if
Rockefeller accepted the changes he would recommend to his Council of Ministers that they
approve the project. 37 Charles writes that Rockefeller and the rest of the Trustees approved the
project without making a single change (this is not true, as I will show).38
In the meantime, apparently enough people had come to know of the proposal in Egypt to
cause Breasted and Charles some concern of its leakage in the press,39 and the two issued a press
release to pre-empt any negative publicity. This was done immediately after Belknap sailed for
New York, and was a decision made entirely by Breasted and his son. Were Breasted and
Charles using the press to generate public support for the project, thereby forcing the
government's decision? If that was their intention, they were quite successful in generating
generally positive support.
Charles believed that they made a crucial mistake by not specifying that the terms and
conditions now drawn up were by the Egyptians themselves. Again, this is not true: the revised
proposal represented Egyptian modifications to what were American terms and conditions.
36
37
38 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 392.
39 Breasted to Belknap, February 12, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. Breasted cabled Belknap on the latter's
voyage back to New York with the revised contract.
Regarding the press release, Charles wrote that the press (and general public) reaction was
favorable without exception (mostly true, if we assume the clippings in the Breasted-Rockefeller
team's archives are representative). The press release, of course, made the project known to the
French in the EAS, although it is possible that they may have been aware of it already, especially
if Pierre Lacau was indeed close to the King, as Breasted suspected he was. In any case, the
publicity allowed French reaction out into the open. Charles writes that the "excitable" and
"garrulous" French Director-General believed that Americans were usurping his position.40
Lacau, of course, was right. (The team's second mistake, in Charles' opinion, was that they had
kept the project from the French, as per British instructions, thereby increasing French
discontent).
When Belknap forwarded the revised contract from New York, the team presented it to
the Prime Minister, who rejected it, apparently saying:
We cannot sign this document! The conditions are absolutely
unacceptable, they infringe upon the sovereignty of Egypt! My colleagues
in the council of ministers decline to consider the matter until the
conditions of the contract have been fundamentally revised!41
Breasted refused revision to "a contract drawn by the Egyptian Government itself.A2 He
informed the Prime Minister that he would leave for New York soon. If an offer of acceptance
were not waiting for him in New York, he would advise Rockefeller to withdraw the project. The
Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 390.
41 Ibid., 396. Conversation reported by Breasted.
42 Ibid., 397.
following day the Egyptian government - itself demonstrating strategic use of the media - issued
a press release stating that. Rockefeller's conditions were unacceptable as they currently stood.
When the government did not change its position within the allotted time, Rockefeller formally
withdrew the offer.43
Charles' recollection of the proceedings is important because it represents the Breasted-
Rockefeller team's view of the failure of the project. It also, incidentally, represents the general
Western view. It lays the blame for the failure squarely on Egyptian stubbornness, something
that most newspapers and opinion leaders in the West readily believed. The evidence suggests
otherwise. The first part of the evidence is the Indenture-Agreement and its unfavorable terms, as
I have already described. The second part comes from the archives, and reveals the motivations,
prejudices and goals behind the project. The archives show that the downfall of the project
resulted in large part from British and French interference as well. But significantly, the failure
was contained within the American conception of the project.44
Archives: The Evidence
Though Raymond Fosdick initiated the project with his "unprompted" 45 enquiry into the
need for repairs to the existing French-built museum, James Breasted must be credited with
43 Ibid., 397.
44 See also, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt,
Palestine, and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194. Abt expresses
the failure of the museum in similar terms.
45 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
launching the project. He first presented the idea for an entirely new building in his 1924
foundational letter to Fosdick, who was "deeply moved"46 by Breasted's passionate response,
and forwarded the letter to Rockefeller Jr. The latter wrote back agreeing on the need for a new
Egyptian museum, but with doubts about the feasibility of the proposal. These doubts were
founded on Breasted's description of the Egyptian government's neglect of its antiquities and on
newspaper reports of political trouble in Egypt, leading Rockefeller to wonder if a museum
should indeed be built in Cairo, and whether it might not perhaps be moved to a location out of
Egypt, somewhere in the West.47
Fosdick accordingly wrote to Breasted describing both the deep interest and the doubts of
his associates regarding the project.48 The latter responded immediately to allay Fosdick's fears.
46 Fosdick to Breasted, October 21, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
47 Rockefeller to Fosdick, October 28, 1924, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC:
"Whether the Egyptian Government is interested enough in its works of art to appreciate having such a gift would
seem rather doubtful, and whether, were such a building provided, it would be properly kept up is also questionable.
If the Egyptian Government has had in mind the possibility of selling its collections to pay its national debt, might it
not be a far greater contribution to the archeological interests of the world, should the matter be brought around in
the right way, to consider buying the valuable part of the collections, including the things from the tomb of
Tutankhamen, and setting them up in some museum where the would be sure of being permanently cared for and
being made available for scholars?
But if the thought of building a new museum in Cairo to house the present collection of things waiting to be added
thereto should seem both wise and feasible, who is there in the Egyptian Government who could be trusted to carry
out such an enterprise?"
48 Fosdick to Breasted, October 28th, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
"The grave doubt is expressed as to the possibility of extending any help while the Egyptian Government is in its
present chaotic and unstable shape.. .it would seem that conditions in Egypt are very unsettled, and the recent failure
of the conference in London, where the Egyptian demands for complete autonomy were refused, does not promise
very much hope for the immediate future."
His letter from October 3 0th, 1924 is revealing.49 It underscores some of his impressions of local
(native) government in Egypt. And it shows a high level of confidence and self-regard with
respect to his understanding of the situation in Egypt. It also shows how much Breasted -
previously on the periphery - had become central to Egyptology, as well as to Egyptian politics,
demonstrating the hand-in-hand relationship of archaeology and politics.
First, Breasted stressed to Fosdick that nationalist sentiments in Egypt would not amount
to anything, and that the U.S. team could be assured of some sort of security and continued
"maintenance of a sufficient British garrison in Egypt." Breasted stated that he was confident:
... the Egyptians know perfectly well that the British Government will
never yield [on this point]. The noise they make in opposition is simply for
home consumption.
He used British presence to put to rest any fears that Fosdick and his associates might have as to
who was ultimately in control of Egypt. And, he downplayed the nationalists by calling them an
"ignorant mob" and asserting that there were in fact Egyptians in government positions "who
remain quietly in the background" and did not look for any trouble: they could be counted on to
mediate with the nationalist elements.50 In the letter, Breasted demonstrated his authority in
Egyptian matters by presenting himself as an insider to Egyptian politics and the British imperial
machinery. After the founding of the Oriental Institute in 1919, he had led a reconnaissance trip
49 Breasted to Fosdick, October 30, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
50 Breasted is using the concept of "local collaborators." See, Ronald Robinson, "Non-European foundations of
European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, Eds. Roger
Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. (London: Longman, 1972).
through the Near East and Egypt. 51 As part of this trip, he experienced firsthand the political lay
of the land. This was before the Treaty of Sevres was signed, and the future of the Arab and
Turkish lands determined. Breasted's trip provided him direct exposure to the political sentiment
in these lands. Upon his return to Cairo in 1920, he was asked by Lord Allenby (then British
High Commissioner to Egypt and Sudan) to report his findings to David Lloyd George, the
British Prime Minister. Breasted wrote that in 1922, the British government asked him to help
settle the Tutankhamun case out of court. He therefore had, Breasted argued, a strong
relationship with the British. He was not exaggerating. At this time, as a matter of fact, the
United States Vice President wished to appoint Breasted as the American Minister to Egypt,
probably in view of the political experience he had gained during his archaeological work in the
country.53
Breasted's letter must have soothed Fosdick's fears, because at their face-to-face meeting
later that year - at which Rockefeller was present - he instructed Breasted to put together a
sketch proposal for the new museum and to undertake a visit to Cairo in the winter to ascertain
some facts regarding building and site. Breasted would determine the physical condition of the
5 James Henry Breasted, The Oriental Institute (Chicago, Ill.,: The University of Chicago Press, 1933), 35-65.
52 Clarification: David Lloyd George was the British Prime Minister. Coincidentally, within this same time frame,
George Lloyd became Lord Allenby's successor as the British High Commissioner to Egypt and Sudan.
53 Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941, 89.
present building and the "legal status" of the proposed site: the barracks and drill ground in front
of the museum.
In his draft proposal for the museum, Breasted first touched on the need for an
architectural sketch. He saw two purposes for this, one would be to present it to the King so that
he could grasp the "material side" of the project, and the other would be to present it to
Rockefeller Jr. (To this end he enquired of Fosdick if one of the many architects who visit Egypt
could be recruited to prepare such a sketch, under an oath of secrecy).
In the draft, he also put down his thoughts on how the project should be presented.
Taking stock of the political situation, he saw that the team must deal with three parties: the
British, the Egyptians, and the French. He believed that the real power lay with the British;
therefore the primary goal was to get them on board with the project, and then deal with the
Egyptians and French. The latter two dealings he considered merely a formality. Accordingly he
advised that the project be presented in confidence first to Lord Allenby, the British High
Commissioner to Egypt and Sudan. Allenby should be asked in turn to present the project to his
government. Then, reducing the project's scope to its simplest terms, a representative of the
donor, accompanied by the American Ambassador, should present it to King Fua'd. Breasted
was confident of the King's approval:
There would not be the slightest doubt but that King Fuad would regard
the magnificent gift as a very gracious and welcome tribute to himself and
his people, - a superb gesture of friendliness and cooperation from the
54 Breasted to Fosdick, December 6, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. This letter also contained the draft
proposal.
Western World to the Orient. It would be necessary to emphasize to His
Majesty that aspect of the project, which ensures to foreign scientists
permanent facilities for the work of foreign scientists in Egypt as a
proposal of friendly cooperation to which the future availability of funds
for maintaining the building would be merely an accessory. I believe that
in this way we could avoid hurting the Egyptians' feelings in the tacitly
involved suggestion that they are unequal to these responsibilities
themselves. 55
After the King approved the project, the U.S. team would run the proposal past the
"actual machinery of the Government itself." This would include a "ceremonious call on the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, with assurances that the whole project is one of
friendly cooperation, - of a totally unofficial character." After this, he suggested consulting with
the Minister of Public Works. Breasted left dealings with his nemesis Pierre Lacau, the French-
Director General of the EAS, to the very end.
As per Fosdick's instructions, Breasted visited Cairo in the beginning of 1925 to scope
out the situation. By the time of his trip, the team seems to have made an internal decision
(which is not directly documented in the archives, but emerges as a side note from the contents
of the correspondence) to entrust the U.S. architect William Welles Bosworth with the
preliminary design of the buildings. Rockefeller's later correspondence with the team shows that
Bosworth's selection was determined by the fact that he was Rockefeller's personal architect and
could be trusted to keep the matter confidential at this early, sensitive stage.56 Bosworth and
ss Breasted to Fosdick, December 6, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
56 Rockefeller to Martin Ryerson (hereafter designated Ryerson), August 4, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E,
Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
Breasted met in Cairo for the first time, in February 1925. Breasted also met with Lord Allenby
and presented the team's plan to him. He reported to Fosdick that Allenby was "sympathetic" to
the entire enterprise, and had forwarded the plans to the British Foreign Office for its assessment
of them."
Breasted's letter to Fosdick of February 2 6th, 1925 is one full of confidence in a
satisfactory outcome of the project. It is also the letter in which he makes a final break with
Fosdick's original idea of funding repairs to the existing museum. So, to the larger objective of
the project - U.S. (and continued Western) control of Egyptian Antiquities - was added a grand
architectural complex. Writing of the problems with the existing building, Breasted used
Bosworth's unfavorable assessment of its architecture, structure and practical considerations:
... We went over the old building several times and he [Bosworth] agreed
that architecturally the structure is grotesquely ugly, that functionally it is
totally unfitted to its purpose, and that structurally it is unsafe and even
destructive. He saw, also, the crowded condition of the exhibits and being
a man of the finest taste, at once caught the possibilities for the new
building. With a few hours after these examinations, he produced a very
beautiful and suggestive sketch for the new building. He then very quickly
and skillfully developed these sketches into plans of a really noble and
impressive building. It seemed to me at once to be the most splendidly
conceived museum building in the world.58
His meetings with Allenby gave Breasted further confidence in British cooperation.
Allenby approved of Breasted's scheme for presenting the proposal to the King first, and then the
s7 Breasted to Fosdick, February 5, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
58 Breasted to Fosdick, February 26, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister. 5 9 He also noted that the chief obstacle to the site
would be the evacuation of the British barracks. The British worried that construction of the new
barracks elsewhere would pointedly call attention to continued British presence in Egypt.
Breasted reassured him that this would not be a problem and, as a potential site for new barracks,
he suggested the Gezira Island across from the present barracks. To this letter to Fosdick,
Breasted also attached a document outlining the projected annual maintenance and upkeep cost
for the museum.60 Meanwhile, Bosworth spent his time in Cairo preparing drawings for the
proposed museum, which Breasted brought back with him on his return to the U.S.
Failed Engagements: The Breasted-Rockefeller Team & The British
The proposal book was the end result of the conception stage. During this phase, Breasted
had not only discussed the barracks site favorably with Allenby in Cairo, he had also made a
59 Breasted to Fosdick, February 26, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
Allenby put Breasted in touch with Mr. P. M. Tottenham, Under Secretary of State in the Department of Public
Works. Tottenham was the only British Secretary in the Department of Public Works. He agreed to pencil in his
suggestions on the draft for the letter to the King.
(In his letter to Fosdick, Breasted warned that the proposal would be unacceptable to the Egyptians unless the gift
was made without any expectation or mention of return of the money, revealing that this was initially part of the
scheme. Breasted also suggested lessening the number of years that the institution should be under Western control,
from thirty years to twenty.)
60 "Introductory notes on documents to be handed to the king." February 26, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E,
Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
The document shows that - at least at this stage - the team considered putting the (French) Director-General on the
payroll of the Egyptian Museum Commission, thereby making Pierre Lacau answerable to the Americans. Breasted
also made some suggestions as to the documents that should be submitted to the King: a letter from the donor
explaining the gift and an explanation of the gift agreement. He writes that the letter to the King should immediately
include the value of the gift, in order to sway the Egyptians' decision in favor of it:
"...it should be noted that the Oriental mind demands rather fullsome [sic] and highly colored statements in order to
be moved and led to adopt a desired line of action."
separate trip to London to discuss the project with the British Foreign Office (BFO) and
important politicians such as, Lord Balfour and Austen Chamberlain, as well as the British
Museum's Sir Frederick Kenyon to ensure that all these important British politicians,
archaeologists, museum directors etc. approved of the project. During this conception phase,
Breasted did not consult with any Egyptians.
In London, the BFO had agreed that the barracks site should be freed up for the project.
Prior to this journey to London, the team had reconsidered their approach with the French.
Breasted was now planning a trip to Paris to meet with the French Foreign Office. However, the
BFO believed that the team's original plan of leaving dealings with the French to the very end
was more suitable, and recommended that this should be the course of action.61 A relieved
Breasted readily agreed; with his customary disapproval of the French, he had no wish to deal
with them just yet. This is one of several instances where Breasted took British suggestions at
face value. He did not suspect the British of subterfuge or scheming, whereas he readily
attributed these qualities to the Egyptians.
Breasted's visit to London was quite successful, and did not prepare him for future
difficulties and failures to be encountered in Cairo. Armed with the proposal book in the fall of
1925, Breasted once again proceeded to Cairo, for the first of what would be a series of
negotiations.
61 Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles
Breasted, 390. See also, Breasted to Hale, July 20, 1925, folder 1925, box Correspondence between George Ellery
Hale and James Henry Breasted, James Henry Breasted Papers, OIA.
Allenby was no longer the British High Commissioner to Egypt and Sudan. Instead, Sir
George Lloyd had replaced him, transferring over from India. Breasted's first meeting with
George Lloyd did not give him cause for concern - the Commissioner was "distracted" 62 with his
new responsibilities, and requested time to consider the proposal. Breasted's description of this
meeting is rife with military terms:
... let me report the results of our first skirmish in the effort to dislodge a
British battalion from a post, which as they put it in their own
communications, "they have been occupying for forty years".. .63
Breasted evinced a genuine pleasure in political dealings with the British army. And
although on the surface the British army and the U.S. team would provide a united front for the
museum after the failed negotiations regarding the barracks' site, the tensions evident in their
initial association are illuminating. Even after the team agreed to compromise on the site, and the
British ostensibly declared support for the project, British backing was perhaps not completely
sincere.64
Breasted's negotiations with the British in Cairo at this time were conducted in secrecy:
the Egyptians and the French still did not know of the project. Breasted's confidence in the
62 Breasted to Fosdick, November 6, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
63 Ibid.
64 Charles seems to intimate as much in his book. When the project was first presented to the British in early 1925
during its preliminary stages, the then-High Commissioner Lord Allenby was receptive to it. But according to
Charles, George Lloyd (the future High Commissioner) was present at the meeting and maintained an air of
"malevolent neutrality" regarding the project. See, Breasted, Pioneer to the Past : The Story of James Henry
Breasted, Archaeologist, Told by His Son Charles Breasted, 381.
superiority of the United States' civilizing mission, which he felt should be given precedence
over any British military maneuverings or Egyptian nationalist sentiments, comes across strongly
in his reports to Fosdick. He wrote, perhaps too naively, that Lloyd was "unreserved in his
conviction that the plan ought to be carried out. Regarding the merits of the plan there is no
difference of opinion between us." And he was confident of the right of the American museum to
the land, and scornful of British presence on it:
Lord Lloyd's next remark was, that to put the plan through will raise many
serious snags for the British administration in Egypt, much opposition by
the army, and troublesome difficulties in housing the displaced troops. I at
once remarked, "I thought you would put them in the Abbassiyeh
Barracks". (I didn't add, "The fine new ones built for you with $2,000,000
of Egyptian money, on the understanding that you would evacuate the
Kasr en-Nil site, which we need for our project"!). Lloyd quickly
responded that they could not send all the Kasr en-Nil battalion so far
away. I let him know that there would be room for a portion of them north
of our site, and that they need not evacuate for six months after their
acceptance of our plans.s
Finally, Breasted wrote that the British requested extra time to consider, because they wanted to
discuss the American museum at a special meeting in the context of the "whole question of the
British Army in Egypt."66
This meeting had an unfavorable outcome for the Breasted-Rockefeller team. The British
army made an internal decision that they could not evacuate the site. The reasons were complex
65 Breasted to Fosdick, November 9, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
66 Ibid.
and varied and will be recounted here briefly.67 Two serious political crises, one within Egypt
and the other in French-held Damascus, led to this decision. The first crises was regarding the
competing interests of local Egyptian parties:
Lord Lloyd is now obliged to steer a safe and sane course among three
contending groups; first, the extreme and dangerous nationalists incapable
of maintaining public safety, led by Zaghloul; second, a palace coterie
forming a little irresponsible autocracy led by the King who is flouting
constitutional government; third, a Ministry of the worthiest and ablest
Egyptians, who are now being fought by both the nationalists and the
palace. The hostility between the King and the English is new, and
fundamentally affects the situation of our project, as I will presently
indicate. 68
Not yet willing to concede defeat in this "skirmish," Breasted met with Major General Sir
Richard Haking who was Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Egypt. He wrote that
Haking was forthright in his recognition of the fact that the British army had no real right to
occupy the Kasr al-Nil site: they had received money for new barracks from the Egyptians, and
the Home Government had instructed them to evacuate the site for the museum. Here, there is a
hint of fragmentation within the British ranks, for Haking asserted that, "...such a policy was
67 Breasted to Fosdick, November 29, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
68 Breasted to Fosdick, November 29, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. The British High Commissioner
apparently asked Breasted for his suggestion on handling the situation. Breasted advised him that the British should
use the one group to counter the other, "I said: 'Stand by the Ministry now, in order to clean up the palace, and then
rule through the palace.' This advice is based on the fundamental fact that real substance of power here is and will
continue to be the British Army. Public safety exists and will be maintained by this means alone. In the crisis of last
Saturday, reported in the enclosed clipping, the Zaghloulists who attempted to hold an illegal session of parliament,
were prevented from doing so only by the British troops."
very easy for a gentleman comfortably and safely occupying a swivel chair in a London office,
but it was quite different for a responsible officer on the ground." 69
In view of the difficulties, Breasted asked Rockefeller (and Fosdick) to reconsider the
issue of the site, and presented the almost certain failure of the original site in a positive light:
... our effort to secure the evacuation of Cairo to make room for this great
project, will inevitably leak out, and produce a profound impression, the
more profound because we failed. Even our failure therefore, will not be
entirely without good results.70
The Kasr al-Nil site was originally selected because the displacement of British barracks
by a cultural institution would present the whole U.S. enterprise to the Egyptian government in a
positive light, considering that the Egyptians themselves desired removal of the barracks. The
site's selection as a strategic move is confirmed by one of Fosdick's cablegrams to Breasted:
REMOVAL TO ISLAND SITE NULLIFIES OUR MOST EFFECTIVE
ARGUMENT WITH EGYPTIANS OF GETTING TROOPS OUT OF
CAIRO71
At first, Rockefeller would not consider an alternate site and instructed that the King
should be informed of the project, the desired site, and the British army's unwillingness to
69 Breasted to Fosdick, November 29, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
70 Breasted to Rockefeller, November 29, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
71 Fosdick to Breasted, November 27, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. Decoded on the 2 8th.
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evacuate said site. 2 But Breasted had begun to see the British point of view and the futility of
continued discussions over the barracks. Lloyd convinced Breasted that the British were trying to
act in the best interest of Egypt and Cairo. Breasted pressed Rockefeller and Fosdick to
reconsider. First, he argued that Haking and Lloyd were united in their efforts to oppose the
Home Government from fulfilling its pledge to the Egyptian government, but he also began to
see the Army's point of view. Haking had explained to Breasted that the barracks by the water
were necessary for both "defense and for victualing [sic] Cairo by water." He admitted that he
could "hold Cairo" from a post other than Kasr, but that protecting it would be hard. And here,
Breasted explained to Rockefeller the second reason for the Army's denial to move from the site
(and in the process took a swipe at the French):
Into this internal situation has now come the distressing destruction of
Damascus due primarily to the fact that a French garrison insufficient or
improperly posted to recover control of a city suddenly overrun by a
looting mob withdrew to their batteries commanding the city and opened a
72 Gumbel to Breasted, November 27, 1925, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
73 Lloyd and Breasted sent off a cablegram to Austen Chamberlain in the Foreign Office in London, in which both
stated their respective positions regarding the site. Although Breasted was resigned to an alternate site - and was
working to convince Rockefeller of the same, he did make one last attempt:
"My principals feel that so many important people now know of this project, that if it collapses they will insist on
knowing the reasons, which will have a regrettable effect on public opinion, both in Egypt and America. As we have
proceeded in reliance upon assurances of cooperation received in London, I am reluctant to sacrifice great
opportunity for Anglo-American cooperation without inquiring whether you have any suggestions which might
make this site available. Earnestly hope for early reply."
He was not really hopeful of a favorable reply and wrote to Rockefeller to prepare him for the outcome. He was
proven right. The British Foreign Office would ultimately not overrule the army's stance. Conditions at the British
and French empire's periphery (the Near East) had led to a readjustment of the BFO's earlier decision.
bombardment which to be sure drove out the mob, but also wrecked the
city.74
The French had held Damascus, but they had failed to protect it. Breasted warned Rockefeller
that if the Americans insisted on the matter and brought it to the Egyptians' attention as
Rockefeller had suggested, the project would be irrevocably "dead":
The reason is this: British retention of the barracks will become such a
valuable fighting point, that in order to keep it and continue to use against
the British, the Egyptians will not be willing to lose it by granting a
museum site to the project anywhere! Our project will have become a
political football, or better, merely a political club which the Egyptians
will not be willing to surrender by furnishing the museum with the needed
site!71
If the Americans on the other hand convinced the British to shift their troops to new barracks,
then the project would risk "being regarded as the occasion for the building of new British
barracks in Cairo." 76 Keeping all these points in mind, Breasted advocated exploring an alternate
site on the Gezira Island (across the water) that he described as a "charming park" of "unusual
beauty" planted with foreign trees. Located on this site, at the tip of the Gezira, the buildings
74 Breasted to Fosdick, November 29, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
75 Ibid.
76 In Breasted's opinion, insisting on the site would therefore have none of the advantages originally envisioned by
the team, save one: proximity of the new museum to the old and ease in moving the large sculptures. He argued that
if men thousands of years ago could find a way to move these heavy artifacts, surely a U.S. team could do the same
today.
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would "make a very impressive prospect from the city [w]ater front."77 Rockefeller was unhappy
with the decision at first, but eventually relented and when the Indenture-Agreement was finally
presented to the King, Exhibit A showed this site (Fig. 5).78
Chauncey Belknap reported subsequent developments to Fosdick. Writing on behalf of
Breasted, he portrayed the newly strengthened position of the British army due to the removal of
Nashaat Pasha, a palace official who was regarded with suspicion by both the nationalists and the
Ministry, and the resolution of a territorial claim made by the Italians. 79 Belknap wrote that
despite his initial feelings on the matter, the British army had demonstrated the necessity of its
presence in Egypt to both the Egyptians and the U.S., and was consequently in a strong position.
Now that the issue of the site was resolved, and the army was - on the surface at least - firmly
behind the museum proposal, the project should be presented to the Egyptians without any
further delay. He ended the letter on a high note expecting the King to approve the project.
Failed Engagements - The Breasted-Rockefeller Team & The Egyptians:
On February 8th 1926, Breasted wrote Fosdick apprising him about the project's progress
since its presentation to the King and, subsequently, to the Prime Minister. He characterized the
77 Breasted to Fosdick, November 29, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
78 The drawings in the proposal book (which had already been published) continued to show the preferred barracks
site, but since most of the urban context of Cairo was not distinguishable in these drawings, the team felt
comfortable using the proposal book. Close inspection of a few of the water-color plates does reveal the barracks
site, if one knows what to look for.
79 Belknap to Fosdick, December 28, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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complex political situation as, "a shifting kaleidoscope much too complicated to be caught and
successfully reported to you." 80 But he took the opportunity nevertheless to write in more detail
of:
... the misty background of ancient oriental experience and the resulting
traits of a mentality so remote from ours as to shift us into a different
world very difficult for modern men of western experience to understand
or even to conceive.81
This remote mentality, so far removed from western understanding and experience, manifested
itself in the inefficiency of the Egyptian government and its inability to accomplish anything.82
Breasted wrote that he was able to "move" the Egyptian government and to accelerate their usual
slowness. He listed the most important men in the negotiations: King Fua'd I, Ahmed Hassanein
Bey (the Royal Chamberlain, whom Breasted considered the "finest of the Egyptian"), Ziwar
Pasha, his Crown Counselor (the Italian Attorney General Signor Piola Caselli), the Judicial
Advisor of the Ministry of Justice (Judge Percival, an Englishman), the British Minister to Egypt
(Neville Henderson), and Lord Lloyd. Interestingly, he did not include the American
Ambassador to Egypt, Howell, whom he considered inept.83
80 Breasted to Fosdick, February 8, 1925, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
"It may be instructive to recall that under their new constitution the Egyptians have held and dissolved two
parliaments. These two parliaments talked for weeks and eventually succeeded in enacting one law and one only.
That law contained only one provision: it decreed an increase in the salaries of all members of parliament!"
[Emphasis Breasted's]
83 Due to his poor relations with the American Minister, Breasted had schemed with the State Department to leave
the Minister out of the conception stage and to bring him in only at the last minute, for the official audience with the
King. The Department agreed and urged him "...not to use this pompous and stupid old country doctor, from Ohio,
Of his dealings with the King, Breasted wrote that after "his initial fit of sulks" he was
now much more cooperative. Perhaps this cooperation allowed Breasted to be gracious towards
him and to describe him as a man interested in science.84 Breasted had a very high opinion of
Hassanein Bey. Hassanein was an Oxford graduate and a man of science, and strongly believed
that the museum and research institute - "those splendid buildings over there on the island" -
must be built as a "symbol of American friendship for Egypt." Of Ziwar Pasha, he also had a
very favorable opinion. It helped that Ziwar apparently agreed on the need for foreign scientists
in Egypt. 85
To illustrate Ziwar's point to Fosdick - and his own - Breasted described his encounters
with Ministers in the Egyptian government who were sympathetic to his cause and who agreed
with Breasted that Egypt had not produced her own scientists. For example, the Minister of
Education (Maher Pasha) lamented to Breasted that there was only one modern Egyptian who
had ever learned to read ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. 86 To Breasted, the solution lay in
a small town product." See, Goode, Negotiating for the Past : Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the
Middle East, 1919-1941, 105.
84 The King had financed Hassanein Bey's Sahara explorations.
85 Breasted to Fosdick, February 8, 1925, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
86 Here, Maher Pasha was referring to Ahmed Pasha Kamal. Maher told Breasted that Kamal had prepared a
manuscript for a book in Arabic on the monuments of Egypt, but Lacau felt it need some revisions before
publication. Kamal in the meantime had passed away and there was no Egyptian scholar in his wake who could
make the necessary revisions. In Whose Pharaohs? Reid writes about Ahmed Kamal's struggle for acceptance in a
field dominated by Europeans and uses this to explain the larger struggle for Egyptian Egyptologists. Kamal's
progress as an Egyptologist was a combination of passion for Egyptology, hard work, numerous publications and
internal European rivalry, which sometimes resulted in the promotion of an Egyptian over a rival European. Kamal
attended the School for Egyptology in Cairo, opened by the German Egyptologist, Henri Brugsch. But the Director-
General of the EAS at the time, Mariette Pasha, refused to hire graduates from the school. When Gaston Maspero
replaced Mariette as Director-General of the EAS, the policy was overturned. Mariette's prejudice against the school
and its graduates was only one of several obstacles that Egyptians faced - from Europeans - as they tried to achieve
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creating more posts for Europeans, instead of addressing the problem directly. He complained
that the government refused to create these additional posts, resulting in a loss to science.
In this same letter, Breasted reported that when the project was presented to Ziwar Pasha,
the latter discussed it with his Council of Ministers and requested changes to the original terms
and conditions. The Breasted-Rockefeller viewpoint of this account is best summarized in a
report prepared by Chauncey Belknap, on his voyage back to New York in which he carried the
Egyptian government's revisions.87 Belknap wrote that due to repeated warnings to the Egyptian
government of Rockefeller's almost-certain resistance to major changes to the Indenture, the
government had dropped many of its original requests. He stated that the pared down version of
revisions that were being submitted to Rockefeller, were required to make the project "legally
and politically feasible."88
He justified his (and Breasted's) decision to proceed with the presentation to the King,
instead of waiting for the political situation to further improve. Aside from the British army's
improved standing, they believed that the government of Ziwar Pasha would not last much
longer. (Elections were expected in April or May). Ziwar was "reasonable", "enlightened" and
"receptive to suggestions of international cooperation," as opposed to the nationalist party that
was likely to succeed him. Belknap described the latter as a "low breed of nationalist politician
some standing in the field. See, Donald M. Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian
National Identityfrom Napoleon to World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
87 "Egyptian Museum Negotiations: 1925-1926. Report by Chauncey Belknap," Belknap to Rockefeller, March 10,
1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
88 Belknap wrote, "Our first plan was simpler and more direct, but these are virtues which appeal more to western
than to oriental minds."
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who misleads his helpless countrymen with the cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians'." Belknap's
statement can be read as a hypocritical view of Egyptian nationalism, but a closer reading
perhaps reveals that Belknap sincerely believed in Egypt's inability to self-govern. Politicians
advocating Egyptian nationalism were, in Belknap's opinion, misleading their countrymen,
whereas politicians who 'understood' that Egypt needed foreign assistance, were "enlightened."
Belknap writes that the Americans were advised to have the project a "fait accompli"
before the new party came into power. Belknap and Breasted were reassured by Europeans
familiar with Egyptian ways, that "the Egyptians have great respect for an accomplished fact."
As Judge Percival (the English Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian government) said:
It is a long and troublesome process to bring these people to make up their
minds, but once a matter has been settled, it is always a surprise to see
how quickly they forget their objections and accept the new fact.89
Percival's statement (and Belknap's earlier statement) underscores Western conception of Egypt
and Egyptians. The West did not believe that Egypt was ready to face the responsibilities of
administration and maintenance of its antiquities, its future, and its governance. Their protests
did not amount to much and they could be easily maneuvered to accept their reality. The decision
was made to proceed.
Of the King's hostile reception of the project, Belknap expressed surprise that Fua'd did
not immediately accept the gift, given his recent unpopularity. The project would have boosted
his image. Belknap writes that, "There was a string tied to the gift, and he [the King} thought
89 "Egyptian Museum Negotiations: 1925-1926. Report by Chauncey Belknap," Belknap to Rockefeller, March 10,
1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
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more about the string than he did about the gift." However, the King changed his mind rather
quickly. 90 Belknap's twenty-one page document also included a four page section titled,
"Egyptian Vanity," in which he attributed the obstacles in the path of the team to said
characteristic:
Vanity, an overweening, absurd and, to westerners, often incredible
vanity, is the predominant trait of the Egyptian character. It is a vanity
which places appearances ahead of realities, and will accept the most
disagreeable dose if it is properly sugar-coated. 91
Egyptian vanity was the opposite of Anglo-Saxon traits:
... "amour proper." The trait of character to which they [Egyptians] refer
is at the opposite pole from the sturdy, self-respect of the Anglo-Saxon,
proud of his independence and resentful of intrusion upon it.9 2
These are interesting observations: Belknap has disdain for Egyptian vanity, but he was banking
on it for the project's approval. Egyptian refusal to immediately accept the project is not seen as
a sign of "self-respect" or "independence," rather it was seen as Oriental subterfuge or vanity.
90 King Fua'd apparently sent the following message to Belknap and Breasted after his initial hostile treatment of the
proposal:
"The King is sincerely grateful for the Donor's magnificent offer, and he wants exactly what you want, so far as
administration so concerned. He knows Egypt has no scientists, and that there must be western control. If the gift
had been made to him outright, he would have created just such a Commission as you plan, to operate the museum.
But he must be on guard against criticism for seeming to acquiesce in any transfer of the great collections to foreign
control. The Egyptian people have just received the gift of independence, and he must do nothing to wound their
self-esteem. He hopes a solution can be found which will enable the Egyptian Government to participate, or at least
to appear to participate, in the administration, not merely through the ministers who are members of the
Commission, but in some more direct way."
91 "Egyptian Museum Negotiations: 1925-1926. Report by Chauncey Belknap," Belknap to Rockefeller, March 10,
1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR, RAC.
92 Ibid.
108
After this digression on Egyptian vanity, Belknap turned back to the actual negotiations.
Ziwar asked Belknap to discuss the terms and conditions with Piola Caselli, the Royal
Counselor. The main objection to the gift was that under Egyptian constitution only the Egyptian
state could manage and operate museums. Antiquities were considered a natural resource. For a
foreign corporation (the Egyptian Museum Commission) to take over this work, a special law
would have to be passed. Even if the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) approved the proposal,
Parliament could block passage of this law. Caselli and his Egyptian colleague, Bedawy Pasha,
appealed for concessions that would allow the "appearance" of some kind of Egyptian control.
For example, they suggested that the employees of the Commission be considered Egyptian
officials, and that their appointment should be through dual control of the government and the
Commission. Belknap and Breasted had wired New York, enquiring if this would be possible.
Fosdick and Rockefeller wired back saying that it was absolutely unacceptable. (The Breasted-
Rockefeller team seemed divided over the issue. Rockefeller had never been to Egypt.
Meanwhile, Breasted and Belknap were on the ground and face-to-face with the Egyptians and
could see the lengths to which they had gone in order to find a solution for the project. They
probably began to realize the short-sightedness of their initial assumption that the project would
be acceptable to the Egyptians exactly as the team had conceived of it.)
After Rockefeller refused to compromise over the Egyptian government's inability to
select museum staff, the government asked instead for veto power, which was also denied. As a
last resort, they asked for veto power over the appointment of the Director of the museum. They
lost this point too. The disappointed Egyptians then came up with a compromise that Belknap
109
believed would be acceptable to Rockefeller and Fosdick. The Commission's functions - the
administrative and financial control - were to be separated out. The Egyptians recommended
creating another organizational body, the Egyptian Archaeology Foundation (EAF), for financial
administration of Rockefeller's donation. It could be incorporated in Great Britain, as the
Breasted-Rockefeller team had desired. The Foundation would not include Egyptians; only two
members each from Great Britain, France, and the United States. These same six members would
be in the Commission as well, where the two Egyptian members would join them. The
Commission would administer the museum, and its permanent President would be the Egyptian
Minister of Public Works. In this way, the control and operations of the museum would remain
an Egyptian government function, not that of an international corporation. Breasted and Belknap
recognized how much the Egyptians had compromised in order to accommodate the proposal,
and they wrote as much to Rockefeller. 93
On February 14 th, Breasted and Charles apparently anticipating a leak, released a press
statement hoping to control the news. Fosdick and Rockefeller reacted with dismay. The team -
showing media savvy - had earlier taken the Associated Press into confidence regarding the
project, so that when news of the project broke in Cairo, the press in the U.S. closely cooperated
with the Breasted-Rockefeller team in its coverage. 94 Regardless, once the story had broken, it
93 Breasted to Rockefeller, February 8, 1926, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
94 Rockefeller to Adolph S. Ochs at the NY times, February 20, 1926, folder 259, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR,
RAC. See also, Rockefeller to Mr. Cooper (General Manager The Associated Press), February 20, 1926, folder 259,
box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
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picked up quickly and the team was unable to control all subsequent publicity, perceptions of the
project (though these were generally positive), and even statements from their own team.95
Rockefeller personally received responses and reactions from his U.S. colleagues and
friends. Cyrus McCormick, an American businessman, wrote to Rockefeller cautioning him that
any agreement must take into account Sa'd Zaghlul's wishes.96 McCormick had visited Egypt
and had seen the Cairo Museum firsthand. He believed that the existing museum was actually
sufficient and that only a new building may be needed to serve as an annex. He suggested that
perhaps the Breasted-Rockefeller project was too ambitious in proposing two new buildings and
a corporation that would control Egyptian antiquity. He understood Breasted's ambition, and
seemed to suggest that he had overreached.
Meanwhile, the team in New York reviewed Egyptian modifications to the proposal,
accepted some and altered others, and sent them back to Egypt with Belknap. In a letter to
Breasted on March 22d , 1926, Rockefeller believed that the concessions made to Egypt - with
some safeguards - should be enough. He wrote:
95 "Egypt Accepts Museum, Says Rockefeller Aid," New York Herald Tribune, February 19, 1926, folder 259, box
25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC. The worst damage was done by an interview with Bosworth who, believing that
the project had been approved, said as much to the press and released the details of the project including the control
of antiquities for 30 years at the wish of Rockefeller Jr.
96 Cyrus McCormick to Rockefeller, February 19, 1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
McCormick described the events of spring 1925, when the King "prorogued the parliament" to void an
overwhelming majority received by Zaghlul. Without Zaghlul's consent, nothing would come of the museum
project. As far as the security situation in Egypt, the only elements keeping things under control were the "moral and
military power of the English." If the English were to leave, "intelligent observers of political events" believed that
Egypt would be fought over by Turkey or Italy, and in either case the outcome would be unfortunate.
Whatever the outcome may be, and of course of that we are uncertain, we
have the feeling that everything possible has been done to get the Egyptian
Government to permit itself to be helped in this important and far-reaching
enterprise.97
Charles Breasted's view that not a single change had been made was untrue. Rockefeller and
Fosdick's modifications included the creation of the post of Vice President under the permanent
President of the Commission. The Vice President would not be an Egyptian. He was entrusted
with the primary workings of the Commission and the President was reduced to a figurehead.
The Egyptian government would have no say in the Vice President's appointment. In an internal
communication, Rockefeller's lawyers advised Breasted that he need not explicitly call attention
to this (and some other) changes. But they also warned him that he had to use his judgment.
Above all, Rockefeller had to be protected against any future charge that he was "trying to put
one over the Egyptians."98
The modified proposal was presented to Ziwar Pasha, who apparently rejected it outright.
Breasted, under instructions from New York, refused to make further changes. He gave the
Egyptian government a fixed amount of time in which to respond and change its mind. When
nothing came of this, Rockefeller withdrew the offer.
97 Rockefeller to Breasted, March 22, 1926, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
9 Belknap to Breasted, March 10, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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On May 1, 1926, the Egyptian government presented its point of view regarding the
project's failure, in a communique in the French Cairo daily, L 'Espoir.99 In it, the Council of
Ministers (the Prime Minister's cabinet) presented their case. The document demonstrates
Egyptian willingness to cooperate and compromise with the Americans. But it also demonstrates
the difficulty of their endeavor. The Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers were not on the
same page necessarily, but both were trying in their own way to accept the proposal, while
asserting Egypt's right to control its own antiquity in the face of absolute Western opposition to
such an idea.
In a text devoid of Egyptian vanity and any associated "mistiness," the Government
stated the facts. The fact was that when His Excellency, the President of the Council (Ziwar
Pasha) received the gift, he asked his contentieux (Royal Counsels) to meet with Belknap in
order to understand the terms and conditions:
... it was not a question of an outright gift but of a gift subject to
conditions. It was, therefore, necessary to determine the extent of these
conditions and to consider the possibility of reconciling them with
Egyptian legislation.
The communiqu6 then stated that the task was difficult because Rockefeller had presented the
Egyptian government with detailed terms and conditions, and expected the government to agree
to them without any changes. After outlining the terms and conditions, the document went on to
state the problems raised by the Indenture. The first problem was that a statute was necessary to
99 "[Egyptian] Government Communiqu6 on the Rockefeller Gift to Egypt: (Translated from the French original,
appearing in L'Espoir, a Cairo daily, of May 1, 1926)," May, 1926, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG 3, OMR,
RAC.
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accept the gift; as per the Egyptian constitution, only the Egyptian government could control
Egyptian antiquity. A foreign corporation was not allowed to do so without the passage of a
special legislation. Even then, it could control Egyptian antiquity only for a short period. In order
to bypass this and simply receive an Executive Order, the Commission would have to be an
Egyptian government body, but Rockefeller was unwilling to accept this. The Egyptians'
solution in the end was to create the EAF, which took over financial control of the endowment
and its income. The Commission would now just control the museum. To "harmonize" their
functions, the six European members of the Commission (leaving aside the two Egyptian
members) constituted the Foundation's membership. The two Egyptian members in the
Commission were the Minister of Public Works and the Director-General of the EAS. The
Egyptian government stipulated that if the Director-General were a foreigner, a second Egyptian
member should be appointed: the Minister of Public Education. After this point, the communique
seems to suggest a division within the Egyptian government. It states that though the division of
labor made the project legally feasible, it resulted in reduced Egyptian participation in it. With
the creation of the Foundation, there were now two Egyptians to twelve Europeans and
Americans. 100 The document suggests that the revised agreement was never shown to the
Council of Ministers. Instead, it was kept between the contentieux, Belknap, and Ziwar. This
raises the question of whether the Council of Ministers would have agreed to the changes.
When Rockefeller accepted the proposed changes, modifying them in the process, the
contract was presented to the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet raised the issues of Egyptian
under-representation independently, and searched for a way to resolve that. In addition, they had
100 Six in the Commission and six in the Foundation.
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to resolve the modifications that Rockefeller made to the Egyptians' earlier draft, specifically the
introduction of a Vice-President in the body of the Commission.
The Council prepared several suggestions. First, the appointment of members of the
Foundation, and the foreign members of the Commission and the Vice President would have to
be approved by the Egyptian government. (Something that Ziwar and the contentieux had asked
for in the first round of negotiations and that Rockefeller had already rejected, with the exception
of the Vice President's appointment, since this post was a new creation that the Egyptians were
learning of for the first time). Second, in accordance with the Egyptian constitution and "in
conformity with the intentions of the donor to assist Egypt to assume her responsibilities for the
conservation of her antiquities," preference was to be given to Egyptians in the appointment of
museum and institute staff. Finally, the parliament would need to approve the gift. The
communique stated that while the Council was putting together these proposed changes, and was
fully prepared to accept the gift if said changes were accepted, it was surprised by Rockefeller's
withdrawal of the offer.
The government's version of the project's failure contradicts Charles Breasted's version.
The interaction between Ziwar and Breasted, during which the former apparently told the latter
that the proposal was "absolutely unacceptable," is only documented in Charles Breasted's book.
Charles was not actually present at this meeting. Furthermore, he was not a neutral observer and
recorder of events, as evidenced by his statement that Rockefeller had not made a single change
to the Egyptians' first draft. In the absence of accurate documentation, the Egyptian communique
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and the Breasted-Rockefeller team's lengthy correspondence assume importance. The merits of
the gift and the reasons for its failure arise from these considerations and analyses.
A third form of documentation also exists: the architectural design of the project. This
can be culled for clues and evidence of American intention. As part of his campaign to gather
support for the project, Breasted had earlier presented it to the British archaeologist, Cecil Firth.
Firth was active in Egypt at the time of the Breasted-Rockefeller proposal, and he had a solid
working relationship with Pierre Lacau, who he believed was acting in the best interests of
Egypt. Firth saw U.S. control of Egyptian antiquity as a problematic proposal and wrote as much
to Breasted:
Would your proposal have the slightest chance at success shorn of the
attractive bait of a fine museum[?] This is I think the acid test.'01
I argue that the design of the proposed New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute embodied
Breasted's concept of "obligation" and "opportunity." Furthermore, the design, and its beautiful
water-color illustrations, was used to cast the Breasted-Rockefeller "gift" in a softer light. The
next chapter analyzes the importance of architecture and site with respect to the Breasted-
Rockefeller gift.
101 Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine,
and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194.
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Chapter 4
DESIGN AND SITE AS BAIT
Proposed site plan showing the museum and research institute buildings overlaying the British
barracks.
Source: Oriental Institute Archives.
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Site and architecture were a fundamental part of the strategy of selling enhanced Western
control of Egyptian antiquity to the Egyptians. At the same time, the two stately and majestic
buildings and the original site with its important political associations would be used to send the
message of U.S. 'arrival' in both Egypt and the field of Egyptology, to "opinion leaders" around
the world. Therefore, from the very beginning, site, style, and materiality were major
considerations in Breasted's conception of the museum:
Under this land, the limestone lies thirty or forty feet deep. Rising on
imperishable piers of concrete based on this limestone, the new museum
should adorn this square. It should be built of massive white limestone
masonry, a structure as enduring as the Pyramids themselves, and suited to
shelter the priceless collections with[in] its walls to the end of time. It
makes my blood tingle to think of it even in imagination!'
In the above excerpt from the 1924 foundational letter to Raymond Fosdick, Breasted
envisioned a building and site that would suggest arrival, permanence, and solidity. Following in
the footsteps of Napoleon and Cromer, he used comparisons with ancient Egypt to legitimize the
project's imperial ambitions. He invoked the "enduring" Pyramids as symbols not just of
enduring construction, but also of a great empire and civilization, and used them to link the
greatness of ancient Egypt and its monuments to the great mission of the modern U.S.
civilization and the monuments it proposed to erect in Egypt.
These monuments - the museum and research institute - were designed as an elegant and
sprawling Beaux-Arts complex, beautifully illustrated in sixteen watercolor presentation
Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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drawings by the renowned architectural draftsman, William Walcot (Fig. 6-21). Originally, the
proposal book would have included a seventeenth drawing: a map showing the location of the
buildings (Fig. 23-24). Breasted instructed the architect, William*Velles Bosworth, to prepare
this drawing using a Baedeker travel map as template. On this drawing, the museum and research
institute were inserted in the location of the British occupied Kasr al-Nil barracks, which in turn
were completely erased from the map. The buildings were shown in close vicinity of the existing
French-run Cairo Museum.2 But after the failed negotiations with the British, the Breasted-
Rockefeller team switched to the new site across the Nile on to the tip of the Gezira Island, and
this drawing was not used (Fig. 22, 5).
This chapter uses four types of spatial analyses to examine Breasted's vision of the
United States' civilizational and imperial mission, as expressed in the New Egyptian Museum
and Research Institute: architecture, site, interior circulation, and geographic representation in
maps. Breasted based his arguments for a new museum on the "tawdry" construction and design
of the existing museum and its lack of facilities for "Science." 3 I begin with an architectural and
urban analysis of the preceding iterations of Egyptian museums in Cairo, leading up to the
French-built version (which still exists today and which the U.S. museum would have displaced).
I briefly analyze the design of this museum to unpack the French ambitions embodied within it.
In the third section, I describe Breasted's vision for the new museum building and the selection
of William Welles Bosworth as architect. Excepting one important and isolated communication
2 Breasted to William Welles Bosworth (hereafter designated Bosworth), July 19, 1925, folder Cairo Museum
Project - Correspondence: Bosworth, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
3 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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between Breasted and Bosworth, the team seems to have unanimously fallen behind the (neo-
classical / neo-Pharaonic) Beaux-Arts scheme. What was the significance of this style? Why was
it chosen over others, such as the Islamic revival style, which was actually quite prevalent in
Cairo at the time? These questions are considered in this section. In the fourth section, I describe
the final design of the museum and examine other factors that influenced it: Breasted's positivist
worldview, Taylorist concepts, references to ancient Egyptian architecture, and precedents set by
other (U.S.) museums at the time. The political negotiations over the original site are covered in
the previous chapter, and in the fifth section in this chapter, I turn to the symbolic and
ideological considerations for the selection of the original site. Next, I focus on the interior of the
museum, and examine Breasted's prescribed circulation through it. What can we deduce from
the hierarchy of spaces and the choice of artifacts in each space? What do these decisions tell us
about the Breasted-Rockefeller team's version of Egyptian - and world - history? Finally, I
focus on two important objects (equipment) in the Research Institute: a map and a globe, both of
which reveal Breasted's larger mission and ambition.
A Collection of Egyptian Museums
The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute - had the project succeeded - would
have been the sixth iteration since 1835 of an Egyptian Museum in Cairo. All six dealt almost
exclusively with Pharaonic Art, leaving out Egypt's Islamic Art - and to varying degrees - the
Coptic and Greco-Roman periods. The division and classification of the country's material
culture into four (4) distinct periods and fields of knowledge was crystallized at the turn of the
twentieth century by the creation of four (4) separate museums in Cairo and Alexandria - each
dealing exclusively with a different period. Egypt's European community initiated the division at
a time of increasing European political and cultural influence in the country. 4
Museum critics argue that contrary to earlier thinking, the museum has never stood
"outside of time and historical processes." Rather, it is a "committed participant" in the creation
of history.5 Indeed, the history of the division of Egypt's material culture and the creation of
Cairo's Egyptian museums reflect the struggle between Egyptian nationalists and Westerners to
use Pharaonic antiquity to their respective political ends, such as imperialism or nationalism.6
This history also reflects internal Western rivalries. The architecture, siting, and program of the
successive iterations of Egyptian museums in Cairo, articulate these struggles and rivalries, and
reflect the division of culture in Egypt.
4 Donald M. Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to
World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 1-2, 6-7, 258-59. The Coptic Museum was actually
created by Marcus Simaika, a Copt. But instead of viewing this as an exception to the rule, we should understand
Simaika's motivations within the context of the European creation of the Egyptian Museum, the Museum of Arab
Art, and the Greco-Roman Museum - all of which had been created prior to the Coptic Museum (which was
founded in 1908). Simaika used the museum to highlight the importance of the Coptic community and history to
Egypt. In the process, he unwittingly helped further the "division of culture." Reid describes Simaika as a "pioneer
who struggled to kindle enthusiasm for the antiquities and history of a vital phase or aspect of the national past."
Simaika was also influenced by European writings and scholarship, and his vision for the Coptic museum grew out
of these.
5 Tim Barringer, "Introduction," in Tim Barringer and Tom Flynn, eds., Colonialism and the Object: Empire,
Material Culture and the Museum (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), 4.
6 See Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World
War I, 9-10. See also, James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the
Middle East, 1919-1941, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007).
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Muhammad 'Ali's proposed, but never built, museum in 1835 was the first iteration of an
Egyptian museum in Egypt, followed by Auguste Mariette's Bulaq Museum in Cairo.7 (Fig. 25-
26). The Bulaq Museum was temporary, to be replaced by a grander complex, envisioned by
Mariette and Isma'il Pasha. Isma'il imagined this new museum as an inclusive institution with
separate buildings for Arab, Greek and Pharaonic Art. He hoped to include the Institut Egyptien
in this complex, which he imagined as a "true scientific center of Egypt." Mariette had several
sites in mind for this complex, but eventually chose the tip of the Gezira - the same spot that the
Breasted-Rockefeller team would reconcile itself to, six decades later.
Perhaps Isma'il conceived of the proposed museum as part of his modernization scheme
for Cairo, which had already resulted in urban changes, construction of the Khedivial (Royal)
Opera House, and construction of new bridges and palaces, all in preparation for the Suez Canal
opening ceremonies in which the Khedive expected to entertain European monarchs and
dignitaries. Egypt's bankruptcy put the museum project on hold, and when it started back up, the
Europeans, who were now firmly in control of both Egyptian antiquity and Egypt itself, directly
guided its mission.
Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I,
104. At the Bulaq, Mariette renovated existing courts in a neo-Pharaonic style. He may have been influenced by
other neo-Pharaonic buildings and interiors of the time, such as the Egyptian Hall in Piccadilly (1812) and the
interior of the Neues Museum in Berlin (1850). The arrangement of artifacts at the Bulaq museum resembled
Champollion's scientific arrangement at the Louvre, but Mariette occasionally deviated from this in favor of a more
aesthetic layout, which he felt would attract local Egyptians.
8 Ibid. All information regarding Isma'il Pasha's museum, has been synthesized from Reid's book.
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France's Cairo Museum
In between the transfer from Bulaq to the new French-built Cairo museum (1889-1902),
the collection was housed at Isma'il's palace in Giza - a move that was opposed and derided by
concerned individuals and archaeological societies (such as the Society for Preservation of the
Monuments of Ancient Egypt). The Giza Palace had what was described as a "half-French, half
Oriental" style that was deemed "incongruous" and unsuitable for Pharaonic artifacts? (Fig. 27).
The neo-classical fagade of the new museum must have seemed much more suitable - and
familiar. European museums at the time, such as the Altes Museum in Berlin and the British
Museum in London, were built mostly in neo-classical styles.' 0 (Fig. 28)
The architecture and urban setting of the new museum represented the political and
cultural climate of Egypt in 1902. The French saw themselves as founders of Egyptology and
leading scholars in the field, in comparison to other European scholars and "the savage ignorance
of the Turks"." But in the face of British military presence in Egypt, the French aimed to set
themselves apart as leaders in archaeology and to emphasize Egypt as their "archaeological
protectorate." To add to this, they (along with the British) were now in control of government
departments in Egypt. Their power in Egypt, and their self-projection as leaders in the science of
Egyptology, is reflected in the design of the Cairo Museum.
9 Ibid., 193. The Giza Palace was built and decorated for Empress Eugene's stay in Cairo, during the Suez Canal
opening festivities.
10 Ibid., 192. The neo-classical tradition was by far the most prevalent style for museums at the time, such as the
British Museum's fagade (built in 1901), the Metropolitan Museum of Art's fagade (added in 1902), the new
building for the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (1907-1909), and the Antiquities Museum designed by Antoine
Vallaury in Istanbul (1891-1907).
" E. de Verninac Saint-Maur as quoted in Ibid., 1. Saint-Maur was a French naval captain.
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The French architect, Marcel Dourgnon, was chosen for the project. He designed the
museum in the neo-classical tradition favored by the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, France's famed
architectural academy' 2 (Fig. 29). In order to relate the neo-classical fagade to the collections
within, Dourgnon included Pharaonic elements such as the pylons (inspired by ancient Egyptian
temples), which framed the central entry arch and columns (Fig. 30). In his book, Whose
Pharaohs? and his article, "French Egyptology and the Architecture of Orientalism," Donald
Malcolm Reid analyses Dourgnon's design and finds in it further strong visual statements of a
European, specifically French, claim to Egypt's Pharaonic past. Honorary plaques on the fagade
placed ancient Greeks (who wrote about the Pharaonic past), and modem European scholars
amongst the ancient Pharaohs themselves. France's superiority in this science was literally
inscribed on the fagade; the plaques honored more French Egyptologists than those from any
other country. Reid writes that the number of names awarded to each European power was
determined by two principles: "scholarly achievement of the individual named (the ideal of
scholarly internationalism) and the balance of foreign power in Egypt (competing
imperialisms)." The balance of power seems to have won out; though the French did dominate
12 Dourgnon's version of the Beaux-Arts tradition perhaps took its cue from Bramante's Romanesque style, which
was popularized by World Expositions, such as the Universal Exposition of 1900 in Paris. The Expo saw the design
and construction of the Grand Palais and the Petit Palais, both of which were much-admired examples of the Beaux-
Arts at the time. The competition for the Petit Palais was held in 1895, the same year as the competition for the
French-built Cairo Museum. For more information on the Grand and Petit Palais see, Arthur Drexler et al., The
Architecture of the tcole Des Beaux-Arts (New York
Cambridge, Mass.: Museum of Modem Art;
distributed by MIT Press, 1977).
" See, Donald Malcolm Reid, "French Egyptology and the Architecture of Orientalism: Deciphering the Fagade of
the Cairo's Egyptian Museum," in Franco-Arab Encounters : Studies in Memory of David C. Gordon, Eds., David
C. Gordon, L. Carl Brown, and Matthew Gordon, Franco-Arab Encounters : Studies in Memory ofDavid C. Gordon
(Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996).
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the field for quite some time, in 1902 German Egyptologists such as Adolf Erman were equally -
if not more - well-known. Germany, however, did not have the same influence in Egypt as the
French and British, and this was evident on the fagade. All major European Egyptologists were
also represented by the installation of their busts in the museum's garden, but French domination
was again emphasized by an imposing statue of Mariette in this garden, and the naming of the
street to the side of the museum, Shari'a Mariette Pasha.
No U.S. Egyptologists were named or honored, showing the lack of U.S. scholarship in
the field and U.S. political power in Egypt. Though Breasted was active in Egyptology at this
time, he and his U.S. contemporaries (such as George Reisner and Albert Lythgoe) were not that
well known in the field. It would take several more years for the Oriental Institute - and for
Breasted - to demonstrate the United States' scholarly leadership in the field, and for the country
to emerge as a player in Egyptian politics.
Local (native) Egyptologists - such as Ahmad Kamal who was active from 1881 to 1914
- were also excluded, sending a clear message to modem Egyptians that Egyptology was a
European science and pursuit. However, the architect and sponsors did make a concession to the
Egyptian sovereign. Abbas Pasha's name appears above the entrance but, as Reid notes, it was in
Latin and would have been incomprehensible to most Egyptians.14 The gesture signified his role
14 Reid, Whose Pharaohs? : Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War L
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as just a figurehead; a "collaborating elite" who had to nevertheless be acknowledged and
granted some semblance of power by the empire(s)."
The museum was situated in Maidan al-Isma'ili'yah (Tahrir Square), in Isma'ili'yah, a
modern ('western') quarter influenced by principles of French city planning.1 6 As a result of
growing European influence in Cairo in the latter half of the nineteenth century, parts of the city
had begun to take on the appearance of a Western city, resulting in the well-known phenomenon
of a 'dual city,' with its 'native' quarters and its 'European' or 'Western' quarters. This
modernization (Westernization) of Cairo was actually initiated by Egyptian rulers, particularly
Isma'il Pasha, who was influenced by Western models.' 7 Today Tahrir Square is filled with
buildings, but in 1902 it was fairly empty and imposing. It contained only two buildings: the
museum and the British occupied Kasr al-nil barracks, respectively the symbols of French and
British imperialism. The Square's location in the so-called 'Western' quarter of the city
emphasized the very 'Western' nature of this science, and Western (European) claim to it.
15 See, George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, By Way of Basra," in
Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin W.
Moore. (New York, London: The New Press): 135-156.
16 Janet Abu-Lughod, "Tale of Two Cities: The Origins of Modem Cairo" in Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 7, No. 4. (Jul., 1965), 429-457.
17 Modernization was motivated by a desire to prepare Cairo for the Suez Canal opening ceremonies in 1869, when
the Egyptians expected to entertain such foreign dignitaries as French Empress Eugenie of France. The urban
changes were also motivated by problems of congestion and traffic in the older city, which later came to be called
the "Arab" city. Urban changes resulted in the creation of boulevards radiating out from maydans. This
"Haussmanization" of Cairo took place after Isma'il returned from his 1867 trip to Paris, where he met Baron
Haussman. The larger result was a bifurcation of the city into what were perceived as "Arab" (native) quarters and
"modern" (European) quarters, even though the urban changes were undertaken by the Egyptians (albeit with
significant European architectural and engineering input).
127
The creation of the Egyptian Museum coincided with the creation of the Museum for
Arab Art (in 1900), the Greco-Roman Museum in Alexandria (in 1902), and the Coptic Museum
(in 1908) (Fig. 31-33). Each was in an urban location and in an architectural style 'appropriate'
to its contents (Fig. 34). Tourists - the main visitors - were instructed by early twentieth century
guidebooks to visit the museums in "chronological" order, which meant visiting the Egyptian
Museum in Cairo first, taking the train to the Greco-Roman Museum in Alexandria, returning to
Cairo for the Coptic Museum in the old quarters of Cairo, and ending their journey at the
Museum of Arab Art, located in the 'Arab' or 'Muslim' quarters.!8
In his essay, "The Crystalline Veil and the Phallomorphic Imaginary," 19 Donald Preziosi
links the creation of the four (4) museums in Egypt at the turn of the twentieth century to the
colonial exhibitionary order displayed in the essay title's referents: the Crystal Palace and the
Great Exhibition. He writes of Europe's vision of itself as the "brain of the earth's body" and the
Crystal Palace as a "laboratory table" upon which all things and peoples could be scientifically
examined, objectively displayed, and categorized. Objects represented the cultures and
individuals that produced them, and Art had a history that was coterminous with the history of
the people who produced it. Like art history and the colonial exhibitionary order, the museum
18 Donald Preziosi, "The Museum of What You Shall Have Been." In Making Cairo Medieval, ed. by Nezar
AlSayyad, Irene A. Bierman and Nasser Rabbat. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington Books,
2005), 134.
19 Donald Preziosi, In the Aftermath of Art: Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics. Critical Voices in Art Theory and Culture.
Edited by Saul Ostrow. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 95-113.
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was a "pantographic instrument for projecting that larger abstraction, 'Egypt', up from its relics
and minutiae."20
Europeans emphasized, and were primarily interested in, Egypt's Pharaonic past over its
Coptic and Islamic pasts. By creating separate museums for each period, by assigning the name
"Egyptian" to the museum housing almost exclusively Pharaonic art, and by giving this museum
"urban centrality", the Europeans created a museological order that reflected their "perspectival"
view of Egyptian history.21 This positivist exhibitionary order (or perspectival view) reasserted
itself in 1926, in the design and urban location of the New Egyptian Museum and Research
Institute.
Breasted argued for new buildings on the basis of the state of disrepair of the existing
museum; the French museum - according to him - was obsolete as a result of shoddy
construction, poor aesthetic decisions, and lack of scientific facilities for the Egyptologist. Only
about twenty years after it was opened to the public, he described the museum as dilapidated and
overcrowded in the foundational letter to Fosdick in 1924. Members of the team who visited the
museum firsthand, supported Breasted's opinions. In another letter to Fosdick, he wrote that
Bosworth had deemed the building "grotesquely ugly,"2 2 during his reconnaissance trip to Cairo
in early 1925. At Breasted's request, he inspected the existing building for structural insecurity,
(which the former suspected):
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Breasted to Fosdick, February 26, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
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I conclude that it [structural insecurity] is so; for when the building was
new it failed to stand up in more places than one, and when the French
architect who built it was reproached for its insecurity he proudly replied,
"Messieurs, je suis artiste. , 23
Falling ceilings, flooding basements and generally cramped quarters had put the greatest
collection in the world in "serious danger. "24 Apart from practical and real dangers in the
museum, Breasted commented disparagingly on the design itself:
Like all of the tawdry buildings put up in Egypt by Italian and French
architects, the Museum is built of brick masonry, plastered over with a
hard stucco imitation of stone. This seems particularly regrettable in view
of the fact that vast limestone quarries arise immediately east and south-
east of Cairo, and furnish a magnificent quality of white limestone almost
like marble. Moreover the masonry and stucco surfaces of the Museum are
obviously very badly done.25
In addition to neglecting to use majestic, readily available material, Breasted also wrote
of French negligence and lethargy in the maintenance of the museum, such as the repair of
damaged staircases, ceilings etc. French negligence also extended to the scientific facilities
required of such a museum; though the library had a wonderful collection of books, it was
housed in a windowless room and was closed two days a week, resulting in serious loss of time
for the "visiting scientist." Summing up the situation, Breasted wrote that even if the collections
23 Breasted to William Welles Bosworth (hereafter designated as Bosworth), February 9, 1925, folder Cairo
Museum Project - Correspondence: Bosworth, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers,
OIA.
24 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
25 Breasted to Fosdick, October 7, 1924, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and
Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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were to survive in such a dangerous, unremarkable building, the lack of facilities and of good
lighting would make it "impossible for Science to utilize them."26
It is significant then that - by Breasted's account - the museum that symbolized French
authority and supremacy in Egyptology and French power in Egypt was, after only two decades
of existence, dilapidated, crowded and hostile to 'Science.' This last was the ultimate insult to
the French (who saw themselves as restorers of science to Egypt), 27 and Breasted's greatest
weapon, since he predicated both his career as a 'new' Orientalist, and U.S. dominance in the
field, on a scientific approach to Near Eastern archaeology. The existing museum's structural,
architectural, and scientific defects were physical signs of the end to French domination over
Egyptology, Egyptian antiquity, and the power structure in Egypt.
After inspecting the existing museum, Bosworth surveyed the barracks site, and worked
out a preliminary plan for the museum and research institute and its site layout, which Breasted
enthusiastically endorsed in letters to Fosdick and Rockefeller. Heading back to Europe,
Bosworth fleshed out the design, keeping in close touch with Breasted. Working with Walcot, he
produced watercolor illustrations for the proposal book.
26 Ibid
27 See, Todd B. Porterfield, The Allure of Empire : Art in the Service of French Imperialism, 1798-1836 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Bosworth and the Beaux-Arts
Though Breasted enthusiastically approved of Bosworth's neo-Pharaonic - early Beaux-
Arts scheme, he initially instructed the architect to look elsewhere for models:
I wish you would think about the feasibility of a new building in Saracen
style, - especially as represented by the mosques of Cairo. Such a mosque
as that of Sultan Hassan below the citadel suggests some imposing and
grandiose exteriors; while the court of Mohammad Ali's mosque, with
reservations for its Stamboul [Istanbul] tawdriness, furnishes interesting
hints of what a museum court in this style might be. All this brings up the
whole question of the appropriateness of such a style, for a museum
building, which might thus obtrude itself upon the observer at the expense
of the collections it shelters. 28
This is the only recorded incidence of anyone involved in the project considering the
"Saracen" (Islamic) architectural style for the new buildings. The eventual dismissal of the style
as an appropriate representation for an "Egyptian" museum shows that the team ultimately
considered it inappropriate or incongruent - despite its preponderance in Egypt at the time. Since
the museum's architecture had to portray 'arrival' and 'solidity' the rejection of the Islamic style
as appropriate shows that the team believed that this style could not convey the necessary
messages.
The Sultan Hassan mosque is a Mamluk structure built between 1356 and 1363.
Mohammad Ali's mosque was begun in 1828 and finished around the time of the Viceroy's
28 James Henry Breasted to Bosworth, February 9, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Bosworth,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. (This is an ambiguous passage. I read it as
Breasted's suggestion to Bosworth to consider a Saracen style building. But, it can also be read as Breasted's
ambivalent or non-committal 'response' to Bosworth's suggestion for the same. In the absence of such a suggestion
by Bosworth in the archives, the first reading seems more appropriate).
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death in 1849. The former was the greatest mosque in the Muslim world at the time of its
construction. Following a shortage of labor in Egypt at the time, it was built and decorated by
craftsmen from all over the Mamluk empire, and as a result is an eclectic, hybrid structure
featuring architectural elements and details not typically found in Cairo. The mosque and the
funerary building create a majestic, beautiful brick complex of Mamluk origins, but their
massing and fenestrations also imbue the buildings with a contemporary aesthetic 29 (Fig. 35-36).
Muhammad Ali's mosque was the largest one built in the first half of the nineteenth century. The
admittedly unattractive structure is also the most imposing one in the Citadel of Cairo.30 It
departed from other nineteenth-century Cairene structures by consciously rejecting the prevalent
Mamluk architectural style and instead adopting the Ottoman style as a means of politically
confronting the Ottoman Porte. But the mosque also featured European and ancient Egyptian
influences, both of which had come to Egypt through Istanbul, and through European architects
practicing in Egypt (Fig. 37). By adopting the Ottoman style and by using architectural elements
from European and ancient Egyptian traditions, it created a break with the Mamluk architectural
tradition in Cairo and with Mamluk rule. The introduction of the new style heralded the new
29 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Cairo of the Mamluks : A History of the Architecture and Its Culture (London ; New
York
New York: I.B. Tauris;
In the United States and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 201-14.
30 The mosque's construction and location had symbolic meaning, since there was no practical need for it; an
existing mosque adjacent to it could have served all congregational needs. Rather, the mosque was built as part of
Muhammad 'Ali's legacy in Egypt, and by building it over an existing Mamluk "hall of justice," the mosque
symbolically - and literally - replaced the old rulers, their system, and their architecture.
ruling dynasty of Muhammad 'Ali. Historians consider the structure as the first modem (and not
necessarily, Western) Islamic structure. 3 1
Thus, both the Sultan Hassan and Mohammad 'Ali mosques are historically and
architecturally significant examples of the Islamic style and the Islamic revival style
respectively, and both demonstrate how different architectural traditions and elements can be
incorporated within Islamic architecture. Furthermore, Islamic revival architecture was popular
in Cairo in the early twentieth century. European architects actually introduced the style to Cairo;
Europeans had studied Islamic architecture out of intellectual curiosity, but also to 'know' the
lands and people they wished to rule. The style was used in both private villas and public
structures, such as the palace for Khayri Bay (1870), the Museum of Arab Art (1902) (Fig. 31),
the Ministry of Waqf building (1915), and the first national bank of Egypt, the Bank Misr
headquarters (1927). In Europe and the West, Islamic revival was considered appropriate for
buildings serving exotic functions, but in the Islamic world, the style began to assume national
32
and religious significance. Breasted may have considered this style in order to communicate
with Egypt's modem-day inhabitants, in opposition to the French-built museum's indifference to
them. " He may have truly admired the style. But though he brought it to Bosworth's attention,
31 Mohammad Al-Asad, "The Mosque of Muhammad 'Ali in Cairo," in Muqarnas, Vol. 9, (1992): 39-55.
32 , "The Re-invention of Tradition: Neo-Islamic Architecture in Cairo," Akten des XXVIII.
Internationalen Kongresses fur Kunstgeschichte Berlin, 15. - 20. Juli 1992 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993): 425 -
36.
3 We do not know if Breasted imagined a building solely in an Islamic revival style, or whether he imagined a
hybrid aesthetic, which could take elements of "Saracen" style and combine it with the neo-classical - the prevalent
museum style. One such example would have been the Indo-Sarcenic Victoria Memorial in India (built between
1906 and 1921), which combined Mughal elements with Britain's favored Gothic Revival style.
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Breasted remained unsure if it were actually appropriate for the collection, or whether it might
instead "intrude" on the observer. He deferred to the architect.
Bosworth was known for his discretion and for his ability to handle demanding jobs and
clients, but he was able to manage these expectations without compromising his design concept
and aesthetic vision. 34 Perhaps he steered Breasted towards the Beaux-Arts style because he
deemed the Islamic style 'inappropriate' for housing Egyptian antiquity.3 5 Perhaps he deemed it
inappropriate for what was really a Western institution. Maybe the decision in favor of the
Beaux-Arts was determined by the fact that most museum buildings in Europe and the U.S. at the
time were built in a Beaux-Arts style. But most likely, Islamic revival was ultimately rejected
because the team rejected modem Egyptian claim to Egyptian antiquity. With a few exceptions,
most of Breasted and Bosworth's discussions about the architecture of the museum took place in
person when they met in Cairo and the archives are unfortunately light in matters of design
decision. However, with some background knowledge of Bosworth, of his past collaborations
with Rockefeller, and of the importance of U.S. affinity for the Beaux-Arts style, we can
speculate why this style prevailed.
Letters between Rockefeller, Breasted, and Martin Ryerson (a Trustee for the Field
Museum in Chicago and Rockefeller's advisor in matters relating to museum design) show that
3 Mark Jarzombek, Designing Mit : Bosworth's New Tech (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2004), 57.
* In the proposal book, Breasted presented Bosworth's vision of the museum's architecture, "In the words of the
architect himself, "it is to be given a treatment as to style-expression which relates it harmoniously with what it is to
contain, or as Viollet-le-Duc phrases it in his definition of style, 'an expression appropriate in every respect to its'
use'.
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Rockefeller chose Bosworth for the initial design phase and presentation drawings, primarily
because he could be trusted to keep the project confidential.36 Bosworth was Rockefeller's
personal architect and had catered to several other high profile clients, including V. E. Macy (one
of the Trustees for the New Egyptian Museum).37 Bosworth's connections in highly respected
circles and his self-projection as a "gentleman's architect," 38 assured Rockefeller that he could
be trusted with this sensitive project.39
Bosworth's first job for Rockefeller (whom he met through Macy) was a landscape
design commission." Over the course of their acquaintance, Bosworth designed townhouses,
bridges, international houses, churches etc. Through these design commissions, the two
developed a close relationship and Bosworth began to influence Rockefeller's art and
architectural pursuits. For example, he introduced Rockefeller to restoration needs at Versailles,
Fontainebleau, and Reims, which resulted in a restoration project that spanned twelve years and
36 Rockefeller to Ryerson, August 14, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
3 Jarzombek, Designing Mit : Bosworth's New Tech, 62-64. See also, S. Quentin Jacobs, "William Welles
Bosworth: Major Works," (Masters thesis, Columbia University, 1988). Other prominent clients included, Theodore
Newton Vail, the U.S. telecommunications industrialist, and Frank A. Vanderlip, the American banker.
38 Jarzombek, Designing Mit: Bosworth's New Tech, 71.
39 Interestingly, it was Bosworth who later strayed farthest from the team's tightly orchestrated press release and
publicity scheme. Misunderstanding the situation and unaware of recent developments, he told journalists in Paris
that the project had been approved by the Egyptian government, while the government and the Breasted-Rockefeller
team were actually in the middle of sensitive negotiations. See, Breasted to Belknap, February 28, 1926, folder
Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence
A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
40 The landscape design commission was at Kykuit, an estate built for Rockefeller Sr.
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cost $2.85 million.41 At the time of the New Egyptian Museum project, Bosworth was in France
where he was supervising this work.42
In addition to Rockefeller's projects, Bosworth's other notable commissions were the
American Telephone and Telegraph headquarters in New York,43 and the campus for the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge.44 The practical and symbolic needs of
these projects were similar to the requirements of the New Egyptian Museum. In addition to
accommodating rapidly expanding operations at both AT&T and MIT, Bosworth was asked to
design buildings that could enhance the image of both institutions4 5 (Fig. 38-40).
4' Quentin Jacobs, "William Welles Bosworth: Major Works," (Master's Thesis, Columbia University, 1988), 21. Of
Bosworth and Rockefeller's relationship, Jacobs writes:
"As their friendship grew over the years, the architect helped the capitalist-philanthropist find a route to self-
expression outside Rockefeller business and charitable concerns by cultivating John D., Jr.'s aesthetic sense through
building, through the accumulation of art objects, and, in what may be seen as a logical progression from these first
two activities, through the restoration of historic structures."
42 For Breasted, the patron and architect's collaboration over these restoration projects was beneficial for the New
Egyptian Museum; he believed that when the time came, the collaboration would go a long way towards winning
French approval for the project.
43 Quentin Jacobs, "William Welles Bosworth: Major Works," 85: "the most consistently classical skyscraper ever
built."
44 See, Jarzombek, Designing Mit : Bosworth's New Tech.
45 Quentin Jacobs, "William Welles Bosworth: Major Works," 87.
As Bosworth himself described his client's wishes:
"It was the aim of Mr. Vail that this vestibule [of the building] should express the ideal the Telephone Company
stands for. A great public service of the highest character, where quality, durability and permanence are established
in solid values. Not where quick and superficial effects for momentary gain are the aim, but where the spirit is that
of a highly organized and fundamental public institution...."
AT&T had recently come under suspicion from the U.S. government because of its market monopoly.
Simultaneously, the company was beginning to face local competition. Bosworth was hired to create a building that
could accommodate not only the company's expanding operations, but also one that could also make a statement of
corporate stability, reliance and legitimacy. For the MIT campus, which Bosworth was hired to design in 1913 and
which was his major commission prior to the museum, he was entrusted with a similar task. Leaving aside practical
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For these projects, Bosworth consistently turned to the formal language of Beaux-Arts
neo-classicism. The fact that the Beaux-Arts style was widely understood to represent these
values, and that Bosworth was an "unabashed Beaux-Arts neo-classicist," 46 is unsurprising. The
style was derived from the academic teachings of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, which opened in
France in 1797, and went on to have an enormous influence in that country and in the U.S.4 7
The Ecole emphasized a thorough knowledge and grounding in the architecture of
antiquity. Reflecting general Western bias, the antiquity that the Ecole typically looked back to,
was that of classical (Greco-roman) origins, which led to the neo-classical designs associated
with the school and movement. Within this general neo-classical aesthetic, Beaux-Arts planning
considerations, Bosworth had to send a clear, definitive message to Harvard - and the Boston public - that MIT
would not consider merging with the more-established school. Bosworth received the MIT commission due to his
connection with MIT's benefactors, Rockefeller and Vail. See, Ibid.
46 Quentin Jacobs, William Welles Bosworth: Major Works (Master's Thesis, Columbia University, 1988), 1.
4? See, James Philip Noffsinger, The Influence of the Ecole Des Beaux-Arts on the Architects of the United States
(Washington,: Catholic University of America Press, 1955).
In his thesis, Noffsinger writes that even prior to the Ecole, American architects (Jefferson being a prime example)
were almost always influenced by French trends in architecture. The United States did not have a proper architecture
school until MIT's opened in 1865. Architectural influence therefore came from Europe. Of all European influences,
French influence probably prevailed because of the sympathetic attitude of powerful Americans towards French
culture at the time:
"The French influence felt in this period was in competition with a strong English influence. The general feeling in
the United States, however, probably placed the French in better standing than the English. There had been two wars
with Great Britain and powerful men like Jefferson and Franklin were always more in sympathy with the Gallic
traditions of cultural excellence." (p.6).
When the Ecole des Beaux-Arts opened in 1797, American architecture students began to attend it. They brought the
Beaux-Arts influence with them when they returned to the U.S. Moreover, when U.S. schools were created, they
were headed either by French architects or academics, or by Americans trained in the French Beaux-Arts tradition.
U.S. architecture schools were therefore modeled on the Ecole.
Bosworth, himself, studied both at MIT and the Ecole. The peak years of American attendance at the Ecole were
between 1897 and 1921 and it is in this period that Bosworth attended the Academy.
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principles emphasized spatial hierarchy, clear transitions, frontal axiality, and logical circulation,
all of which were expressed in the building's fagade, section, and plans. Ornament was usually
symbolic (not overly decorative, though this would change later) and was used to provide a
suitable 'character' for the buildings. The suitability - and hence the choice and placement of
ornament - was determined by the function of the building, its social relevance, and the message
that the client and architect wished to convey.
Bosworth, like other architects, found creative expression and synthetic freedom within
the Beaux-Arts tradition. It allowed him to synthesize historical references from other nations
and periods within the basic neo-classical framework.48 For Bosworth, the synthesis and use of
these different styles and traditions (such as the neo-Pharaonic elements in the museum and
research institute buildings) and the lack of a pure historical style, was appropriate for a country
such as the United States; with its diversity of backgrounds and cultures, and the variety and
scope of international interests of its wealthiest men (such as Rockefeller) the U.S. could
accommodate and own all styles.49
48 S. Quentin Jacobs, William Welles Bosworth: Major Works.
Bosworth's landscape designs, such as those for Rockefeller at Kykuit (and for the lawyer, Samuel Untermyer at
Greystone) were eclectic, and combined influences from various styles of national gardens, including Persian,
English and French.
49 Ibid. Jacobs quotes Bosworth from an article the latter wrote:
"Thus in America to-day, the gardens have no pure historic style; and, we believe, very fitly so. A country composed
of a population of such varied ancestry, so large that its local traditions are equally varied, and yet so bound together
by the rapidity of intercommunication and the multiplicity of its publications ... should rightly be bound down by no
fixed historical styles."
Analyzing Bosworth's quote, Jacobs writes:
"Herein lies the key to the eclectic character of Bosworth's designs for both Kykuit and Greystone. The terraces at
Kykuit provide a platform for formal and botanical features of divergent national traditions synthesized into an
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Though the Beaux-Arts began its decline in the U.S. around 1922, around the time of the
Breasted-Rockefeller project, the style provided an authoritative compositional and formal
language that was still easily recognizable and that was understood to represent major
institutions. And after Breasted's initial suggestion regarding the "Saracen" style, it was the
accepted choice for the New Egyptian Museum:
He [Bosworth] undoubtedly has very good taste and is also, I understand,
a Beaux Arts man - a distinct advantage for the monumental and formal
treatment this building should receive.
(Martin Ryerson to Rockefeller, 1925).
That the Islamic or Islamic-revival style was not used though it demonstrably had the
ability to incorporate diverse elements and to indicate strength and grandeur, and though it was
in fact used for other institutions in Egypt at the time, is indicative then of other biases. In a
letter to Rockefeller, Bosworth wrote that the building was designed to give it a "typical
Egyptian character while making it at the same glance look like a museum". 5 ' Breasted,
Bosworth, and Rockefeller use "Egyptian" to refer solely to ancient Egypt, particularly the
American garden, as befit a garden for patrons, father and son, whose business and cultural interests ranged no less
widely than their gardens' historical sources."
50 Ryerson to Rockefeller, August 24, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
Ryerson joined the Breasted-Rockefeller team in the capacity of an unofficial design advisor, after Bosworth had
already prepared the preliminary Beaux-Arts design. Whether Bosworth would be the final architect or not,
Rockefeller planned to use his illustrations to prepare the proposal book, and to sell the project. Rockefeller deferred
to Ryerson, who was a Trustee at the Field Museum in Chicago, in matters of architecture and style. Ryerson (and
Breasted) convinced Rockefeller to retain Bosworth for the final design.
5 Bosworth to Rockefeller, April 9, 1925, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
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temples at Karnak and Luxor. In designing the museum, the team had begun to think of defining
a new modem style for presumably this Egypt. Were they thinking of a 'national' style? It is not
clear. But whatever the case may be, the idea that the Islamic style and any variation on it could
be appropriate for Egypt, was discarded. In a letter to Breasted, Bosworth wrote that Walcot (the
draftsman) was thrilled at the prospect of a new architectural style for Egypt that would emerge
out of its ancient past:
He has grown to love the dignity & beauty of Egyptian architecture, in its
adaptability to modem requirements. If these buildings go through it will
have its effect on the architecture of modem Egypt & he thinks determine
its style.
Architecture
The new building... in lighting, planning, distribution of space and
methods of construction, is to be thoroughly modem. While this is true it
is at the same time to be Egyptian in spirit. In the words of the architect
himself, "it is to be given a treatment as to style-expression which relates
it harmoniously with what it is to contain, or as Viollet-le-Duc phrases it
in his definition of style, 'an expression appropriate in every respect to its'
s'." 53
use.
Breasted dedicated several pages to the museum's architecture, site, and circulation, and
throughout reinforced that the general aesthetic and layout were derived from these two
influences: modem requirements for science (scientific display of objects, good lighting, etc.)
52 Bosworth to Breasted, August 14, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Bosworth, box Cairo
Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
s3 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 23-24.
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and the spirit of ancient Egypt. The building's neo-Pharaonic influence was evident in certain
architectural or ornamental elements, but these were still included within a general neo-classical
aesthetic. This is particularly true of the Research Institute, which fits the mould of a neo-
classical institutional building, with its proportions, portico, front steps and general plan. To
relate it to ancient Egypt, the portico and inner vestibule merely incorporated Egyptian columns,
and a pair of sphinxes guarding the entrance (Fig. 17). That the neo-classical should frame the
ancient Egyptian "spirit" demonstrates the still-existing Greco-Roman bias of the larger
Breasted-Rockefeller team, despite the efforts of men such as Breasted to show the origins of
Western civilization in Egypt.
Plate I (Fig. 7) of Bosworth's design shows a bird's eye-view of the complex: the two
buildings are situated at the edge of Cairo along the Nile. The museum is the much larger
building; the smaller one is the research institute. The background shows an indeterminate
context, which stands in for Cairo. The building fagades (a hybrid of neo-classical and neo-
Pharaonic) engage the area in front of the museum and on the two sides, but do not engage the
rear. Courtyards perforate the mass of the museum building. The frontispiece provides the same
impression of airy outdoor rooms visible through the colonnaded zones (Fig. 6). The buildings'
exterior walls are surfaced with stone to resemble the architecture of ancient Egypt. 54
5 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 24:
"In harmony with the ancient buildings of the land, it is proposed that the exterior of the entire structure shall be of
solid ashlar stone masonry, not faced with stucco like most of the modem buildings of Cairo and the Mediterranean
world."
While connecting the museum to Egypt's ancient architecture, Breasted also dismissed the unfortunate and "tawdry"
stucco-on-masonry exterior finishes that were to be found in such buildings as the French-built museum. The
proposed building's construction method actually uses structural steel columns and I-beams in the roof and ceiling,
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The complex featured a riverside entrance, with ramps and staircases - lined with what
look like sphinxes - leading down to the water55 (Fig. 8). Describing the waterfront entrance,
Breasted once again referred back to ancient Egyptian architecture:
Like the great temple of Karnak the building will face the Nile (Plates I
and II), and may therefore be embellished with a landing embankment and
an imposing escalier leading up from the river to the main entrance in the
center of a front which it is expected will measure nearly six hundred feet
(180 meters). 6
On the street level, a driveway leads to a forecourt with steps leading up to a double-
colonnaded porch, composed of richly painted columns with ancient Egyptian motifs. In an
unusual move, the porch and inner vestibule have columns of the same height creating a grand
interior scale, which continues throughout the building.57 The scale (the columns are forty-five
feet high) is appropriate to the sculptures, but both eclipse the visitor.
and concrete walls and foundations, but with an understanding of the message that stone facing would send, both
Breasted and Bosworth chose to hide the structural system beneath the stone fagade. Here are parallels to
Bosworth's design for MIT. Before he was brought on board, MIT had considered a design proposal by the engineer
John Freeman. Freeman presented a complete architectural and engineering design for the university, but he was
passed over as designer. In his book, Jarzombek writes that Bosworth was inspired by many of Freeman's scientific
and technical decisions and chose to use them, but that he also understood the symbolism of materials. Where
Freeman advocated concrete surfaces, Bosworth proposed stone surfaces to symbolize solidity, presence, and
imperishability. See, Jarzombek, Designing Mit: Bosworth's New Tech.
5 This design feature is reminiscent of Bosworth's proposal for a similar water entrance for MIT, which was never
realized. See, Ibid.
56 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 24.
5 Bosworth was later hired by MIT once more, to create an entrance for the campus off of Massachusetts Avenue,
and here he reuses this feature: same height columns at porch and inner vestibule. See, Jarzombek, Designing Mit:
Bosworth's New Tech.
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In a move reminiscent of Dourgnon's museum, the visitor would find the following
inscription in the portico to one side, in Arabic, French, and English, "Erected in the Reign of
His Majesty King Fuad I." Perhaps the inclusion of Arabic and English was meant to contrast
with the Latin inscription in the French-built museum, which the local Egyptians were unable to
read, and to indulge the perceived "vanity" of the Egyptian King.
The plan consists of a main axis aligning with the river dock, the frontcourt and portico
on the outside, and on the interior stretching from the vestibule to the rear chamber of the
building, with three successive exterior courts in between (Fig. 14), featuring pools and desert
foliage. The pools are ringed by halls, which form the interior exhibition and circulation spaces
and act as transitions between individual courts.
Plate V shows a clerestory hypostyle hall, "suggested by the great colonnade of the
Karnak hypostyle" (Fig. 11). 58 The rear court featured graceful palm columns "reproducing
those discovered in the pyramid Temple of Sahure, the oldest colonnades yet known (2 8th
century BC)." 5 The use of elements reminiscent of ancient Egyptian architecture in this
'American' building and the absence of any elements or features from modem Egypt,
emphasized a dismissal of modem Egypt in order to create a link with ancient Egypt: a selective
view of Egypt's history and another tactic of legitimizing the team's presence in Egypt.
Symmetrically arranged on either side of the main axis - from front to rear - are two
small courts, separated by a larger court. Each side features an exit, which would relieve
58 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 25.
59 Ibid.
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congestion. Running in between each side entrance is a second (transverse) axis, linking these
entrances to the central courts on each side, and cutting across the transition space between the
courts along the main axis.
Interior Layout
In contrast to the existing French-run Cairo Museum, the New Egyptian Museum had a
very specific interior layout, which adhered to the strict chronological framework of the
development of man and the rise of Western civilizations, as Breasted perceived these. The strict
Beaux-Arts axiality and symmetry of the museum's plan allowed - or perhaps demanded - such
a clear and determined sequence and hierarchy. 60 Breasted prescribed two movements through
the museum (Fig. 41). In the first, the central courtyards and hypostyle halls (with architectural
elements reminiscent of the greatest epochs of ancient Egypt), would draw the visitor through the
building along the long, main axis from portico to the rear apse - the "holy-of-holies" 61 - where
colossal statues of the important Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh, Amenhotep III, and his wife
Queen Tiy would be placed under a vaulted ceiling, suggested by the temple of Luxor. During
the approach to the rear, the floor sloped up, placing the statues at a slightly more imposing
height, and slowing the circulation to signify that the visitor had reached the apex of ancient
Egyptian civilization (Fig. 13). This first axial movement - and the placement of the statues -
60 This could have been true of the French-run museum as well, which was also a Beaux-Arts plan, but this earlier
museum was too crowded with items and monuments to allow such a legible layout. Of course, lack of a clear layout
could also point to the difference in ambitions of Breasted and the French museum authorities.
61 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 25.
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resembles temple layouts such as those at Karnak and Luxor (to which Breasted continuously
refers in his letter) where the holiest and most sacred spot is furthest back from the front.
After this initial movement through the museum, the visitor would return to the entrance,
where he or she would then move through the museum in another manner, this time in a
clockwise direction, to get a sense of the chronological arrangement of the collections (Fig.
41).62 The visitor would turn left to enter a hall containing Stone Age artifacts, then proceed
toward the rear where he would find "monuments of the successive ages of Egyptian
civilization", until he reached the aforementioned sacred rear apse.63 In the preceding areas on
either side, he or she would find items from the newly discovered Tutankhamun tomb.
Continuing down from the rear apse, the visitor would survey the monuments of Egypt's decline,
enter the periods of Greco-Roman supremacy, followed by the monuments of Christian Egypt,
and then exit the museum. In this "exclusively Egyptian museum" there was no space for modern
monuments or monuments from Arab and Ottoman empires, betraying Breasted's scholarly
position and ideological view of the Near Eastern civilizations as part of Western origins. In his
letter to King Fua'd, Breasted presented a clear picture of this worldview. While speaking of the
West as the fortunate heirs to Egyptian ancestry, he wrote of surveying the development of man
from:
... primitive savagery to a highly refined culture expressing itself in
marvelous monuments and works of art, through a magnificent
culmination to a decline which eventually resulted in European
62 Ibid
63 Ibid.
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supremacy, and after the Sixth Century B.C. in European leadership of
civilization.64 [Emphasis mine]
Breasted is typically careful to present the project as a gift to science. How do we explain then
his decision to inject the above sentiment of boldly appropriating Egyptian antiquity in a book,
which was designed to sell the project to the Egyptian King? It seems to me that he wrote such
an emphatic and direct statement to 'remind' the Egyptians of Western right to Egyptian
antiquity. His use of the term "European" instead of "American" may have been a concession to
the book's future European audience.
Unlike the French-built museum, other influences to the design and layout of the New
Egyptian Museum are derived from requirements of scientific display, research, and efficient
circulation.65 In his letter to the King, Breasted repeatedly stressed scientific concerns and
64 Ibid.
65 Corridor widths, moveable wall partitions, the heights of the window sills (high enough for the placement of large
monuments underneath), side lighting, dark room and laboratory facilities, high ceiling in the basement (where
monuments could be studied and stored), all point to these scientific, practical concerns. We can see the influence of
MIT (and of the engineer Freeman) with regards to the scientific and technical aspects of the museum's design.
Freeman was influenced by Taylorist ideas of efficiency. His desire for natural light, natural ventilation, and
efficient circulation, as well as his belief in concrete and structural steel bones manifested itself in the final design of
MIT. The same concerns and influences can also be seen in the Museum design.
Contemporary museums in the United States were another important influence on the design of the New Egyptian
Museum. Well after William Walcot completed the presentation drawings, and at the time the proposal book was
being printed by Oxford University Press, Rockefeller instructed his design team to undertake a trip to U.S.
museums so that they could finalize and improve the preliminary design as needed. During this trip, the team
primarily focused on the technical aspects of these museums, such as lighting requirements, circulation, ceiling
heights, and exhibition display requirements. Accordingly, in September 1925, Bosworth, Breasted, Ryerson, Macy,
and Fosdick visited the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, the Field Museum in Chicago and the Cleveland Art Museum.
Breasted also managed to procure drawings for the Detroit Institute of Arts, by Paul Cret, which was then under
construction. At the end of this trip, Breasted reported to Rockefeller:
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requirements, and explained that though the exterior of the museum was neo-Pharaonic, the
interior was guided by practical concerns. In the proposal book, he tellingly collapsed the two
influences and called the museum, a "Temple to Science."
The Site
The removal of artifacts to locations outside of their lands of origins is one of the major
themes of Western imperialism with respect to Near Eastern archaeology.66 Removal,
transportation to Europe (or the U.S.), and installation in a Western institution required modern
technology, scientific know-how and financial means that the West possessed. Feats of removal
"Mr. Ryerson then expressed his conclusions on the leading fundamental questions involved in
our proposed building. I should say these points were the following:
1. Size of Building and Advisability of a Third Floor. The possibilities for the construction of a 3rd
floor were exhaustively discussed. Its inclusion had at first been favored by Mr. Ryerson. The
group favored raising the ceiling of the basement (calling the Ground Floor, as distinct from the
Main Floor) and making it fully available as exhibition space. On learning that this could afford
considerably more than twice as much floor space as the old Museum contains, Mr. Ryerson very
expressly approved omitting the 3rd floor, but favored roof construction strong enough to permit
later erection of a low flat roof house for preparators' studios, etc., if they should ever prove
necessary.
2. Disposition and Architectural development of exhibition hall space. With architect and engineer
both present, this discussion brought many valuable technical details from Mr. Dunn [engineer],
who was very valuable to the conference.
3. Style of architecture and materials to be employed.
4. Position and extent of offices for the Museum Administration Staff.
5. A large number of miscellaneous lesser questions."
Breasted elaborates further only to say that of the above, 1, 3, and 4 were settled, 2 required further study, and with
5, a host of minor problems would arise. What these conclusions were, we do not know. And so our architectural
analysis must remain limited to Bosworth's preliminary design.
See, Breasted to Rockefeller, September 13, 1925, folder JHB and John D. Rockefeller Jr. - 1925, box JHB
Correspondence with John D. Rockefeller Jr, Breasted Papers, OIA.
66 See, Magnus Thorkell Bernhardsson, Reclaiming a Plundered Past : Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern
Iraq, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
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were celebrated in written accounts, such as those of the French removal of an obelisk in 1831 to
Paris.67 Usually these accounts were accompanied by illustrations showing natives standing off
to one side, observing these technical feats. The power to remove antiquity from these lands to
the metropolitan centers demonstrated imperial might and imperial right to antiquity.68 The
theme of removal - in a few different ways - is at work in the conception and failure of the New
Egyptian Museum and Research Institute.
Physical removal was rendered impossible after Pierre Lacau's restriction of the flow of
antiquities outside of Egypt, around the time of the Tutankhamun controversy. This angered
Breasted who, like other Western archaeologists, hoped to secure part of the tomb's contents for
institutions back home.69 If Egyptian artifacts could not be removed to the imperial center, then
perhaps the empire could come to Egypt in the guise of a museum. The terms and conditions of
the museum project amounted to such a move. Picking up on an Egyptian government official's
suggestion that the collection should be sold off to pay the national debt, Rockefeller had
enquired of Fosdick at the beginning of the project whether this might indeed be possible.70 He
hoped that perhaps the collection (and museum) could be located in the West, where they could
be accessed more easily for research purposes. In the end, however, the museum remained in
Cairo, but where in Cairo is an important issue and leads to yet another notion of displacement,
this time with respect to the British, the French, and the modern Egyptian nation.
67 See, Porterfield, The Allure of Empire : Art in the Service of French Imperialism, 1798-1836.
68 See, Ibid.
68
69 See, Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941.
70 Rockefeller to Fosdick, October 28, 1924, folder 258, box 25, series 2E, RG III, OMR, RAC.
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Khedive Sa'id Pasha commissioned the Kasr al-Nil as a palace around 1854 and an
Italian team designed the project.71 During Isma'il's urban reforms in Cairo, a swing bridge was
built to the south of the palace, to provide the visiting French Empress, Eugenie, access to her
apartments on the Gezira Island for the duration of the Suez Canal opening ceremonies. A further
bridge from the Gezira to the West bank linked both sides of Cairo for the first time, providing
easy access to the Gezira. (Bridge access made the future proposed relocation of the New
Egyptian Museum to this site possible). In 1882, the British appropriated the site and turned into
a barracks, with a training and parade ground behind it (Fig. 42-43). In 1903, the Cairo Museum
was built behind these barracks and parade ground. In 1926, the Kasr al-Nil was the only British
barracks within the city, and though the British had entered into a legal agreement with the
Egyptian government to move out of these barracks into another location (the Abbassiyeh), they
were hesitant to do so apparently for security reasons. The site, with its waterfront location, was
ideal for military barracks. And Breasted and Rockefeller agreed that it would be ideal for their
new museum.7 2 The Breasted-Rockefeller team hoped to appear sympathetic to the cause of
Egyptian nationhood; by physically displacing British barracks and building over the site and
next to the existing French-run museum (rendering the latter obsolete) the U.S. team wished to
7 It was turned into an Egyptian government building and then an Egyptian Army headquarters, until the British
appropriated it as their barracks.
72 Throughout the museum negotiations, Breasted corresponded at length with his friend and colleague, George
Ellery Hale. During Breasted's first round of negotiations with the British, Hale wrote to him recommending that he
find another site - perhaps on the Gezira. Hale suggested that the Cairo Museum collection was not just in danger
from a lack of scientific know-how, but also from Egyptian "mobs" who might destroy it during potential future
nationalist insurrections. The barracks - in his opinion - were the only means of protecting the collection. He
suggested that the new museum be built in close vicinity of the barracks, but that it should not displace them. In
response, Breasted cited various reasons why this was not a feasible idea: the bridge connecting Cairo and the
Gezira was not strong enough for the transportation of antiquities, for example. But his real reasons were the
symbolic association with the barracks site.
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appear to 'help' the Egyptians in their struggle for nationhood by removing the two dominant
imperial forces in the country. To further demonstrate that the U.S. sympathized with the
Egyptian struggle for nationhood and independence, Breasted referred to the former country as a
"Great Democracy of the West." 73
However, the preference for the barracks' site also showed imperial ambitions. Perhaps
this was evident to the British, who may have refused to evacuate the site for this reason. The
idea of tearing down the barracks and building over them was strongly reminiscent of such
actions by new conquerors and imperial hopefuls throughout time, including similar acts by
ancient Pharaohs who built, rebuilt, tore down, and added to ancient sites such as Luxor and
Karnak. By removing British barracks and erecting the museum right next to the French one,
Breasted was trying to assert U.S. dominance over these two Western powers, in contradiction to
the apparent U.S. support of Egyptian nationhood. In its site layout, the museum turned its back
on to modern Cairo; it had no rear entrance and the urban context depicted in the illustrations
was indeterminate (Fig. 7). Instead, the museum faced the Nile in the manner of ancient Egyptian
temples and looked towards Giza with its famous pyramids. By proposing to locate the museum
along the Nile and giving it a waterfront entrance, Breasted was also making other imperial and
civilizational connections. He was thinking of the location of the museum vis-A-vis the ancient
ruins further down the Nile (Fig. 44). He imagined tourists on steamships stopping at the New
Egyptian Museum where they would presumably be indoctrinated in the U.S. version of
Egyptian history and civilization, before proceeding down the river to the ancient sites, such as at
Giza, Karnak and Philae etc. Breasted, of course, was not thinking just in terms of tourism, but
73 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 14.
rather with respect to making a larger, symbolic connection with past empires. For example, in
the letter to the King, he made a symbolic connection with Alexander and the Ptolemaic
Dynasty:
The first such institution ever founded by men arose on the Nile, - the
famous Alexandrian Museum. It is indeed appropriate that the capital of a
new and independent Egypt should now be embellished with what may
prove to be the most magnificent museum of modem times.
A Larger Ambition
The Research Institute, though a much smaller building than the museum, nevertheless
housed a large ambition. The Library is the key feature of the building; it is the main room on the
ground floor, facing the Vestibule and looking out onto the river, ringed by balconies at the top.
Invisible in the plan layout, but revealed in the water color perspective, are two sizable maps - a
large map of the Nile Valley with an East-West orientation covering one wall, and a huge globe
situated in the center of the room - both charged cartographic presences in the Library,
reminiscent perhaps of military command centers or palace map rooms75 (Fig. 19-20). In his
letter to the King, Breasted wrote of creating a cultural condominium, unconstrained by
geographical considerations:
74 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925), 22. This is strongly reminiscent of
Napoleon's representation of himself as Alexander, on the frontispiece of the Description just over a hundred years
earlier.
7 Jeffrey Abt makes a similar point. See, Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller
Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine, and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII
(1996): 173-194.
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It should be noted that its [Research Institute's] researches would not be
subject to hampering geographical or cultural restrictions. The terms of the
great endowment permit the extension of its investigations to follow the
lines of diffusing culture in all directions and if necessary into other
continents. In future generations, therefore ... the new Cairo Egyptian
Museum and its Research Institute seem destined to become a far-reaching
focus of scientific research in the ancient lands of the Near East as a
whole, including all the lands where the cultural ancestors of the civilized
peoples of the West once had their home.76
For a scientific man such as Breasted, the map and globe represented yet another kind of science
- that of geography and its "prime technology of knowing, mapping."77 In Siam Mapped,
Thongchai Winichakul addresses the map as a means of projecting control, not as a passive
medium that displays objective knowledge. Winichakul writes:
In terms of most communication theories and common sense, a map is a
scientific abstraction of reality. A map merely represents something that
already exists objectively 'there'. [But] this relationship was reversed. A
map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a
model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent... It had
become a real instrument to concretize projections on the earth's surface.
A map was now necessary for the new administrative mechanisms and for
the troops to back up their claims... The discourse of mapping was the
paradigm, which both administrative and military operations worked
within and served.78
The maps and globes in the research institute did in fact project and anticipate Breasted's
version of "spatial reality." The wall map in the Research Institute's library shows the ruins and
76 The New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute at Cairo (England, 1925). .
77 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press: Honolulu, 1994). X.
78 See, Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1994).
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temples of ancient Egypt. But the globe in the center of the room covers a larger area. One of
James Breasted's ambitions was to establish permanent field expeditions in every important
cultural region of the ancient Near East - an "empire of bases." All data and materials thus
gathered would converge "on the centralized headquarters in America" - the Oriental Institute.79
A key requirement in the design of the museum was that it should be able to expand. In fact,
Rockefeller's main objection to the Gezira Island was that the site seemed rather small for future
expansion. On the original site, Bosworth had reassured Breasted that the museum could be
enlarged almost indefinitely to the West, using a 'honeycomb principle.' The expansion that the
Breasted-Rockefeller team desired had two inter-related aspects to it; the team aimed to study all
ancient civilizations of the Near East, and to extend U.S. presence throughout in these lands,
through the Oriental Institute's "outposts."
In The Oriental Institute, published in 1933, we find a third map, which shows the
ancient civilizations of the Near East and the Fertile Crescent.80 In this map, Breasted was not
paying attention to the modem nations of these lands (the map did not reflect "reality"). Rather,
he was concentrating on the earlier civilizations and on the "cultural condominium" (the new
"spatial reality") that he anticipated establishing throughout the Near East, from his base in the
New Egyptian Museum (Fig. 45). Taken together, these three maps underscore Breasted's
imperial ambition.
79 James Henry Breasted, The Oriental Institute (Chicago, Ill.,: The University of Chicago Press, 1933), 81.
80 Breasted claimed to have coined the term, "Fertile Crescent."
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Chapter 5
"THE OBLIGATION"
Mural in the dome of the U.S. Library of Congress, showing a politically young but scientifically
advanced United States, at the head of all nations and civilizations, next to ancient Egypt, the
origin of civilization (according to Breasted).
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At a particularly trying stage in the New Egyptian Museum negotiations - when the
Egyptian government asked the Breasted-Rockefeller team for concessions that the latter was
unwilling to grant - Breasted reassured Rockefeller that a successful outcome would prove to
have been worth these difficulties:
All this is a part of the price we are paying for the privilege of sharing in
what I am more and more convinced is to be a powerful illustration of the
new mission of America and American civilization. Here in this ancient
valley where the men of the Nile first taught the world to use metals and to
build sea-going ships, the wealth wrung from a new continent by these
very means will return to its ancestral shores to raise a shining symbol of
western enlightenment and friendship.'
Reminding him of the originary significance of ancient Egypt, Breasted compellingly tied
Rockefeller's wealth and philanthropic obligations to his own vision of the United States'
mission. Despite encountering unexpected problems at every stage of the negotiations, Breasted
remained supremely confident in this mission, of which the museum would be a "powerful
illustration." By now we know that this mission had an imperial dimension to it. And we know
that on the surface, the mission was about the United States' scientific contribution to the study
of the ancient Near East: the place where science and technology first emerged. U.S. wealth -
Rockefeller's immense fortune - was acquired through science and industry. The U.S. and
Rockefeller would now repay their debt to ancient Egypt; this wealth would make its way back
to its "ancestral shores" in the spirit of international diplomacy and friendship. The museum was
to be the medium for the translation of private U.S. wealth into a diplomatic and cultural project.
Breasted to Fosdick, February 8, 1925, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
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Chapter 5 takes its cue from Breasted's quote and concludes this thesis with an analysis
of John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s role in the conception and failure of the New Egyptian Museum and
Research Institute. Breasted remains the project's key protagonist; his notion of the United
States' mission and its expression through the museum is demonstrated throughout the thesis.
But though he was the visible man on the ground while Rockefeller characteristically remained
in the shadows, it was the latter's money that would fund the project. And although it was
Fosdick who approached Breasted, we know that it was Breasted who instantly deepened and
widened the scope of the project, which was originally limited to repair work on the French-built
museum. What were Rockefeller's motivations? What did he expect in return for his gift? Were
his concerns primarily altruistic and diplomatic? Did he himself have an imperial ambition for
the United States? Did he share Breasted's vision? Or, was he following Breasted's lead? What
do the answers to these questions tell us about the United States' engagement with the Near East,
and their changing perception of it from an extension of Europe 2 to perhaps a new frontier for
the U.S.?
The excerpt from Breasted's letter to Rockefeller presents the U.S. mission as solely a
philanthropic, scientific contribution to the Near East. This same message was presented to the
Egyptians. But the larger correspondence in the archives frequently and forcefully belies this
view, as do the terms and agreements and the design and site of the museum - as we have seen.
The project was driven by an imperial and Orientalist approach to Egypt. Breasted combined and
resolved his imperial ambition and civilizing mission through Rockefeller's philanthropy.
2 See, John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis,: University of
Minnesota Press, 1963).
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I begin with a brief background of Rockefeller's philanthropy and motivations. I then
turn to his relationship with Breasted, who introduced him to Near Eastern studies. Through their
museum proposal, the Breasted-Rockefeller team proposed to significantly impact Egyptian (and
eventually Near Eastern) archaeology and politics. Therefore, even though the project was
privately conceived and funded, the team did take the U.S. State Department into confidence; the
State Department secured official introductions for Breasted's meetings with British, French, and
Egyptian officials. However, the team instructed the government to remain in the shadows, and
did their best to conceal any signs of U.S. government involvement from the Egyptians. 3
Why did the U.S. government support the project? Did it use a philanthropic project to
enter the imperial field in Egypt, which had thus far been dominated by Great Britain and
France? Or, did the State Department allow itself to be led by the Breasted-Rockefeller team's
purpose? Did it simply fall in line behind their mission? I analyze the relationship between
philanthropy and the U.S. government, as demonstrated by this case study, and will return to my
earlier question of the Breasted-Rockefeller team's imperial drive; where is it located and what
does the conception and failure of the New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute reveal to us
about this?
3 Breasted to Fosdick, May 16, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap,
box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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Rockefeller and Philanthropy
Raymond Fosdick wrote the official biography of John D. Rockefeller Jr., which was
published in 1956.4 Written by an intimate colleague and friend (and with Rockefeller's consent
and help) Fosdick's book can be considered a definitive source of information on Rockefeller Jr.,
whom Fosdick described as a man obsessed with using his vast fortune towards the well-being of
his fellow-men:
... Mr. Rockefeller emerged as a man of simplicity, modesty, instinctive
courtesy, and democratic tastes. More than that, he became obsessed with
the idea that the wealth which he had inherited must be employed to
promote the well-being of his fellow men; and in a long lifetime he
devoted himself to this purpose with constructive imagination and
undiscouragable patience.5
Indeed, the extent of Rockefeller's philanthropic work is compelling in its breadth and
importance. He donated money both personally and through his (and his father's) philanthropic
foundations: the Rockefeller Foundation, the General Education Board, the Laura Spellman
Rockefeller Memorial, and the Bureau of Social Hygiene etcetera. Through these organizations,
he concerned himself with promotion of research in the natural sciences and medicine, social
work, cultural work, and international diplomacy. The Museum of Modern Art was co-founded
by his wife, Abby Rockefeller, in 1929. Rockefeller provided the land on West Fifty-Fourth
Street in New York for its building. He bought and then donated the land along the East River in
Manhattan to the United Nations for their headquarters. After the First World War, he funded the
4 Raymond B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait, [1st ed. (New York,: Harper, 1956).
5 Ibid., 1.
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restoration and rehabilitation of the Rheims Cathedral, the Chateau de Fontainebleau and the
Chateau de Versailles, in France. Apart from funding the Oriental Institute at the University of
Chicago, its field expeditions, and the failed proposal for the New Egyptian Museum, he funded
the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem. Of his contributions to international projects,
Fosdick writes that Rockefeller was spurred into action by the devastation of the First World
War. He was interested in using diplomatic and cultural institutions (the United Nations,
museums) in " 'flagging the next war before it plunges suddenly around the curve to pile into us
as it did in 1914...' ,6 Rockefeller clearly understood the power of culture to influence
international relations.
Rockefeller was also spurred into action by events closer to home, such as the Colorado
mines revolt and the subsequent Ludlow Massacre in 1913, which resulted in a massive public
outcry against him and threatened to irrevocably damage the family's reputation.7 The Ludlow
Massacre refers to the events of April 20th, 1914, when a violent confrontation between the
Colorado state militia and the workers of the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company, who were striking for better working conditions, resulted in the death of a number of
workers, including two women and eleven children. The New York Times reported the Massacre
as follows:
6 Ibid.
7 Fosdick writes that after "the Ludlow massacre," as it was called, "the name of Rockefeller was denounced from
one end of the country to the other..." Twenty men, two women, and twelve children were killed as a result of this
massacre, leading to major investigations into Rockefellers, Sr. and Jr., and other industrialists such as Carnegie
Mellon, J. P. Morgan etc.
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The Ludlow camp is a mass of charred debris, and buried beneath it is a story of
horror imparalleled [sic] in the history of industrial warfare.8
By some accounts, the blame did not rest entirely with Rockefeller Jr., but he was the face of the
Rockefeller family. Recovering from this almost-damning event, Rockefeller took the advice of
an associate to heart:
It seems to me you will have to lead, have to be the example, whether you
will or not. Your modesty and your humility do not permit you to see this,
but those who have.. .your life most at heart see it, and it is in the field of
industry primarily that this leadership must be conspicuous.
Circumstances, for which you are not responsible, have identified part of
your fortune, part of your life, with Colorado.. .You can withdraw from
that field altogether, or you can make it an object lesson to the world, but
you cannot maintain an attitude of neutrality towards a single feature of it.
To make it to all mankind, the expression of your industrial creed, is, I
believe, the greatest service you can render to the world today...9
The Ludlow Massacre was perhaps the most violent event with which the Rockefellers were
personally associated. Mostly though, it was the idea of Rockefeller wealth that was held suspect
by the U.S. public and government leading to anti-trust charges against Standard Oil, the family-
owned corporation. In an effort to legitimize their wealth, and very likely as an example of what
the writer Eduard C. Lindeman calls, the "beginning of a rudimentary social consciousness by
the wealthy,"' 0 both father and son began to think of and find ways to use their excessive,
surplus income. In this, they were guided by their trusted advisors such as Raymond Fosdick and
8 New York Times, April 21, 1914
9 Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait, 159.
10 Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture (Harcourt Brace & Company, Inc., 1936), viii.
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Frederick T. Gates, and by academics and scholars in various fields in which they themselves
were not experts, such as the fields of medicine, art and archaeology.
Breasted and Rockefeller
Attracted as he was to the works of earlier cultures, it is quite unlikely that
Mr. Rockefeller would ever have ventured as far as the vast and silent
world of pyramids, temples, and ancient manuscripts had he not come to
know Dr. James H. Breasted, that brilliant and engaging scholar who
played so important a part in introducing America to the ancient Near
East.11
(Raymond Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait, 1956)
Breasted introduced Rockefeller to Near Eastern archaeology, and to the significance of
the ancient civilizations. Most Americans in the early twentieth century were not very aware of
the modern Near East or its ancient civilizations.12 Though Rockefeller was a sophisticated,
cosmopolitan man, he too was quite removed from this field. It took Breasted several years of
calculated and passionate campaigning to engage Rockefeller and his philanthropic foundations
in the history and study of these ancient civilizations. Part of Breasted's strategy was to
continuously and exhaustively demonstrate links between the ancient Near East and the United
States, between ancient Egyptians and modern Americans:
You are today one of the great forces in making social, economic and
industrial history. The very principles of justice and fair treatment which
you are so admirably applying in your present day work, first grew up in
" Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait. 357.
12 See, DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939.
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the minds and hearts of men in that ancient world of the Near Orient
around the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The noblest task in the study
of man, is to recover the story of the human career, which culminated in
the emergence of a religion of divine fatherhood and human
brotherhood. 13
Here, Breasted endows Rockefeller with the qualities of social justice, industry, and economy,
which were first found in the ancient Egyptians. In the process, he presented the modem
inhabitants of these lands as devoid of the qualities of their ancestors: qualities that show up only
later in "American civilization," 4 and American men.
Breasted, like the U.S. public, was keenly aware of Rockefeller's devotion to
philanthropy, international conflict resolution, social work, and cultural endeavors. He shrewdly
tailored his correspondence with Rockefeller to appeal to these aspirations and ambitions in his
patron. In writing that these qualities - social justice, morals, and religion - first grew up in
ancient Egypt, he was thus able to draw Rockefeller in.
Rockefeller's backing of the New Egyptian Museum as a private individual was essential
to the team's strategy for the project. In his letter to the King, Breasted mentioned Rockefeller's
restoration work in France to underscore the non-official, cosmopolitan, apolitical, and
benevolent contributions of the donor. By doing so, he tried to disarm the Egyptians. When the
project was made public, nearly as much attention was paid to the project itself and the Egyptian
government's reception of it, as to Rockefeller who had hitherto been in the background.
Probably, this was the most scrutiny he had ever received over a philanthropic act. Newspapers
13 Breasted to Rockefeller, February 16, 1919, folder 812, box 112, series G, Record Group 2, OMR, RAC.
14 Breasted to Fosdick, February 8, 1925, folder 261, box 25, series 2E, Record Group III, OMR, RAC.
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in the United States and in Egypt commented on his gift, and the public (both American and
Egyptian) sent in their comments speculating about what it all meant.
Rockefeller's image as a U.S. philanthropist millionaire worked to sway public opinion in
his favor, for the most part. Breasted and his son, Charles, compiled newspaper clippings from
Egypt, and sent them back to Rockefeller. They included only one dissenting op-ed as an
example of apparently only a very small number of nationalists who were opposed to the project:
Can a wealthy Egyptian venture to make such a proposal to Greece or the
Island of Sicily for instance? Or can our friends the westerners allow us to
restitute all the monuments and antiquities that fill the museums of
London, New York, Paris and Berlin? Those who are acquainted with real
facts know how those monuments happened to be in those museums and
what price was paid for them.
If this Haroun or any other thinks that by means of his money he can buy
the Pyramids or Pharaoh's obelisk, as it is possible to buy anything in his
country, then let me state, by virtue of my being the humblest heir of my
forefathers, that I totally refuse to sell my share. 5
The writer of the above piece, Gomas, saw the project for what it was, but most clippings
(assuming they are representative of the larger newspaper stories in Egypt), gave Rockefeller the
benefit of the doubt. The following clipping expresses trust in Rockefeller, but there is a
discernable wariness in the text:
15 Muhammad Lutfy Gomas, A 1-Ahram, Feb 24, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo
Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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And today Mr. Rockefeller, the great millionaire of America who has so
far offered 100 million pounds to the world, offers to Egypt a gift of 2
million pounds in order to start a new museum and an archeological
institute.
The reason why the Egyptian government has not yet made any final
decision regarding the matter is because of the terms made by the donor,
as explained in our local news today. The Government is afraid lest the
enterprise might add complications to the present ones caused by the
capitulations and other international problems from which Egypt is
suffering considerably.
But Americans are people of noble character. They respect the
independence and dignity of nations. Therefore we should not be
disappointed, but hope that Rockefeller will modify his conditions. 16
Breasted kept a clipping from "Al Balagh", which he described as the "most strangely
anti-foreign journal in Egypt," which nevertheless viewed the project (and Rockefeller)
positively:
... Our personal belief is that Mr. Breasted's statement, namely, that
Rockefeller does not seek any material ends, is true.
Egyptians also tried to grapple with the magnitude of the gift. The most interesting newspaper
article touched on the U.S. philanthropy, and suggested "psychological impulses" for the gift:
We shall not attempt to discuss the psychological impulses that drive a
man to spare a large portion of his wealth for what he thinks to be the
welfare of humanity after long years of toil and hard work. The
16 Editorial, "The Egyptian Museum: Rockefeller's Gift," Al Ahram, February 17, 1926, folder Cairo Museum
Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
17 Al Balagh, February 17, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo Museum Project
Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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discussion...is a question to be carefully analyzed by psychologists, not by
such a paper as this.'8
The paper then goes on to write in glowing terms of U.S. philanthropy:
This habit of making donations has become a national character of the
Americans. ...
What Rockefeller Junior is doing today, namely, giving Egypt ten million
dollars for the purpose of establishing a museum worth of the great
monuments dug out of the soil of Egypt, and building an archeological
institute, is only an instance of what he and other compatriots are doing all
over the world. We do not know of any country in the Old World that has
not received some share of the generosity of the citizens of the New
World.
... We venture to state that the recent awakening, educational, social and
otherwise, in the Orient is due to the tremendous efforts of these
promoters of generous ideas.
... It is a gift from a lover of science, and science has no home.
The above extract shows that Breasted's strategy to emphasize science and philanthropy, and to
underscore the fact that the gift was from the United States, was successful in some quarters.
The New Egyptian Museum and role of the U.S. Government
The Breasted-Rockefeller team wished to present itself to Egypt's government and public
as a private group, gifting a museum to Egypt and, incidentally, displacing the British Army
from its barracks - a displacement that the Egyptians strongly desired. But though the project
18 "Rockefeller's Gift and Obstacles in the Way," in Al Mokattam, February 17, 1926.
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was indeed privately conceived, it was more than just a gift. And to that end, the team did take
the U.S. State Department into confidence, but dictated the terms of its involvement and the
overall strategy.
The relationship between the Breasted-Rockefeller team and the State Department over
this project highlights the nature of U.S. foreign policy at the time, which was primarily guided
by the interests of the country's private interest groups, 19 rather than out of a well-formed foreign
outlook.
The private citizens in this case - Breasted, Rockefeller and Fosdick - had a political and
cultural vision worthy of governments. Most of the imperial ambition seemed to be generated by
Breasted. However, in an interesting letter to Fosdick, Breasted makes an unmistakable,
reference to both Fosdick and Rockefeller's vision of the project. Breasted had met with the
British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, in London in June 1925, to discuss the project.
He wrote to Fosdick of the case he had made for Anglo-American cooperation in Egypt:
I would like to mention...one aspect of the project in which I know that
you and the donor are especially interested. At Lord Balfour's lunch I
urged upon Mr Chamberlain the importance of Anglo-American co-
operation in our Museum project. The control of Palestine and
Mesopotamia, with its great ancient cities of Jerusalem, Babylon, and
Nineveh, which have been recovered from Mohammedan rule... by a great
Christian nation...all this, together with the extraordinary discovery of the
Tomb of Tutenkhamon, [h]as aroused universal interest, - caught the
imagination of all civilised [sic] people, and centred [sic] their thoughts
on the ancient Bible Lands where civilisation was born. I urged that, just
at this juncture, a combination of British influence and American
resources in these ancient lands.. .would work far-reaching consequences
among all English speaking peoples, and prove most effective in bringing
19 See, DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939.
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together England and America, as the people of both countries learn more
and more of the results of such an informal Anglo-American alliance ...
... Mr Chamberlain responded very warmly to this suggestion, and stated
that, as a matter of actual experience, America and England had come
nearer together in the outlying regions of the British Empire than
anywhere else, and he proceeded to gove [sic] a recent example in the
conduct of Anglo-American interests in Siam. A combination, such as I
have suggested, being completely devoid of embarrassing political
entanglements, is one that offers great possibilities, and a Statesman of Mr
Chamberlain's very practical turn of mind, found the idealistic aspects of
the arrangement supported by actual experience.20
Demonstrating unabashed racial and political supremacy, this statement shows that both
Rockefeller and Raymond Fosdick thought of the museum as a vehicle for establishing Western
control over Biblical lands, which were until then controlled by the Muslims. The concern is
categorically not with the modern nations, seeking freedom and independence. The project was
conceived of as a way of uniting the "Christian," "English speaking" nations of Great Britain and
the United States through a combination of British influence (Army) and American resources
(Rockefeller's money, Breasted's scholarship, and the Arabs' favorable view of the United
States) and ensuring that these lands remained militarily and archaeologically under control of
the West. Such an informal Anglo-American alliance would be less susceptible to "embarrassing
political entanglements."2 1
20 Breasted to Fosdick, June 23, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo Museum
Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
21 Perhaps Breasted was referring to the pre-War Chester Project in which the United States officially supported a
private U.S. bid to build railroads in the Ottoman Empire. The project was led by Admiral Colby M. Chester, who
believed that there were possibilities for commercial and industrial markets for the U.S., in the Near East.
Specifically, Chester was looking at the Ottoman Empire, where he planned to bid on a railway construction project
just prior to the First World War. The moment was opportune. The Ottomans were wary of the European powers
who were hovering above the Ottoman Empire, waiting for its imminent collapse. U.S. involvement in the area was
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The absence of any mention of the French is revealing. By suggesting that the United
States would uphold the archaeological end of the bargain, the Breasted-Rockefeller team
proposed to take over France's role as leader of archaeology. The British government seems to
have understood this. They did not object. However, probably aware that they were
compromising or violating the spirit of the Anglo-French 1904 Treaty, they declined to discuss
the project with the French. Instead, they asked Breasted to do so. The British seemed to be
taking advantage of the perception of the United States' as an apolitical entity in the Near East,
and perhaps they were themselves interested in removing the French from their position as head
of the EAS, and weakening French authority in Egypt. Perhaps they believed an Anglo-
American alliance was preferable and more advantageous than an Anglo-French alliance in the
changing world. Or, perhaps they were playing the French against the Americans to temper the
long established but declining power of one and the inevitable rising power of the other. In the
end, the BFO went as far as to suggest to Breasted that he leave France out of all negotiations,
suggesting that it would be better to present the French with a fait accompli.2 2
The team's extensive talks with the British Foreign Office in London were in contrast to
their dealings with the U.S. State Department, reflecting the particular nature of U.S. foreign
policy at the time. The team used the State Department only to provide an official stamp of
purely humanitarian until this point, and Chester hoped to take advantage of the United States' positive, apolitical
image in the Ottoman Empire, to win this project. The U.S. State Department took the unusual move (for the time)
of supporting this bid, but the bid met with an embarrassing end.
22 Breasted to Fosdick, May 16, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo Museum
Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA. Here, the U.S. State Department's advice to Breasted went
unheeded. The Department had warned him that if the British tried to exclude the French from this decision, "it
would bring about a combination of the Egyptians and the French to oppose the English and also ourselves and our
project."
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approval to their project for the benefit of the British, who cared about such formality. The
government's involvement was kept confidential from the Egyptian public:
It is true that the British lay enormous emphasis on official or unofficial
influence. Official influence or pressure of any kind is for a British
statesman a very different thing from a merely personal presentation, and
if the weight of the U.S. Government is behind our project it will in some
ways, of course, add enormously to our influence in handling the difficult
Barracks question and the problem of French relations to our Mesuem
[sic] project. On the other hand, our project derives a certain dignity and
strength from the very fact that it stands on its own merits and has not
become entangled in the meshes of political influence.23
The team devised an interesting strategy. They would approach control of Egyptian
archaeology from two ends. The museum was the visible offer to the Egyptian government. At
the same time, Breasted was working with the State Department through his colleague George
Ellery Hale, the National Academy of Sciences, and U.S. museums with a stake in the
archaeological field in Egypt (such as the Metropolitan Museum), to ensure Western control of
the Egyptian Antiquities Service by appealing to the British to apply pressure on the Egyptians,
so that a Westerner could remain in control of the EAS. The State Department was on board with
this plan, since the interests of private U.S. groups were at stake. As Hale wrote to Breasted:
The State Department naturally wishes to base all its representations to
foreign governments on the concrete American interests involved. They
therefore wish to receive resolutions from the Metropolitan Museum and
all other institutions and societies directly interested, pointing out the vital
23 Breasted to Fosdick, May 10, 1925, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence A, box Cairo Museum
Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
importance of having a foreign scientific man serve as Director General of
Antiquities instead of an Egyptian. 24
The statement is revealing because it clearly shows the unique relationship between the
U.S. government's foreign policy and "American interests," as they were defined by U.S.
scholars, institutions, and philanthropists. It shows how U.S. foreign policy in the Near East was
determined by American interest groups and by changing conditions in the Near East itself. Up
until the early twentieth century, the U.S. seemed disinterested in the Near East. The country's
activities were of a private nature limited to those of missionaries, colleges, some business
interests, and some cultural interests (such as the beginnings of archaeological work). The State
Department supported these projects but was uninterested in promoting them, or in involving
itself in the political situation in the Near East.26 It was the European century, not the American
century, and the Department viewed the Near East as Europe's domain.27 It only demanded that
its citizens and interest groups receive the same advantages that were shown to the Europeans.
State Department employees in the field, however, were often not very effective in securing
these interests, leading U.S. groups to turn to British officials instead, a situation that continued
into 1926 with the Breasted-Rockefeller team's close association with the British government.
24 Hale to Breasted, May 8, 1925, folder 1925, box Correspondence between George Ellery Hale and James Henry
Breasted, James Henry Breasted Papers, OIA.
26 Accordingly, it left the "Eastern Question" up to European powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire).
27 See, DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939.
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From 1900 to 1914, due to stirrings of nationalism in the Near East, the State Department
encountered difficulties in ensuring that its citizens received the same concessions as the
Europeans, but it adhered to its policy of non- intervention, with one exception which turned into
a major fiasco and strengthened the Department's resolve to remain in the backseat with regards
to the Near East. 28 Even when the nations of the Near East called on the United States to support
their cause, the latter sided with Europe, as was illustrated by Theodore Roosevelt's support for
British administration in Egypt in 1910.29
With 1919, the U.S. of course began to engage with the Near East, but it retreated rather
quickly at the end of the Paris Peace Conference. However, its brief involvement had created
pro-U.S. sentiments in the Arab world, which the Breasted-Rockefeller team would try to
capitalize on in the near future. In the meantime, the Department allowed itself to be led by
private interest groups. But perhaps because it had already engaged with the Near East, and
because it had developed imperial interests in other parts of the globe, the State Department
began to show more interest in Near Eastern affairs, than it had before. With respect to
archaeology, the Department seems to have used the interests of U.S. archaeological institutions
to probe and gauge the Near East with private money and minimum trouble for the government.
With regards to the control of the EAS, the State Department asked U.S. museums to
send resolutions to the Department, stating what they would like to accomplish. The Department
suggested that museums request "foreign control" rather than "European control," as it wished to
28 The Chester Project. See footnote 21.
29 DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939.
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ultimately see an American in power.30 Accordingly, Breasted sent urgent cablegrams to all
major museums asking them to write letters and most - especially those with archaeological
expeditions in the Near East such as the Metropolitan Museum - complied. The Department
displayed its naivet6 and limited grasp on the situation, when it suggested that it might have
better luck bypassing the British and speaking to the Egyptians directly. Breasted, however, was
politically savvier. He had traveled extensively in the Near East and he knew that although there
was good feeling towards the U.S., the country had no official power. He also knew that the
British army had to be kept in the loop. Accordingly, he encouraged the State Department to
cooperate with the British.31
Theories of cultural imperialism work on the premise that cultural or social incentives are
a more efficient, less confrontational, means of winning over a country and creating hegemony.3 2
Accordingly, empires or governments - such as the French under Napoleon - use culture as a
means of gaining foothold in foreign lands. Possibly the State Department perceived the
Breasted-Rockefeller museum as such a tool. But the Department did not initiate the project.
Since the project was conceived entirely in the private realm and without U.S. government
30 Hale to Breasted, May 9, 1925, folder 1925, box Correspondence between George Ellery Hale and James Henry
Breasted, James Henry Breasted Papers, OIA.
The Department did realize the difficulty of this goal in light of general scholarly respect for the French, particularly
Lacau's predecessor, Gaston Maspero.
31 Simultaneously, Breasted asked for introductions for the museum project. As it turns out, he did not need the
introductions. In London he was able to meet the British Foreign Minister on his own account, showing how deeply
he had penetrated the political scene in these countries. In Egypt, he did rely upon the American minister, for the
sake of formality.
32 See, George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, By Way of Basra," in
Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin W.
Moore. (New York, London: The New Press): 135-156.
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knowledge, in this instance of cultural imperialism philanthropy led the way. In a
groundbreaking work on U.S. foundations, Wealth and Culture, Eduard C. Lindeman researched
the unique culture of foundations and philanthropy in the United States. Looking at the work of
foundations from 1921 to 1936 - the first major proliferation of them - he wrote of their
importance in American life:
Foundation trustees wield a power in American life, which is probably
equaled only by the national government itself, and by the executives in
our dominant corporations. 33
Lindeman focused primarily on national philanthropy and foundations, but his observations can
also be used to understand the work of individual U.S. philanthropists in the international arena.
Foremost is the notion that the foundation is almost more powerful than the government in
determining which fields or areas of research are to be funded. We can deduce from this that the
foundations - and private philanthropists - led the way in local and international missions, and
that the U.S. government followed suit. In the case of the Breasted-Rockefeller team, the
foundation in turn was led by a scholar.
There are probably government archives that could reveal if the State Department was
merely following the Breasted-Rockefeller team or if it was using the team's considerable power
to strengthen its own position and to test the waters in the Near East. Archaeological institutions
and museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Oriental Institute, and eventually
the Breasted-Rockefeller project, had mobilized the U.S. State Department's involvement in
33 Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture (Harcourt Brace & Company, Inc., 1936), VIII. Lindeman analyzed the
Rockefeller-endowed General Education Board - amongst many other foundations - for his study.
Egyptian archaeology. Perhaps the government began to understand archaeology as a tool with
which to widen the political fissures in Egypt in 1926 for U.S. entry. Of the two international
powers in Egypt, the British were in a stronger position. Their Army was stationed in Cairo. The
French, meanwhile, maintained only a tenuous hold on archaeology in Egypt and on the
Egyptian Antiquities Service and they were easier to dislodge from their position. The Breasted-
Rockefeller team's project was based on firming up the western control of Egyptian Antiquity,
but they were also hoping to establish American dominance in the field. Much like the Egyptian
nationalists themselves, the team and the State Department, which approved of removing Lacau,
saw the British lack of control over archaeology as a way of making inroads into this important
field. Egyptian archaeology was then an arena in which both the Egyptian nationalists and U.S.
imperialists saw a chance to gain a foothold. That the project failed, demonstrated that the
Egyptian government was actually quite aware of its imperial nature from the very first.
-- ----- ---
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EPILOGUE
Mausoleum of Sa'd Zaghlul. Architect, Mustafa Fahmy.
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By withdrawing their offer in March 1926, the Breasted-Rockefeller team did not
irrevocably kill the proposal for the New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute. Two months
later, the team was evaluating the proposal's failure and tentatively considering the Egyptian
government's communiqu61 on the project and the changes that the government said it was in the
process of proposing when the gift was withdrawn.2 The team decided to conceal any obvious
enthusiasm for re-engaging with the Egyptian government over this project, believing that such a
tactic would tip the balance in their favor. But internally they had begun weighing the Egyptian
government's terms of engagement. The team relented on some points, but could not
compromise on foreign control of the antiquities. At about this time, the nationalist party
defeated Ziwar Pasha's government, and came into power. The new government apparently
expressed an interest in the project, 3 prompting Breasted to deem the nationalists 'moderate,' in
a reversal of his earlier position, perfectly illustrating the idea of local "collaborators" as a
changing group.4 Simultaneously, King Fua'd I approached the Breasted-Rockefeller team
separately through Charles Watson, the founder and president of the American University of
"[Egyptian] Government Communique on the Rockefller Gift to Egypt: (Translated from the French original,
appearing in L'Espoir, a Cairo daily, of May 1, 1926)," May, 1926, folder 258, Box 25, Series 2E, RG 3, Office of
the Messrs. Rockefeller (hereafter designated OMR), RAC.
2 Belknap to Breasted, May 15, 1926, Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap, Cairo
Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
3 Breasted to Fosdick, June 4, 1926, Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap, Cairo
Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
4 See, Ronald Robinson, "Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration,"
in Studies in the Theory ofImperialism, Eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972).
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Cairo. 5 Distancing himself from the ex-Prime Minister and highlighting internal Egyptian
rivalries, the King blamed the failure of the project on Ziwar Pasha.
At this point it is helpful to revisit the idea of "local collaborators." The team now
considered the nationalists as collaborators, as opposed to Ziwar Pasha. This prompts us to ask
why the nationalists wished to cooperate with the Breasted-Rockefeller team. Did they still hope
that the United States would live up to its promise as a 'benevolent' power, championing
nationhood for Egypt? It is certainly possible; welcoming a U.S. private interest group could
perhaps turn this hope into a concrete reality. The King's separate bid to the Breasted-
Rockefeller team adds another dimension to the political situation. Why was the King interested,
after his initial dismissal of the project, and why was he approaching the Breasted-Rockefeller
team, independent of the nationalist government? Did he wish to gain U.S. support and backing
for his position? Again, it is certainly possible. The King's indirect approach through the
American University of Cairo (another private U.S. institution in Cairo), and the nationalist
party's interest in cooperating with a 'private' group of individuals (as the Breasted-Rockefeller
team presented themselves to be), both point to the 'private,' 'cultural' dimension of U.S.
imperialism, in contrast to British and French imperialisms.
However, despite Egyptian attempts at re-engagement, and despite the Breasted-
Rockefeller team's interest in restarting the project, nothing came of it. The exact circumstances
5 C.R. Watson to Fosdick, August 11, 1926, RAC.
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regarding the final death of the project are uncertain. The main problem seems to have been the
team's unwillingness to relinquish foreign control of the antiquities.6
Probably the failure to restart the project stemmed from another development as well, for
which Breasted himself was responsible. During the New Egyptian Museum negotiations -
before the offer was withdrawn - Breasted visited Jerusalem, where he found another
dilapidated, dark museum in desperate need of replacement.7 He wrote to Fosdick, who believed
that Rockefeller might be interested. Accordingly, Breasted outlined a plan for a new museum
and research institute, but on a more modest scale than the Cairo proposal. In the spring of 1927,
after the New Egyptian Museum offer had been withdrawn, Rockefeller pledged $2 million for
the Jerusalem project, contingent on successful negotiations with the authorities in Palestine.
Rockefeller's willingness to undertake another such project in the Near East after the
fairly spectacular failure of the Egyptian project may seem surprising if it were not for the fact
that the Palestinian authorities in question were actually the British, whom the Breasted-
Rockefeller team did not suspect of any mischief in the Egyptian case, and with whom they
could presumably work easily. The British were much more firmly in control in Palestine; not
only did they control the military affairs of the country, they also controlled the domestic affairs.
Probably the more direct British control allowed for smoother negotiations, as well as a
less ambitious strategy on the part of the Breasted-Rockefeller team. The museum and research
6 Watson to Fosdick, March 6, 1927, RAC. See also, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-
Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt, Palestine, and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt
XXXIII (1996): 173-194.
7 All facts regarding the Palestine Archaeological Museum (now Rockefeller museum) are from Jeffrey Abt's
article. See, Jeffrey Abt, "Toward a Historian's Laboratory: The Breasted-Rockefeller Museum Projects in Egypt,
Palestine, and America." Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt XXXIII (1996): 173-194.
institute were combined in one building, designed by Austen St. Barbe Harrison, the British born
architect of the Public Works Department in Palestine. The building's design suggested a
"Romanesque sensibility" but with Arab and southern Italian influences, and was built using
local Jerusalem stone (Fig. 46). Similar to the New Egyptian Museum proposal, the galleries
were laid out in a chronological clock-wise manner, this time providing a survey of Near Eastern
history, starting with the prehistoric age and ending with 1700 C.E.
The Palestine Archaeological Museum featured both a museum and a research facility.
The director of the British-formed Department of Antiquities was the head of the museum, but
Rockefeller stipulated that an international advisory board (the Archaeological Advisory Board)
be created to advise the director, in order to maintain some form of international control over the
collection. The Board members would include all active, leading archaeological schools in
Palestine, of which the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) was a major player.
Breasted was a Trustee of the ASOR. However, it seems that the Palestinian government was not
asked to hand over its antiquities to this Board for any number of years.
The lenient terms of the museum caused some concern to Rockefeller and Fosdick. They
were not concerned about adequate care and protection of antiquities as might be expected if we
took their commitment to science alone at face value. Rather, their concern stemmed from the
politically incorrect difference in treatment of the Egyptian and Palestinian governments.
Fosdick wrote to Breasted:
8 If there is any rhetoric of appropriation of origins etc. in this layout from Breasted, I do not know. My focus has
been on the New Egyptian Museum and consequently, I did not study the archives of the Palestine Archaeological
Museum.
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We are treating the Palestine Government far more liberally than we
offered to treat the Egyptian Government. The reasons for it are obvious:
we can deal with the English in Palestine where it is impossible to deal
with the Egyptians in Egypt. However, if the Egyptian proposition should
ever be reopened, the terms upon which Mr. Rockefeller had offered to
contribute his money to Palestine, if publicly known, might seriously
embarrass the situation. For that reason it would seem as if the terms ought
to be presented by the English, and Mr. Rockefeller's contribution made
on the basis of those terms.
Lord Plumer (the British High Commissioner) was informed of this and, for the sake of
appearances, he made the (already agreed upon) proposal to Rockefeller, who 'accepted' it. The
museum was not completed until 1935 (due to an earthquake and political turmoil). It opened in
1938. Jordan nationalized it in 1966. After the Six Day War, it came under Israeli control. The
museum is now known as the Rockefeller Museum.
The Breasted-Rockefeller team's defeat in Cairo, but their easy passage in Jerusalem and
the difference in the degree of control they asked for and received in each case further
underscores the nature of this emerging U.S. imperialism. The imperial drive, as I have argued,
was concentrated in a private interest group comprised of an industrialist-philanthropist-
capitalist, and activated by a scholar and Orientalist. The Breasted-Rockefeller team approached
political matters with a confident and ambitious mix of corporate and scholarly approach, but
without any actual political experience pertinent to the complex reality of the Near East. They
sought to use cultural projects for the "political ordering of space" and for creating
archaeological (and as we have seen, political) "bases" throughout the Near East.9 Unlike the
9 Here we are reminded of Chalmers Johnson's notion of the "empire of bases," as mentioned in George Steinmetz's
article. See, George Steinmetz, "Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, By Way of Basra," in
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French, they tried to separate the control of archaeology from the Egyptian government by
creating a private corporation, privately funded, located outside of Egypt and unanswerable to
the country's government. U.S. imperialism was not a continuation of Old World Empires; it
adopted some concepts of Old World imperialism (particularly cultural imperialism), and grafted
these onto a totally new private, corporate system.
Breasted expected to succeed by the sheer weight of Rockefeller's money behind his
project. He did not factor in the shrewdness of the British and French empires, and the strength
of Egyptian nationalism and its wariness over such 'gifts,' no matter how much the Egyptians
wanted to compromise and work with the team. Additionally, in the inter-war period, the U.S.
State Department may have supported these cultural projects, but it did not have much authority.
Its outlook and ambition with respect to the Near East was still rather weak and tentative.
Furthermore, it had not followed through with the self-determination that Wilson championed,
thereby draining some of the Muslim goodwill towards the U.S. And, in the absence of any
military bases or real authority in the Near East, it made the Breasted-Rockefeller team
dependent on the British, who clearly saw the team's initial bid to move the army out of the Kasr
al-Nil barracks as the usurpation that it was. Rumors in Cairo attributed the failure of the project
to the British Residency. A government minister suggested as much to Breasted, who brushed it
Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. Eds. Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, Kevin W.
Moore. (New York, London: The New Press).
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off. 10 Breasted's dismissal of this possibility was another in a list of failures on his part to gauge
the situation correctly.
Cairo was perhaps a particularly difficult starting point. Breasted's incorrect, yet
confident, reading of the political situation handicapped the team. Breasted perceived three
political players: the Egyptian nationalists, the British, and the French, but only feared a Franco-
Egyptian alliance against the project and failed to see other shifting alliances. And, he failed to
credit Egyptian nationalism. The team's failure in Cairo and their success in Jerusalem
demonstrates that they were really only comfortable dealing directly with the British and that the
balance of power was still in the favor of the British at this stage in the inter-War period.
The successful Palestine Archaeological Museum was one of three 'afterlifes' or
'epilogues' to the New Egyptian Museum and Research Institute. In 1927, Sa'd Zaghlul, the
leader of the nationalist Wafd party passed away. His mausoleum design was marked by a major
debate. Should it be neo-Pharaonic or neo-Mamluk?
There was little precedence for the neo-Pharaonic in Cairo, prior to the New Egyptian
Museum proposal. During Isma'il's rule and in the subsequent colonial period, there were only
three examples of a neo-Pharaonic building in Cairo: a commercial resident block, the French-
built Cairo Museum, and a Jewish synagogue. In all three, Pharaonic influence was limited to
10 Breasted to Watson, May 26, 1926, folder Cairo Museum Project - Correspondence: Curtis Fosdick Belknap, box
Cairo Museum Project Correspondence A-M, Breasted Papers, OIA.
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ornamental applications,11 as it was in the design of the New Egyptian Museum. These neo-
Pharaonic elements were a Western import: Europe and the United States appropriated the style
and then introduced it into Egypt. Breasted's design for the proposed New Egyptian Museum
displayed the grandest use of such elements, and in 1927 just after the failure of the museum, it
was the most prominent such example.
The architect, Mustafa Fahmy, proposed two mausoleum designs: one was a neo-Mamluk
design, the other was neo-Pharaonic. Despite protests over the 'un-Islamic' character of the neo-
Pharaonic design, ultimately the style prevailed (Fig. 47), ushering in a brief era of neo-
Pharaonism in Egyptian architecture that lasted until 1930. Secular nationalist leaders
encouraged neo-Pharaonism in thought and architecture to unite the Copts and Muslims in the
Egyptian nationalist struggle. 2 The style emerged as a useful, neutral and unique metaphor for
nationalism: it allowed different religious groups to unite behind it, and it allowed Egypt to
differentiate itself from Europe and from the rest of the Arab world. Though the neo-Pharaonic
won out over the neo-Mamluk in this instance, ultimately the Egyptian base was ruled by pan-
Arab sentiments, and the country returned to the neo-Mamluk. 13
"1 Aly Hatem Gabr, "Neo-Pharaonic Architecture in Cairo: A Western Legacy," Medina Magazine (1998): 44-51.
Gabi writes, "The massing, rhythms and organization remain European, with Egyptianizing features included simply
to enliven the fagade. While the Ramses Street block bristles with Neo-Pharaonic heads and scarabs, these are
tailored to fit into a Neo-Baroque fagade that pays homage to European style... In each case, where the detail is
Neo-Pharaonic, its context and the reason fir its placement is classical. Even the details are modified in an almost
Piranesian manner to make them more European in character. The result? An eclectic European version of Pharaonic
decoration."
1 Ralph M. Coury, "The Politics of the Funereal: The Tomb of Sa'd Zaghlul," Journal of the American Research
Center in Egypt, Vol. 29 (1992): 191-200.
" Ibid.
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The publicity generated by the Breasted-Rockefeller museum just prior to the
mausoleum's design strongly suggests that the latter was influenced by Bosworth's design. So
the rejection of the museum, which was an imperial project, and the appropriation of the style
that it was imposing in Egypt, in the mausoleum of the nationalist leader - and through it the
modem Egyptian appropriation of ancient Egypt - can be seen as a moment of nationalist
triumph.
On June 18, 1953, Egypt became a republic. On November 12, 1953, the New York Times
announced that hotelier Conrad Hilton had signed an agreement with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the
President of Egypt, to build the first Hilton hotel in Cairo. The government agreed to provide the
site. Their pick: the Kasr al-Nil, the location of the British barracks and the first choice of the
failed Breasted-Rockefeller museum. Hilton hotels were conceived as "a little America."14
Conrad Hilton was honest about the profits he made, but he also believed that these hotels
promoted the U.S. way of life in countries most susceptible to communism after the Second
World War. The Kasr al-Nil remained the political site of choice for foreign intervention and in
the end a private U.S. project was built on the site of the British colonial barracks. (Fig. 48).
The failure of the New Egyptian Museum was therefore not the end of the story for U.S.
imperialism, the Breasted-Rockefeller team, Egyptian nationalism, Egypt-U.S. relations, or the
site. With the Palestine Archaeological Museum, the team succeeded elsewhere but with a more
moderate proposal, and the British succeeded in holding off U.S. ambitions for a while. The
"Annabel Jane Wharton, Building the Cold War : Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 2001), 1.
187
French succeeded in retaining control of the Egyptian Antiquities Service a little while longer -
at least until the Nasserist revolution. Though the Egyptians lost out on a grand new museum,
they managed to successfully defeat another incoming Western power in the only field they
could viably contest in: Egyptian archaeology. They translated this triumph in the appropriation
of the neo-Pharaonic style in their nationalist leader's mausoleum. However, after the Second
World War, the United States dominated international politics: its period of tentative engagement
with Europe and the Near East was over. The United States' ascendancy was accompanied by the
end of British and French colonial empires. Reflecting these new realities, ultimately, a U.S.
corporation did open its "base" in Egypt.
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Kase EINiI Barracks, Cairo, from the air
Figure 1: Kasr al-Nil Barracks, Cairo. The barracks were situated along the Nile and faced the
water. The French-built Cairo Museum is in the top right of the photograph, overlooking the parade
ground behind the barracks.
Figure 2: Photographing a rock stela, during the 1906-1907 Nubian-Egyptian Expedition. Photo-
graph taken by James Breasted.
Source: The Oriental Institute Website.
Figure 3: Stereograph from Egypt through the Stereoscope.
Figure 4: Stereograph from Egypt through the Stereoscope.
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Figure 5: Exhibit B, attached to the Indenture-Agreement. The
on Gezira Island.
Source: Oriental Institute Archives.
map shows the 'compromise' site
Figure 6: [Frontispiece] "Suggested Entrance Portico Of The New Cairo Museum Building Fac-
ing The Nile.
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth." Source: The New Egyptian Mu-
seum and Research Institute at Cairo (Proposal book - typical for all water-color plates, unless
noted otherwise)
Figure 7: "General View of Suggested New Cairo Museum Buildings Seen From Across The Nile
The Museum On The Right, The Research Institute On The Left. Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
,..Omar# so
Jail
SL
Figure 8: "Suggested Treatment Of Water Approach To The New Cairo Museum Buildings Seen From Mid-Nile
As They Might Appear At Ceremonial Dedication. Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
Figure 9: "Suggested Alcove Off Main Vestibule Of The New Cairo Museum Building.
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
*
'Wi
9.
t~it pa,
Figure 10: "Suggested Main Court In The New Cairo Museum Building Adapted For Out-of-door Exhibits
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
Figure 11: "Suggested Hypostyle Hall In The New Cairo Museum Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
Figure 12: "Suggested Rear Court In The New Cairo Museum Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth."
Figure 13: "Suggested Interior Of Rearmost Hall In Axis Of New Cairo Museum Building, With
Colossal Statues Of Amenhotep III And Queen Tiy. Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by
Welles Bosworth."
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Figure 15: "Suggested Sections Of New Cairo Museum Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 16: "Suggested Interior Of An Exhibition Hall Showing High Side-lighting In The New Cairo Museum Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 17: "Suggested Facade Of New Research Institute Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 18: "Suggested Vestibule Of The New Research Institute Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 19: "Suggested Library In The New Research Institute Building
Drawn by William Walcot from Designs by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 20: "Suggested Plan Of The New Research Institute Building
From Designs by Welles Bosworth"
Figure 21: "The Pyramids of Gizeh At Sunset
From a Water Color by Welles Bosworth"
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Figure 22: Aerial photograph showing Gezira Island
Source: Oriental Institute Archives.
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Figure 23: Suggested Site Plan of the New Cairo Museum Building and Research Institute at
Cairo. Probably Prepared by Welles Bosworth on the directions of Breasted. Breasted planned to
insert this map in the proposal book.
Source: Oriental Institute Archives.
Figure 24: Suggested Site Plan of the New Cairo Museum Building and Research Institute at
Cairo. Probably Prepared by Welles Bosworth on the directions of Breasted. This plan shows
the new buildings superimposed on the barracks. It was not meant for the proposal book; it was
probably used as a schematic drawing. Source: Oriental Institute Archives.
Figure 25: Bulaq Museum, courtyard. Source: Reid, Whose Pharaohs?
Figure 26: Mariette's arrangement of Ancient Egyptian artifacts. Source: Reid, Whose Pha-
raohs?
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Figure 27: Egyptian Museum at Khedive Isma'il's Giza palace. Source: Reid, Whose Pharaohs?
Figure 28: British Museum.
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Figure 29: French-built Egyptian Museum.
Figure 30: Egyptian Museum - Arch bracketed between two pylons.
Figure 31: Museum of Arab Art.
Figure 32: Greco-Roman Museum.
Figure 33: Coptic Museum.
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Figure 34: Map of museums in Cairo. Source: Reid, Whose Pharaohs?
Figure 35: Sultan Hassan. Figure 36: Sultan Hassan.
Figure 37: Muhammad 'Ali's mosque.
Figure 38: AT&T Headquarters. Source: Jarzombek, Designing MIT Bosworth's New Tech.
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Figure 39: MIT. Source: Jarzombek, Designing MIT: Bosworth's New Tech.
Figure 40: MIT. Source: Jarzombek, Designing MTT: Bosworth's New Tech.
Figure 41: Breasted's proposed layout / circulation. Source: By author over Proposal Book plan.
Figure 42: Parade ground near Kasr al-Nil, with French-run museum in the background.
Figure 43: Kasr al-Nil from the water.
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Figure 44: Map showing the relative position of Cairo (and the New Egyptian Museum) to the
ancient sites along the Nile.
Figure 45: Map showing Oriental Institute Expeditions.
Source: Breasted, The Oriental Institute.
Figure 46: Palestine Archaeological Museum, Jerusalem.
Figure 47: Sa'd Zaghlul's mausoleum.
Figure 48: Nile Hilton.
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